Brown v. Randle & Garvin Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1943
• Docket Number: No. 53.,53.
• Citation: 32 A.2d 104
• Parties: BROWN et al. v. RANDLE & GARVIN, Inc., et al.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

32 A.2d 104

BROWN et al.

v.RANDLE & GARVIN, Inc., et al.

No. 53.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

March 8, 1943.

Appeal from the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Division.

Suits by Melvin O. Brown, Mrs. Melvin O. Brown, Raymond F. Perry and others against Randle & Garvin, Inc., and District of Columbia for damages on account of allegedly improper sewer repairs, which were consolidated. From an order striking out of complaint in each case, item of damages for ‘annoyance, inconvenience and mental suffering $500’ as to the District of Columbia only, the plaintiffs appeal. On motion to dismiss appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

[1] Unlike the U. S. Court of Appeals for this District, ¹ we have no power to entertain special appeals nor discretionary power with reference to interlocutory orders. Our statute ² provides: ‘Sec. 7(a) Any party aggrieved by any final order or judgment of The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, as created by this Act, or of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia, may appeal therefrom as of right to The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Appeals may also be taken to said court as of right from all interlocutory orders of The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia whereby the possession of property is changed or affected such as orders dissolving writs of attachment and the like’.

The orders appealed from are obviously not included in the language, ‘interlocutory orders * * * whereby the possession of property is changed or affected such as orders dissolving writs of attachment and the like’; nor, of course, can they be said to be ‘final orders or judgments' so as to be embraced in the class of appeals over which we have general jurisdiction.

Even giving it a liberal construction ³ we cannot extend the language of the statute so as to include a class of appeals which Congress plainly did not intend to be within our jurisdiction. The orders were not such as finally disposed of the rights of the parties and therefore we cannot review them at this stage of the proceedings. ⁴

While we must dismiss the appeal, we do not wish to be understood as sanctioning the action of the trial court in granting the motions to strike. On the contrary we think it was precipitate and certain to give rise to unnecessary confusion, delay, and expense. On the very threshold of the case plaintiffs' claims have been cut in half (or more) and one defendant has been told that it need not plead to that part of the claims. Indeed at the argument before us defense counsel took the frank position that they need not plead at all to four of the claims which have now been reduced to the status of class B cases in which no responsive pleading is required. What this really amounts to is that the cases have been prejudged and the measure of damages fixed without hearing any testimony and before the cases are even at issue. Plaintiffs are precluded from offering any testimony to support their claims for ‘annoyance, inconvenience and mental suffering’ and the entire tenor of the litigation has been altered to their prejudice. It will be seen that additional confusion will result from the fact that the ruling applies only to one defendant, the District of Columbia. The claim was not stricken as to defendant Randle and Garvin, Inc., and as to that defendant, plaintiffs...