Brown v. Office of State Comptroller
| Decision Date | 29 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:15-cv-880 (SRU),3:15-cv-880 (SRU) |
| Citation | 211 F.Supp.3d 455 |
| Parties | Virginia BROWN, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF STATE COMPTROLLER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Claire M. Howard, Todd D. Steigman, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Josephine S. Graff, Ann E. Lynch, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, Allison P. Dearington, Jackson Lewis-P.C., Hartford, CT, Cindy M. Cieslak, Michael J. Rose, Fordharrison, LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Virginia Brown filed this action in Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, against the Office of the State Comptroller, individuals within the Comptroller's Office, the State Employees Retirement Commission ("SERC"), and individual members of SERC. The defendants removed the case to this court on June 9, 2015. In her initial complaint, Brown alleged that she was retaliated against on account of speech protected by the First Amendment and Connecticut Constitution. On December 10, 2015, I held a hearing on the defendants' motions to dismiss and dismissed the action. I permitted Brown to file an amended complaint, which she filed on January 15, 2016. In the Amended Complaint, Brown focuses her allegations against only two individuals, Brenda Halpin and Linda Yelmini, and the State of Connecticut. On February 12, 2016, Yelmini filed a motion to dismiss. On February 29, 2016, the State and Halpin followed with their respective motions to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, Yelmini's motion to dismiss (doc. # 97) is granted, and the joint motion to dismiss brought by Halpin and the State of Connecticut (doc. # 98) is denied.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is designed "merely to assess the legal feasibility of a complaint, not to assay the weight of evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc. , 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli , 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980) ).
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, and decide whether it is plausible that plaintiffs have a valid claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Leeds v. Meltz , 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996).
Under Twombly , "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (). The plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal obligates the plaintiff to "provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief" through more than "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quotation marks omitted). Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claims] is improbable, and ... recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quotation marks omitted).
Beginning on September 21, 2012, Virginia Brown was employed by the State of Connecticut as a "Staff Attorney II." Her duty was to provide legal services to the Comptroller's Retirement Services Division ("Division") and the State Employees Retirement Commission ("SERC"). At all relevant times, Brown was supervised by Brenda Halpin, the director of the Division.
Beginning in October 2012, Brown discovered that the State Employees Retirement System ("SERS") was not being administered in accordance with its written terms. Brown believed that the improper administration was in violation of state and federal law, and reported the alleged misconduct to her supervisors. Brown also prepared legal memoranda that identified the mismanagement of SERS and disclosed the possibility that such mismanagement was in violation of state and federal law. Upon seeing her memoranda, Deputy Comptroller Martha Carlson instructed Brown to alter her memoranda in a manner that would, inter alia, replace certain accurate factual statements with false statements in an attempt to conceal the Comptroller's practice of awarding benefits to retirees, including certain politically connected employees, who were not entitled to the benefits. Subsequently, other members of the Division, including Halpin, instructed Brown to alter her legal memoranda, and Brown refused each of their requests. Brown also alleges that Yelmini, a SERC trustee, instructed her to alter her legal memoranda.
Finding that her superiors were not receptive to her grievances, Brown reported the alleged misconduct to the State of Connecticut Office of the Auditors of Public Accounts (the "Auditors"). Brown made substantially the same disclosures to the Auditors that she had made to Comptroller employees. In December 2013, Brown took the additional step of filing a whistleblower complaint in accordance with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4–61dd, in which she disclosed corruption, unethical practices, and violations of state and federal law.
Brown alleges that both Halpin and Yemini were aware of Brown's repeated efforts to disclose what she believed to be the improper administration of the State retirement system. Further, Brown alleges that Haplin and Yelmini both participated in, and were aware of others' attempts to force Brown to alter her legal memoranda in a false and misleading manner.
Subsequent to her reports to the Auditors and refusals to alter her legal memoranda, Brown alleges that she was retaliated against by both Halpin and Yelmini. Brown contends that Halpin and Yelmini both took action to eliminate her core job duties and isolate her from her colleagues and staff, and were responsible for the issuance of negative service ratings, including a letter of counseling. In November 2014, Brown was notified that her position was being eliminated and she was given the option to transfer to another State agency. She accepted the opportunity to transfer and then filed the instant action, which was removed to this court on June 9, 2015.
On December 10, 2015, I held a motion hearing and ruled from the bench, dismissing all of Brown's federal and state claims against five individual defendants, the Comptroller's Office, and SERC. In permitting Brown to amend her complaint, I instructed her to clarify her allegations regarding which portion of her speech was protected and which defendant did what action that constitutes a violation of her federal and/or state law rights. In her Amended Complaint, filed on January 15, 2016, Brown brings both federal (42 U.S.C. § 1983 ) and state law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31–51q ) claims against the State of Connecticut, Halpin, and Yelmini. Brown alleges that she was retaliated against for engaging in speech that was protected by either the First Amendment or the Connecticut Constitution.
Though Brown's complaint is still lengthy and vague at times, she has narrowed her claims and provided more detail to her allegations. Brown's allegations remain centered around the manner in which the Division and SERC were applying the law governing Connecticut state disability and retirement benefits. Brown complains that she engaged in two types of protected speech: (1) she reported the alleged misconduct to the Auditors; and (2) she refused to alter her legal memoranda in a manner that would cause her to make false statements and issue knowingly false and erroneous legal memoranda.
The major difference between Brown's initial complaint and the amended version is that the Amended Complaint makes clear that she is alleging intentional unlawful conduct rather than a mere disagreement with her supervisors over the correct application of a legal standard. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 31, 36, 37, 39, 58. Rather than alleging that there was a dispute over the correct application of the legal standard, Brown now contends that the defendants "ordered Plaintiff to make materially false factual statements ...," Am. Compl. at ¶ 58, and "instructed Plaintiff to change the documents she prepared in ways that would have (a) concealed facts reflecting the improper administration, and (b) replaced certain accurate factual statements contained in the documents with false statements ...," Am. Compl. at ¶ 36.
Similarly, Brown clarifies that her reports to the Auditors included reports of violations of state and federal law. Am. Compl. at ¶ 64. She alleges that reporting to the Auditors was not part of her ordinary job duties and that, in fact, she had never communicated with the Auditors prior to her first disclosure of the alleged wrongful conduct on July 30, 2013. After that date, Brown continued to disclose alleged "corruption; unethical practices; [and] violation of state laws and federal tax laws" to the Auditors. Am. Compl. at ¶ 102.
Defendants move to dismiss the First Amendment claim, brought against the Halpin and Yelmini, on largely the same grounds. First, defendants argue that any of Brown's alleged complaints to the Auditors were made pursuant to her official duties and thus are unprotected under Garcetti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). Second, defendants dispute Brown's allegation that she was forced to make "materially false statements." Defendants argue that the dispute at...
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