Brown v. Pa. Higher Educ. Agency
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-979 (CKK) |
| Parties | Shuntay Antonio Brown, Plaintiff, v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Agency et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
This pro se action brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act was removed from D.C. Superior Court by Trans Union, LLC. See Not. of Removal [Dkt. # 1]. In addition to the three major credit reporting bureaus, namely Trans Union; Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian"); and Equifax Information Solutions, Inc. ("Equifax"), plaintiff has sued the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") (collectively the "Federal Defendants"); the D.C. Housing Authority ("DCHA" or "Housing Authority"); and the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency ("PHEAA").
Pending before the Court are the fully briefed motions to dismiss of Equifax [Dkt. # 36], PHEAA [Dkt. # 38], DCHA [Dkt. # 60], and the Federal Defendants [Dkt. # 65]. Each motion seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1 For the reasons explained below, the Court will (1) grant the motions of PHEAA and DCHA to dismiss with prejudice, (2) grant without prejudice themotions of Equifax and the Federal Defendants' to dismiss, and (3) deny all of plaintiff's sundry motions.
In the operative complaint filed in Superior Court on April 3, 2019, plaintiff invokes the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). He claims only that "defendants are refusing to report true information under the FCRA credit dispute regarding domestic violence under VAWA and FCRA."2 Compl. at 1 [Dkt. # 1-2].3 Plaintiff does not allege supporting facts nor seek a cognizable remedy. See id. (). Yet, on April 8, 2019, Trans Union removed the case to this court based on federal question jurisdiction. See Not. of Removal ¶ 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (). At that time, according to Trans Union, no other "named Defendants" had been served with process, but it was able to obtain Experian's consent because Experian was "aware of this litigation[.]"4 Not. of Removal ¶ 5.
According to PHEAA, plaintiff "is a federal student loan borrower who until [July 3, 2019] had several loans serviced by PHEAA, a federal student loan servicer doing business as FedLoan Servicing." PHEAA's Mem. of P. & A. ("Mem.") at 1 [Dkt. # 38-1] . On February 26, 2019, plaintiff "filed two credit dispute forms with PHEAA, alleging that his student loan debt was either discharged in bankruptcy or suspended due to disability." Id. On March 14, 2019, PHEAA informed plaintiff that contrary to his belief, "his student loans were not discharged in bankruptcy, . . . but that [it had] received a consolidation payment on March 13, 2019 that had the effect of combining [plaintiff's] prior loans into a new loan, and making the prior loans as paid in full." Id. at 1-2 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).5 PHEAA then "furnished" to the credit reporting agencies information that "correctly reflects that [plaintiff's] prior loans are considered paid in full as a result of his loanconsolidation." Id. at 2; see Compl. Ex. B at 61-79 (); Compl. Ex. C at 95 ().
A party may move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although dismissals with prejudice are disfavored, a "dismissal with prejudice is warranted . . . when a trial court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency." Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations in the operative complaint, but "not . . . the plaintiff's legal conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Court may consider not only "the facts alleged in the complaint" but also "documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated byreference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice." Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Pro se pleadings are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), but still they must satisfy the minimal requirement of alleging sufficient "factual matter" to permit a court "to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]" Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff mentions VAWA, which was enacted "to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence . . . by establishing a Federal civil cause of action for victims of crime of violence motivated by gender." 34 U.S.C. § 12361(a) (formally 42 U.S.C. § 13981)). Although plaintiff has not specified which defendant is subject to the VAWA, the Housing Authority "implements VAWA in several ways, including the adoption of an Emergency Transfer Plan for victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault or stalking."6 Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of DCHA's Mot. to Dismiss at 6 [Dkt. # 60] (citing 14 DCMR § 4907,14 DCMR §§ 8500 et seq.; 24 CFR § 5.2005(e)); see generally Compl. Ex. A, (HUD's "Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 Guidance") [Dkt. # 1-2 at 8-59].
Apart from the fact that plaintiff has alleged no coherent set of facts to establish his standing to sue under the VAWA, the Supreme Court has deemed unconstitutional the provision that creates a private cause of action, 34 U.S.C. § 12361(c). In United States v. Morrison, the Court "consider[ed] the constitutionality of [then-numbered] 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence." It concluded:
Petitioner's [ ] complaint alleges that she was the victim of a brutal assault. But Congress' effort in § 13981 to provide a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy for the conduct of [the] respondent[.] But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States.
529 U.S. 598, 601-02, 627 (2000).7 Consequently, plaintiff's VAWA claim is dismissed.
"Congress enacted [the] FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy." Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (citations omitted). To that end, the FCRA imposes limitations and duties on furnishers of information, and it creates liability for certain violations. Id. at 53 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681o, 1681n).
Under the FCRA, "[a] person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate."8 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A). In addition, "[a] person shall not furnish information relating to a consumer to any consumer reporting agency if . . . the person has been notified by the consumer . . . that the specific information is inaccurate; and . . . the information is, in fact, inaccurate." Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(B). Both these obligations arise under Section 1681s-2(a) of Title 15, but there is no private right of action for violations of this section. Haynes v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 825 F. Supp. 2d 285, 295 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing §§ 1681s(c)(1)(B), 1681s-2(c)-(d) (); see also SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp, 652 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2011) ().
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), upon being notified by a credit reporting agency of a dispute as to the accuracy of its information, the...
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