Brown v. New York
| Decision Date | 26 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case # 20-CV-6042-FPG |
| Parties | KENNETH BROWN, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, SUPERINTENDENT T. STITCH, ADMIN DEPT. S. DURFEE, SECURITY DEPT. C. YEHL, PROGRAMS DEPT. M. HILL, SUPERVISOR MR. CABRERA, LAW LIBRARY OFFICER JOHN DOE (1), (2), STATE INSPECTORS JOHN DOE (1), (2), JANE DOE (1), (2), THE COMPANY OF KAPLEN & SCHMIDT "ELECTRICAL", JOHN DOE (1), (2) (THE COMPANY OF COGENIC MECHANICAL), JANE DOE (1), (2) (THE COMPANY OF COGENIC MECHANICAL), THE COMPANY OF BETLEM HEATING AND AIRCOOLING (JOHN DOE (1), (2) OR JANE DOE (1), (2)), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
Pro se Plaintiff, Kenneth Brown, was previously confined at the Wyoming Correctional Facility ("Wyoming").1 He filed a Complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. ECF No. 1. He has also applied to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and moved for appointment of counsel, ECF No. 3.
Because Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), he is granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a), the Court must screen Plaintiff's Complaint. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A unless he files an amended complaint as directed below.
Section 1915 "provide[s] an efficient means by which a court can screen for and dismiss legally insufficient claims." Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court shall dismiss a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, if the court determines that the action (1) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Generally, the court will afford a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend or to be heard prior to dismissal "unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim." Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639 (internal quotation marks omitted). But leave to amend pleadings may be denied when any amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
In evaluating the Complaint, the Court must accept all factual allegations as true and must draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). "Specific facts are not necessary," and a plaintiff "need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555(2007)); see also Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213, 216 (2d Cir. 2008) (). Although "a court is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations," McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff was transferred to Wyoming on February 18, 2017 and assigned to the D-2 housing unit. ECF No. 1 at 3. The unit was "in very bad condition," and prison officials were in the process of repairing all the housing units, bathrooms, showers, plumbing, and lighting. Id. at 3-4. On September 5, 2018, Plaintiff was moved to the C-2 unit, which was newly renovated. Id. at 4. After two weeks in the C-2 unit, Plaintiff "started to notice the build up of what appeared to be black soot/mold on the bathroom ceiling" caused by inadequate ventilation. Id. (emphasis removed). Every time Plaintiff used the bathroom or showers he experienced "stomach aches[] and bad head aches [sic]" and his skin became dry and itchy after he washed his hands or face. Id. He also noticed "fungus" on his feet and under his toenails. Id. Plaintiff attended sick call and was given lotion and ointment for his skin and told to take pain medication for his headaches. Id. Plaintiff was given foot cream for the "fungus," which was not effective. Id.
On November 12, 2018, Plaintiff told Correctional Officer George that the inmates should not be living with the mold problem. Id. at 8. George "then got on the phone and called someone."Id. A maintenance crew was sent to the unit, but they did nothing for about two or three weeks. Id. at 5, 8. The mold continued growing on the ceiling and down the walls, the color changed from brown to grey to black and areas of the ceiling still had black spots as of March 1, 2019. Id. Plaintiff and other inmates attempted to clean it up but were told to stop and were otherwise not given any bleach or cleaning supplies to properly clean the mold. Id. at 5. In July 2019, inmates were temporarily moved out of the C-2 unit while moldy sheet rock was removed and the ceiling was redone, and inmates were then moved back into the unit. Id. at 13.
Plaintiff also states that windows in the unit needed to be repaired during this time period because cold air penetrated the windows in the winter, causing consistent cold temperatures in the housing units. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff further claims that, on November 12, 2018, Plaintiff "was [d]iscriminated against" by not being allowed to work in the law library as a Clerk, even though Plaintiff has a "legal Research Certificate to work as a clerk in any law library in the City and State of New York Correctional Facility." Id. at 9.
As a result of these conditions, Plaintiff experienced pain and suffering from physical injuries, including headaches and injuries to his chest and feet; medical expenses; and "mental anguish." Id at 11. Plaintiff believes he will continue to suffer for some time. Id. Plaintiff sent a letter to Superintendent Stitch and filed grievances regarding the mold in the C-2 unit showers and the denial of law library work. Id. at 5-6, 9, 20, 23, 26, 31. Plaintiff claims Superintendent Stitch never responded to his grievances. Id. at 5-6, 9.
"To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). "Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).
A. Defendants State of New York and Defendants Named in Their Official Capacities In this action, Plaintiff brings suit against the State of New York and multiple individual defendants in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment, however, bars federal court claims against states, absent their consent to such suit, an express statutory waiver of immunity, or valid congressional override of immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to state officials sued in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). "An official arm of a state enjoys the same Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as is enjoyed by the state itself." Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (). Plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities are thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165-67, n.14; Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 at 199-201. "[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Gaby v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Tech. Colleges, 348 F.3d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 2003). Accordingly, any claims against the State of New York and any Defendant in his or her official capacity are dismissed.
B. Defendants Stitch and Durfee
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to establish the personal involvement of Defendants Superintendent Stitch and Administrator Durfee. Plaintiff alleges that Stitch and Durfee were put on notice of the discrimination and mold, by way of Plaintiff's letter and grievances, and never responded to them or otherwise corrected the problems. ECF No. 1 at 6, 9. He argues Stitch failed to follow the Department of Correction and Community Supervision's ("DOCCS") own policies and procedures to clean and remove mold and that his inaction constitutes a failure to train or supervise subordinates. Id. at 6.
To establish liability against an official under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that individual's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; it is not enough to assert that the defendant is a link in the chain of command. See McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 2004); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, the theory of respondeat superior is not available in a Section 1983 action. Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). A supervisory official can be personally...
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