Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1919
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BROWN v. NEW HAVEN TAXICAB CO.

105 A. 706
93 Conn. 251

BROWN
v.
NEW HAVEN TAXICAB CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 19, 1919.

Appeal from City Court of New Haven.

Action by Theodore Brown against the New Haven Taxicab Company, in which defendant interposed a counterclaim. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals, while plaintiff files a plea in abatement. No error. Plea in abatement overruled.

See, also, 92 Conn. 252, 102 Atl. 573.

105 A. 707

Prentice W. Chase and Albert McC. Mathewson, both of New Haven, for appellant.

George W. Crawford, of New Haven, for appellee.

GAGER, J. This action was brought to recover damages for injuries to person and property caused by the collision of two automobiles at the intersection of Chapel and High streets, in New Haven. The plaintiff claimed the collision was caused by the negligent driving of the defendant's automobile. The defendant denied negligence, claimed contributory negligence by the plaintiff, and counterclaimed for damages to his automobile due to plaintiff's negligence. The plaintiff recovered a verdict, which the court refused to set aside, and the case comes to this court upon defendant's appeal, claiming error by the trial court in the refusal to set aside the verdict, and sundry errors in the charge to the Jury.

There was no error in refusing to set aside the verdict. It appears that the Intersection of these two streets constitutes rather a blind corner. The plaintiff was driving on Chapel street, approaching the intersection from the west. The defendant was driving on High street, approaching the intersection from the south. The plaintiff's speed was put by different witnesses at from 12 to 25 miles per hour, and the defendant's speed at from 6 to 25 miles per hour. The relative speeds of the plaintiff and defendant, and their reasonableness under the circumstances, became vital issues in the case. There were irreconcilable differences in the testimony as to the actual rates of speed, and their reasonableness under the circumstances, and also the conduct of the drivers, and these were open questions of fact for the jury to determine. Under proper instructions the jury did determine them in favor of the plaintiff, and a careful reading of the testimony shows that the jury might reasonably have come to the conclusion it did.

The defendant complains of certain portions of the charge to the jury. It is assigned for error that the court charged as follows, to wit:

"The defendant's servant knew, or ought to have known, that Chapel street was a much traveled highway, and that the probable condition of traffic on said street required a person driving thereon from a street such as High street to be unusually careful, and to operate his automobile at such a rate of speed, and to have the same under such control, that he could seasonably stop the same and avoid...