Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 28 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-02784-DCN-SVH |
| Parties | ISAIAH BROWN, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JOEY WESLEY TUTT, in his individual capacity as Corrections Officer at McCormick Correctional Institution; and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges's report and recommendation (“R&R”), ECF No. 18, that the court grant defendant Joey Wesley Tutt's (“Tutt”) motion to dismiss, ECF No. 10, deny defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections' (“SCDC”) motion to dismiss, ECF No. 14, and dismiss plaintiff Isaiah Brown's (“Brown”) claims with prejudice as to all defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R and dismisses Tutt's claims against all defendants.
Brown was, at all relevant times, an inmate at the McCormick Correctional Institution. Tutt was, at all relevant times, a corrections officer at McCormick Correctional Institution. Brown alleges that on or about August 8, 2019, Tutt assaulted Brown by using chemical munitions and by punching and kicking Brown. Brown further alleges that he suffered serious injuries from Tutt's assault and received no emergency care or medical care.
In a case that was previously before this court, Brown, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Tutt on September 3, 2019. Brown v. Tutt, 1:19-cv-02481-DCN-SVH (2019) (“Brown I”). In Brown I, Brown alleged that Tutt assaulted him by using unauthorized chemical munitions and by punching and kicking him in violation of his Eight Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C § 1983. See Brown I (ECF No. 1). On March 20, 2020, Tutt filed a motion for summary judgment in that case. Brown I (ECF No. 39). Brown failed to respond, despite multiple court orders directing him to do so, and on June 1, 2020, the court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Brown I (ECF No. 47).
On June 28, 2021, Brown, proceeding with counsel, filed a complaint in the McCormick County Court of Common Pleas against Tutt, SCDC, and multiple John Does, alleging (1) negligence, (2) negligent hiring, (3) negligent supervision, (4) negligent retention, and (5) violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1-1, Compl. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C), all pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to Magistrate Judge Hodges.
On September 14, 2021, Tutt filed his motion to dismiss. ECF No. 10. Brown responded in opposition on October 12, 2021, ECF No. 15, and Tutt replied on October 19, 2021, ECF No. 16. On September 28, 2021, SCDC filed its motion to dismiss. ECF No. 14. On October 21, 2021, Brown filed a motion for extension of time to respond to the motion. ECF No. 34. On October 21, 2021, Magistrate Judge Hodges issued the R&R, recommending that the court grant Tutt's motion to dismiss, deny the motion for extension of time, and deny SCDC's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 18. On November 4, 2021, Brown filed his objections to the R&R. ECF No. 19. On November 18, 2021, SCDC responded to Brown's objections. Brown did not file a reply, and the time to do so has now expired. As such, the matter is now ripe for the court's review.
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the Magistrate Judge's R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). The recommendation of the Magistrate Judge carries no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the R&R to which a specific objection is made. Id. However, in the absence of a timely filed, specific objection, the court reviews the R&R only for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a] party's general objections are not sufficient to challenge a magistrate judge's findings.” Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 483, 488 (D.S.C. 2006) (citation omitted). When a party's objections are directed to strictly legal issues “and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed with.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Analogously, de novo review is unnecessary when a party makes general and conclusory objections without directing a court's attention to a specific error in a magistrate judge's proposed findings. Id.
Tutt moved for dismissal of the complaint on two bases: (1) the doctrine of res judicata, and (2) sovereign immunity under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the court grant Tutt's motion to dismiss based on res judicata. The Magistrate Judge determined that based on the judgment in Brown I, the claims against Tutt in this action met all three elements of claim preclusion. See ECF No. 18, R&R at 5-8. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge explained that (1) the dismissal for failure to prosecute in Brown I was on the merits, (2) the parties are identical, and (3) Brown's current claims arise out of the same occurrence that was the subject of Brown I. See id. (citing Pittson Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999)). Brown, adopting the same position as he had in his response to Tutt's motion to dismiss, agreed that he could not maintain a § 1983 claim against Tutt in federal court and did not object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on those grounds. See ECF No. 19 at 1 (). Accordingly, the court “must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315 (internal quotations and citation omitted). After reviewing the record in this case, the applicable law, and the R&R's analysis, the court finds no clear error in the Magistrate Judge's finding that Brown's claims against Tutt are precluded based on res judicata and that Tutt's motion to dismiss should be granted. The court therefore adopts the R&R in this respect.
Next, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court deny SCDC's motion to dismiss based on its failure to comply with Local Civil Rules 7.04 and 7.05 (D.S.C.). R&R at 3 n.1. SCDC failed to brief its motion to dismiss, and the Magistrate Judge recommended denying SCDC's motion for failure to comply with those rules. SCDC does not object to the R&R's recommendation, and again, the court finds no clear error in the Magistrate Judge's determination.
Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court sua sponte find that Brown's claims against all defendants-including SCDC and the John Does-should be dismissed with prejudice based on res judicata. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that although Tutt was the only defendant in Brown I, SCDC and any of its employees, agents, or contractors are in privity with Tutt. The Magistrate Judge further explained that while the propriety of Brown's claims against SCDC were not properly raised, the court may raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte. R&R at 6 n.2 (citing Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006)). Brown does not object to the Magistrate Judge's finding that SCDC is in privity with Tutt, and the court adopts that finding. Instead, Brown objects to the Magistrate Judge's dismissal of the case with prejudice, which Brown perceives as a recommendation that the court preclude Brown from bringing his state claims in state court. In support, Brown argues that South Carolina state courts may still allow Brown's state law claims to proceed if there was no determination as to the facts surrounding his state law claims in federal court. However, as the court reads it, the R&R did not address the preclusive effect of Brown I in state court. Instead, the R&R was analyzing the preclusive effect of Brown I in the instant action. Brown's objection is misplaced, and the court overrules the objection.
As stated above, Brown argues in his objections that the R&R overlooked South Carolina law on res judicata establishing that a dismissal for failure to prosecute does not preclude the state court from considering issues not expressly adjudicated in the federal court proceeding. See Jones v City of Folly Beach, 483 S.E.2d 770, 773 (S.C. 1997). Brown argues that although the complaint in Brown I was dismissed for failure to prosecute, the decision in Brown I did not adjudicate any issues of South Carolina law because Brown did not raise any state law claims in that case. As a preliminary matter, Jones does not impact the court's decision to dismiss the claims in this case due to res judicata. Since this case involves the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment, the R&R properly applied federal law of claim preclusion. Compare First Pac. Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (“When considering the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment, we apply the federal law of claim preclusion.”), with Zimmerman v. Coll. of Charleston, 2013 WL...
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