Brown v. Reeder

• Decision Date: 14 November 1908
• Citation: Brown v. Reeder, 108 Md. 653, 71 A. 417 (Md. 1908)
• Parties: BROWN et al. v. REEDER et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

71 A. 417

108 Md. 653

BROWN et al. v. REEDER et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

November 14, 1908

Appeal from Circuit Court, Charles County, in Equity; Geo. C Merrick, Judge.

Bill by Elizabeth S. Reeder and another against Gustavus T. Brown to determine the validity of certain deeds.Defendant having died pending this suit, Catesby Graham Brown and others, his heirs at law, were made defendants in his place.Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BURKE, BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, and WORTHINGTON, JJ.

W Mitchell Diggs and L. Allison Wilmer, for appellants.

W. Roy Stephenson and Adrian Posey, for appellees.

WORTHINGTON J.

The more essential facts of this case, briefly stated, are as follows: Mrs. Elizabeth S. Bowie, widow, of Charles county Md., being the owner in fee of a certain tract of land located in that county, containing about 500 acres, known as "Wicomico," on the 18th day of June, 1880, made a deed of the same to one Gustav A. Rasch of Baltimore City, in trust for the use and benefit of herself for life, and after her death "in trust for the use and benefit of her son, William T. Stoddert, and his heirs forever" her son's name having been changed from Bowie to Stoddert to please his grandfather, Maj. John T. Stoddert.Subsequently, on August 4, 1885, during the lifetime of his mother, William T. Stoddert died, leaving one daughter, Mrs. Elizabeth S. Reeder wife of Foster M. Reeder, as his only heir at law, who, together, with her husband, is the appellee in this case.Mrs. Elizabeth S. Bowie, the mother of William T. Stoddert, died on June 8, 1905, at the advanced age of 85 years.A few days before her death--that is to say, on May 17, 1905--she executed a deed in fee simple of the same land to her nephew, Gustavus T. Brown, the original defendant in this case, who died pending the suit, leaving a son and two daughters, as his only heirs at law, who were made defendants in his place and now appear as the appellants in this court.The last-mentioned deed from Mrs. Bowie to her nephew, Gustavus T. Brown, was, of course, of no avail beyond the conveyance of her equitable life estate, provided for in her deed to Rasch, if that deed was itself a valid conveyance; but as Brown and his heirs, the appellants, claimed the land under the deed of May 17, 1905, on the ground that the deed of trust of date June 18, 1880, violated the rule against perpetuities and was therefore void, and Mrs. Reeder, the appellee, claimed the property by virtue of the deed of trust, which, as she contended, did not violate the rule against perpetuities, but was a perfectly valid deed, while, on the other hand, as she insisted, the deed to Brown was void, as well because of Mrs. Bowie's mental incapacity at the time it was executed, as of her want of title at that time, except as to her equitable life estate, a bill of complaint was filed by Mrs. Reeder and her husband, the appellees, in the circuit court for Charles county, in equity, on August 9, 1905, for the purpose of having the validity of the two disputed deeds judicially determined.The lower court upheld the deed of trust to Rasch and declared the deed to Brown null and void and of no effect whatever.The substituted defendants, heirs of Gustavus T. Brown, deceased, have prosecuted this appeal.

The first and most important question presented by the record is whether the deed of trust to Rasch of June 18, 1880, violates the well-known rule against perpetuities, and is therefore void.A copy of this deed is set out in full in the report of this case preceding this opinion.It will be observed, by referring to the deed, that it recites as follows: "Whereas the said Elizabeth S. Bowie is desirous to make provision for herself and her son William T. Stoddert, against future contingencies, and for the maintenance and support of the said William T. Stoddert; and Gustav A. Rasch of Baltimore City in the state aforesaid is willing to accept the trust under these presents and to discharge and execute the same according to the true intent and meaning thereof," etc.Then after conveying the property to Rasch and his heirs, "to the use of him and his heirs,"she again declares the purposes for which the grant is made; that is to say: First, for her own use for life, and then "in trust for the use and benefit of said William T. Stoddert and his heirs forever."As to the employment of the additional words, "to the use of him (Rasch) and his heirs,"we do not think they have any particular meaning or effect in this case, because the deed of trust is itself a deed of bargain and sale, whereby the bargainer herself was seised to the use, and by operation of the statute of uses (St.27 Hen. VIII, c. 10) the use was executed in the bargainee.The additional words mentioned added nothing to Rasch's title and served no office whatever, as without them he took the legal title, and the additional use remained unexecuted in him and his heirs.Brown v. Renshaw,57 Md. 67.

In connection with the conveyance of the legal title to Rasch and his heirs, the words of the deed to which the appellants especially refer as creating a perpetuity are these: "In trust for use and benefit of said William T. Stoddert and his heirs forever."Whether these words of themselves, without other words in the deed explanatory of the intention of the grantor, would create a perpetuity, we are not called upon to determine, for in construing a deed, as well as in construing other instruments of writing, we are not usually to confine ourselves to a single word or phrase, but to ascertain if possible the intention of the parties, and especially of the grantor, by considering the whole deed and every part thereof.Waller v. Pollitt,104 Md. 172, 64 A. 1040;13 Cyc. 363.The courts are first, by an inspection of the deed, to ascertain what the parties intended should be effected by it, and then they are to expound it so as to accomplish that intention, unless expressions are employed which positively forbid it.Peyton v. Ayres, 2 Md. Ch. 64."It is the duty of the court(the intention being ascertained) to give the instrument such interpretation as will effectuate that intention, provided the terms and expressions employed will admit of such construction."Peyton v. Ayres, supra.In the construction of deeds and contracts, the courts take into consideration the language employed, the subject-matter, and the surrounding circumstances.Chesapeake, etc., Co. v. Goldberg,107 Md. 485, 69 A. 37.

It seems only proper therefore, in this connection, to refer to certain extrinsic circumstances connected with the making...