Brown v. Rice's Adm'r
| Decision Date | 16 September 1875 |
| Citation | 67 Va. 467 |
| Parties | BROWN v. RICE'S adm'r. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
A & J, partners, give two notes to R. They both die, A being the survivor. At the death of A both notes are barred by the statute of limitations. After the death of A, R knowing that the notes were barred by the statute fraudulently, or under a mistake of the law, represents to B his administratrix, that said notes are unpaid, and are valid and in full force in law against the estates of A & J and proposes that if B will give her bond to R for one-half the amount of the notes, R will settle the other half with J's representative, who is R's daughter; and thereupon B trusting to these representations, executes her bond to R for the amount of one-half of the notes. HELD:
1. If this was a misrepresentation of the law, still it is a case in which equity will relieve B; and the defence may be made at law by plea under the statute setting out the facts.
2. But it was in truth a misrepresentation of a fact; and the facts set out in a plea is a good defence to an action on the bond by R's adm'x against B.
This is an action of debt in the Circuit court of Rockingham county brought by William R. Warren, adm'r c. t. a. of Milly Rice, deceased, against Mary B. Brown, upon two bonds executed by said Mary B. Brown to said Milly Rice. The defendant filed two special pleas, to which the plaintiff demurred, and the demurrer was sustained; and there was judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Mrs. Brown thereupon applied to this court for a supersedeas; which was allowed. The case is sufficiently stated by Judge Anderson, in his opinion.
Berlin and Harnsberger, for the appellant.
G. G. Grattan, Woodson & Compton, for the appellee.
This is an action of debt by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error upon two bonds--one for $1,900, payable one day after date, and the other for $491.55, payable on or before the 1st of July 1869, both bearing the same date, the 24th of February 1869. They are executed to Milly Rice, the intestate of plaintiff below, and signed " Mary B. Brown, adm'x of A. B. Brown," with a (seal) annexed.
The defendant tendered two special pleas under the statute in bar of the action, both of which were rejected by the court. The second plea is substantially a plea to this effect. That the said Milly Rice, plaintiff's intestate, in her lifetime " fraudulently procured the execution of the said writings obligatory in the declaration mentioned by the defendant, as administratrix of A. W. Brown, for and in consideration of the one-half of two notes not under seal, which had been executed to her in her lifetime by defendant's intestate, and J. G. Brown as partners, in their firm name of A. W. & J. G. Brown, by falsely and fraudulently representing to her, the said defendant, that the said notes were still " unpaid, valid, and in full force in law against the estate of A. W. & J. G. Brown, when, in truth and in fact, both of the said notes were then barred by the statute of limitations; which fact was well known to the said Milly Rice, but was fraudulently concealed from the defendant.
The averments by the first plea are more in detail. It sets out the dates of the notes of A. W. & J. G. Brown, and when payable; the death of J. G. Brown, and the subsequent death of A. W. Brown, from which it appears that the latter, as surviving partner, was entitled to the possession of the social effects, and was bound for the debts of the firm; and from which it also appears that the said notes were barred by the statute of limitations in the lifetime of A. W. Brown, the defendant's intestate. It also appears from the said plea, that the defendant never saw the said notes; but that representations were made to her by the plaintiff, then acting as the agent of Milly Rice, through defendants brother, that the said notes were lawful debts, outstanding against the estate of A. W. & J. G. Brown; and a proposition, that if she, as administratrix of A. W. Brown, would give her bonds for one-half of said notes, she, Milly Rice, would arrange the other half with the widow of said J. G. Brown, who was her daughter, and that the estate of A. W. Brown would be benefitted, as it would thereby be released from one-half of the debt for which it was then bound. And that she, the defendant, was induced by these representations to assent to the proposition. That afterwards the plaintiff, as agent of the said Milly Rice, had the bonds, which are the writings obligatory in the declaration mentioned, drawn and sent to her by her brother, and she executed them as administratrix, and not in her own right, not knowing until after-wards the fraud which had been practiced on her in procuring the execution of her bonds for notes which were barred by the statute of linitations, and which she had never seen. Such are in effect the averments of the first plea, stripping it of much that is immaterial and surplusage.
Both pleas are, that the bonds were executed by her in her character as administratrix, and not in her individual right, or as her personal obligations, as she had no assets. Though the legal effect of the obligations be different, and she is bound personally, the averment to the contrary cannot vitiate the pleas, if they constitute a good equitable defence against the bonds, considering them as her personal obligations. And it cannot be doubted that the facts averred in the pleas present as good a defence against the bonds, regarding them as personal, as if they only bound the assets; because, whether personal or not, it was an obligation to pay the debt of the intestate; and if personal and binding upon her, it constitutes a stronger defence for her, because the debt being extinguished as a debt of the intestate by the statutory bar, she could have no recourse upon the estate if she paid it. The question remains, are these pleas a bar to the plaintiff's action?
It is contended for the defendant in error, that the misrepresentation alleged by the pleas is a misrepresentation as to matters of law, and that such misrepresentation does not constitute fraud, because the law is presumed to be equally within the knowledge of all the parties. But whilst the legal proposition is in general true, it is also true that, " if a man dealing with another misleads him, and takes advantage of his ignorance...
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