Brown v. Rodriguez

Decision Date12 April 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL NO. SA-15-CA-396-PM
PartiesBARRY A. BROWN, TDCJ-CID No. 2041759, Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY ERIC RODRIGUEZ, Badge No. 4002, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Pursuant to the consent of the parties and transfer of the case to the undersigned,1 and consistent with the authority vested in the United States Magistrate Judges under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(1) and Appendix C of the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges in the Western District of Texas, the following Memorandum Decision and Order to address pending motions.

I. JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is noted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Barry A. Brown ("plaintiff"), acting pro se, then in the custody of the Bexar County Adult Detention Center and now in the custody of the Texas Department of Public Safety-Criminal Institutions Division, initiated this suit on or about May 12, 2015, when he fileda motion to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP")2 and an original complaint naming two defendants, Bexar County Sheriff's Department Deputy Eric Rodriguez ("Deputy Rodriguez") and the Bexar County Adult Detention Center ("BCADC").3 Plaintiff's original complaint asserts two claims, one for excessive use of force and a second for denial of medical care, each arising on March 30, 2015.4 Plaintiff's complaint does not specify the relief plaintiff seeks, other than having his "excessive force claim granted and other relief to which I may be entitled" awarded to him.5 More specifically, plaintiff states in his sworn complaint that on March 30, 2015:

[Deputy Rodriguez] "assaulted me using 'excessive force' namely by slamming the cell door on the left side of my body (repeatedly), which caused a serious knee injury and bruises and lacerations on my left arm;"6
"The said officer assaulted me using 'excessive force' for about twenty five (25) to thirty (30) seconds by backing up then lunging forward, ramming the cell door with the left side of his body while my body (was not) clear of the cell door;"7 and
"After the incident I told the said officer that I could not stand on my left knee andthat I was having (severe) pain, I requested that he . . . get me medical treatment."8

Plaintiff alleges he received medical treatment from the medical department the next day, March 31, 2015, and "they gave me an ice pack for my knee and released me."9

On May 20, 2015, the Court granted plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed IFP and summons issued.10 On June 9, 2015, defendants filed a corrected motion to dismiss.11 On July 8, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint.12 On July 29, 2015, Judge Ezra entered an order which granted defendants' motion to dismiss BCADC as a party defendant but, construing Brown's allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, declined to dismiss plaintiff's excessive use of force claim against Deputy Rodriguez and denied as moot plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.13

On July 30, 2015, the Court entered its initial scheduling order which established the following deadlines: September 21, 2015 as the deadline to file any motions to amend or supplement pleadings or join parties; December 4, 2015 as the deadline for discovery; and December 18, 2015 as the deadline to file any dispositive motions.14 On July 31, 2015, Judge Ezra transferred this case to the docket of the undersigned based on the consent of the parties.15

On August 13, 2015, plaintiff filed a second motion to amend complaint, seeking to "join 'Bexar County' as a defendant party" and again allege a deficient policy, practice or custom by the County.16 On August 19, 2015, the Court denied plaintiff's motion to amend, noting that plaintiff earlier "voluntarily dismissed any claims against the County" after BCADC moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims against it, and plaintiff's "three-page submission . . . makes [only] conclusory assertions that the County has a constitutionally deficient custom, policy, or practice relating the alleged excessive use of force."17

On August 25, 2015, plaintiff filed motions to appoint counsel, for jury trial, and for a conference with counsel.18 The same day, the Court entered three separate orders which deniedplaintiff's motion to appoint counsel, mooted plaintiff's motion for jury trial, and denied plaintiff's motion to meet and confer.19

On August 26, 2015, Deputy Rodriguez filed his answer to plaintiff's original complaint.20 In the answer, defendant alleges six affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity, and demands a trial by jury.21

On August 28, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the ruling which denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.22 The same day, the Court entered an order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.23

On December 7, 2015, Deputy Rodriguez filed a motion for summary judgment.24 The same day, the Court entered a seven-page order informing plaintiff of summary judgment procedures and calling upon plaintiff to file a response to defendant's motion for summary judgment by December 28, 2015.25 On December 22, 2015, plaintiff filed a "motion for summary judgment," which sets out plaintiff's response to defendant's motion for summaryjudgment and asks for entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of plaintiff.26 In his affidavit, plaintiff testifies, in sum, that on March 30, 2015:

"as I exited my cell the name officer slammed the cell door on parts of my body, then he continued ramming the cell, assaulting me using excessive force . . . ;"27
"I then requested medical care but the named officer . . . denied me medical care;"28
"I was in severe pain, I ask the officer to call in a code one—(which is a medical emergency code for BCADC), the named officer refused to call in a code one and refused to report the incident;" and29
"I requested medical care for the injuries the named officer caused and (several) other inmates ask the named officer to get me medical care, the officer refused to have me seen by medical."30

On December 30, 2015, Deputy Rodriguez filed his response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.31 On January 11, 2016, plaintiff filed a reply in support of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.32 On January 14, 2016, defendant filed an objection to plaintiff's reply.33 On February 5, 2016, plaintiff filed a response to defendant's objection.34 On February 25, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint seeking to assert claims against BCADC and Sheriff Susan Pamerleau.35 On March 1, 2016, defendant filed a response to plaintiff's motion.36 On March 15, 2016, defendant filed a motion to strike certain discovery requests of plaintiff.37 On March 24, 2016, plaintiff filed a "corrected" motion for summary judgment.38 On March 28, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to "dismiss" defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's discovery requests.39 On March 29, 2016, defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff's corrected motion for summary judgment.40 On March 31, 2015, defendant filed a response to plaintiff's motion to"dismiss" defendant's motion to strike.41

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Unless otherwise noted, the parties do not appear to dispute certain of the following facts which are set out to provide a factual background and context for the legal issues addressed in this ruling: On March 30, 2015, plaintiff was an inmate housed at BCADC. Plaintiff and Deputy Rodriguez agree that plaintiff was involved in an incident in which plaintiff's left arm and left leg were caught between the cell door and the side of the cell. Plaintiff claims Deputy Rodriguez acted intentionally and maliciously to cause him harm; Deputy Rodriguez denies intent to harm plaintiff and claims any contact between the cell door and plaintiff was an accident. Plaintiff claims he suffered injuries as a result of the incident; deputy Rodriguez claims any injuries suffered by plaintiff were de minimis.

IV. ISSUES
1. Whether defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted or denied.
2. Whether plaintiff's motion or corrected motion for summary judgment should be granted or denied.
3. Whether plaintiff's motion to amend complaint should be granted or denied.
4. Whether defendant's motions to strike plaintiff's discovery requests and corrected motion for summary judgment be granted or denied.
5. Whether plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's motion to strike should be granted or denied.
6. Whether any other motions or requests for relief should be granted or denied.
V. STANDARDS
A. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

The standard to be applied in deciding a motion for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.42

Mere allegations of a factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 requires that there be no genuine issue of material fact.43 A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law.44 A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.45 Therefore, summary judgment is proper if, under governing laws, there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict; if reasonable finders of fact could resolve a factual issue in favor of either party, summary judgment should not be granted.46

The movant on a summary judgment motion bears the initial burden of providing the court with a legal basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it allegesdemonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.47 The burden then...

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