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Ex parte Patsy Pattern d/b/a Korner Store
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
Bibb Circuit Court, CV-06-152;Court of Civil Appeals, 2070810
SHAW, Justice.
Lana T. Brown, the plaintiff below, sued Patsy Patton d/b/a Korner Store ("Korner Store") seeking worker'scompensation benefits. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Korner Store, and Brown appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. That court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Brown v. Patton, [Ms. 2070810, April 17, 2009] ___ So. 3d (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). Korner Store petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and render a judgment in favor of Korner Store.
Facts and Procedural History Korner Store operated a gas station/convenience store where Brown worked as a cashier. One day, while on duty, Brown walked to the store's deli counter to refill her coffee cup. When Brown began walking back to the front of the store, she inexplicably fell, breaking her wrist. Brown subsequently filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits, which Korner Store denied because, it contended, Brown's fall was eitherattributable to an idiopathic characteristic1 or was due to some unexplained, but not work-related, cause.
Brown filed an action seeking worker's compensation benefits; Korner Store moved for a summary judgment. Relying on the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 830 So. 2d 741, 746 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), which held, on markedly similar facts, that, because the employee was unable to identify a work-related cause for her fall, "the evidence in the record [did] not support a conclusion that [the employee's] injury arose out of her employment" and did not, therefore, entitle her to worker's compensation benefits, the trial court granted Korner Store's summary-judgment motion.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that this Court's decision in Ex parte Byrom, 895 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 2004),
"deemed controlling language contained in a footnote in Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., 680 So. 2d 262 (Ala. 1 996), to the effect that an employee who claims to have been injured by 'a sudden and traumatic external event' that would constitute 'an "accident" in the colloquial sense' need only, in order to demonstrate legal causation, 'produce substantial evidence tending to show that the alleged "accident" occurred' (680 So. 2d at 266 n. 3). "
Brown, ___So. 3d at___. Based upon the foregoing rationale, the Court of Civil Appeals "conclude[d] that substantial evidence was presented tending to show that [Brown's] accident was one that arose out of her employment." _ So. 3d at
Korner Store petitioned this Court for certiorari review, which this Court granted.
Ex parte Nathan Rodgers Constr., Inc., 1 So. 3d 46, 49 (Ala. 2 00 8).
In its opinion in Brown, the Court of Civil Appeals correctly noted that causation under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1 97 5 ("the Act"), was at issue in this case:
"Under §§ 25-5-51 and 25-5-77 (a), Ala. Code 1975, taken together, an employer must pay compensation for, and provide medical benefits as to, its employee's injury that is caused by 'an accident arising out of and in the course of [his or her] employment' without regard to the negligence of the employer or the employee. There is no dispute that the employee's accident occurred 'in the course of her employment, i.e., within the period of employment at a place where the employee would reasonably be and while she was reasonably fulfilling employment duties or engaged in doing something incident to it. Rather, the issue presented is whether the employee's accident arose out of her employment, i.e., whether there was 'a causal relationship between the injury and the employment. ' Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pettus, 623 So. 2d 313, 314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).
"The principal 'fault line' that has been revealed by the application of the 'arising out of requirement by Alabama courts is the distinction between accidents that are at least partially attributable to an affirmative employment contribution and those that are attributable solely to what are called 'idiopathic' factors, a term that 'refers to an employee's preexisting physical weakness or disease' that is '"peculiar to the individual"' employee. Ex parte Patterson, 561 So. 2d 236, 238 n.2 (Ala. 1 990). Thus, a fall may, under the appropriate circumstances, properly be deemed an accident arising out of employment.... In contrast, a fall may, under the appropriatecircumstances tending to show an idiopathic factor, not be an accident arising out of employment.... _ "In [Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.] Morgan, [83 0 So. 2d 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002),] this court reversed a judgment that had been entered in favor of a retail cashier seeking benefits under the Act under factual circumstances similar to those present in this case. After citing various cases in which this court had considered the 'arising out of' element of compensability, we concluded in Morgan that because the cashier did not know what had caused her to lose her balance and had admitted that the workplace probably had nothing to do with the accident in which she was injured, no substantial evidence supported the proposition that the cashier's injury arose out of her employment...."
Brown, ___So. 3d at___. As noted above, the trial court determined that Morgan controlled in this case and that it mandates a judgment in favor of Korner Store. However, the Court of Civil Appeals held that, after Morgan was decided, the law regarding causation changed:
"Just over two years after Morgan was decided, the Alabama Supreme Court issued its decision in Ex parte Byrom, 895 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 2004). In Byrom, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that an automotive-service manager who had been injured while using a telephone during an electrical storm by an electrical surge stemming from a bolt of lightning had suffered an 'accidental' injury. Most pertinently, Byrom deemed controlling language contained in a footnote in Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc., 680 So. 2d 262 (Ala. 1996), to the effect that an employee who claims to have been injured by 'a sudden and traumatic external event' that would constitute 'an "accident"' in the colloquial sense need only, in order to demonstrate
legal causation, 'produce substantial evidence tending to show that the alleged "accident" occurred' (680 So. 2d at 266 n.3). In the words of Byrom, Trinity 'does not reguire proof beyond the fact of the accident itself that the accident arose out of the employee's employment.' 895 So. 2d at 947 (emphasis added).
"That Byrom has significantly altered the post-Morgan legal landscape is a fact that has not been lost upon at least one judge of this court, whose special opinion in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Muilenburg, 990 So. 2d 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2 00 8), illustrates the effect of Byrom:
"'In this case, as in Byrom, the employee is claiming that he was injured in an "accident." The record contains various versions of how this "accident" happened, but it is undisputed that while working the employee unexpectedly fell, immediately and severely injuring his left leg. Having proven that he had sustained an "accident" while working, the employee, according to Byrom, did not need to prove any additional facts in order to satisfy the "arisina-out-of-the-emplovment" requirement.
"'I fully recognize that Byrom did not involve an injury caused by a fall. However, the holding of Byrom is phrased so broadly that I can conclude only that the supreme court intended that it would apply to all "accidental" injuries. I am also fully aware that a line of decisions from this court that were issued before Byrom rejected a legal test similar to the one adopted in Byrom when determining whether an injury suffered as the result of a fall is compensable. See Casteel ex rel. Johnson v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 860 So 2d 3 4 8 (. Civ. App. 2003); Pittsburg &Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Rubley, 882 So. 2d 335 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (accord); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 830 So. 2d 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); and Slimf old Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 417 So. 2d 199 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981), writ quashed, Ex parte Martin, 417 So. 2d 203 (Ala. 1982) (declining to use "but-for" test to determine compensability of fall at work). Although I agree totally with the reasoning in those cases, and although I disagree totally with the analysis used in Byrom, unless and until our supreme court overrules it, this court must follow Byrom. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-16.'
" 990 So. 2d at 44 0 (Moore, J., concurring in the result). Thus, as Judge Moore has intimated, Byrom eliminates any requirement that might have been applied in Mo rgan to require an employee who falls at work, such as the employee in this case, to show legal causation beyond
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