Brown v. Reed

• Decision Date: 20 January 1969
• Citation: 209 Va. 562,165 S.E.2d 394
• Parties: George Haywood BROWN v. Irvin M. REED.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 394

165 S.E.2d 394

209 Va. 562

George Haywood BROWN v. Irvin M. REED.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 20, 1969.

Paul Whitehead, Lynchburg, for plaintiff in error.

S. J. Thompson, Jr., Lynchburg (James O. Watts, III, Lynchburg, D. L. Manson, Martinsville, Caskie, Frost, Davidson & Hobbs, Lynchburg, on brief), for defendant in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON, and HARRISON, JJ.

HARRISON, Justice.

Plaintiff, George Haywood Brown, and defendant, Irvin M. Reed, were fellow employees of the Lynchburg Foundry Company in Lynchburg, Virginia. The company carries workmen's compensation insurance, and the parties were covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Foundry maintains upon its premises a company parking lot for the convenience of its employees and also provides for them a shower and locker room.

On the morning of October 28, 1966, Brown came to the Foundry with the intent to 'punch in' for the day shift which began work at 7 A.M. He parked in the lot, went to the locker room, changed clothes and started back across the parking area en route to the machine shop where he would punch the time clock, thereby beginning his workday and his pay. Brown was struck and injured by Reed's automobile as he was walking in the passageway between the spaces in the parking area.

Reed worked the night shift and on the day of the accident stopped work at 6 A.M. He punched the time clock, thereby stopping his pay, left the building and went to the locker room where he showered and changed to street clothes. He then proceeded to the parking area, got into his automobile and was backing it preliminary to turning around and picking up some other employees who rode with him. It was during the course of this backing maneuver that he struck and injured plaintiff.

Brown brought his motion for judgment against Reed for damages, alleging negligence in the operation of defendant's vehicle. Defendant filed a plea alleging that plaintiff is barred from proceeding in this action because the accident arose out of and in the course of their employment and that plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act. The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed plaintiff's action. We granted a writ of error.

The narrow question for our determination is whether plaintiff's common law action against defendant is barred by the provisions of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act. The pertinent sections are:

' § 65.1--103. Duty to insure payment of compensation; effect of insurance.--Every employer subject to the compensation provisions of this Act shall insure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner hereinafter provided. While such insurance remains in force he or those conducting his business shall only be liable to an employee for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified.

' § 65.1--40. Employee's rights under Act exclude all others.--The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Act respectively to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.'

Defendant says that plaintiff's injury is one arising out of and in the course of his employment caused by the alleged negligence of a fellow employee who was also acting at the time in the course of his employment.

Brown concedes that since he was in the act of reporting for work, and not on a mission purely personal to himself, he could be held as covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. However, plaintiff further contends that at the time of the accident defendant was on the premises of the Foundry solely for his own benefit, and not in pursuance of any demand of his employment.

We have held repeatedly that the words of the statute 'arising out of and in the course of the employment' should be liberally construed to carry out the humane and beneficent purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act; that the expressions are used conjunctively and are not synonymous; that both conditions must be present before compensation can be awarded; that the words 'arising out of' have been construed to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, and the words 'in the course of' refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred; and that an accident occurs in the 'course of employment' when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be reasonably expected to be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or is doing something which is reasonably incident thereto. Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 123 S.E.2d 393 (1962); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 568, 159 S.E.2d 633 (1968).

As a guide in determining whether an accident arises 'out of' the employment, we cite the definition and test stated in In Re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A.1916A, 306 (1913) that an injury arises out of the employment 'when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury'.

We apply these well-established principles to the instant case. The time, location and circumstances of the accident place plaintiff and defendant in similar, but reverse, positions with respect to their employment. Plaintiff, en route to work, had parked his vehicle in a lot provided by his employer for that purpose. He had proceeded to a locker room, likewise provided by his employer, changed clothes, and was moving from the locker room across the parking area with intention to punch a time clock and begin his day's work.

Defendant was doing all of that in reverse. He had completed his day's work, punched the time clock, and proceeded to the locker room where he changed clothes. He then went to his vehicle and, preliminary to leaving the parking area, was backing his vehicle when he struck plaintiff. Thus if plaintiff was within the course of his employment at the time of the collision, so was defendant.

We cannot agree with the theory of plaintiff that defendant was on the premises solely for the latter's benefit. There is no such thing as 'instantaneous exit' immediately an employee punches a time clock. Manifestly an employee has a reasonable time after quitting work in which to absent himself from the premises of his employer.

Applicable to the present situation is the following from Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158, 48 S.Ct. 221, 222, 66 A.L.R. 1402, 1404 (1928):

'And employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the...