Brown v. Smith

• Decision Date: 05 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civ. 20-8463 (NLH) (AMD)
• Parties: RAYMOND LAMAR BROWN, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN RICHARD SMITH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey

RAYMOND LAMAR BROWN, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN RICHARD SMITH, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 20-8463 (NLH) (AMD)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 5, 2023

Abigail M. Luhn, Esq.

Jack N. Frost, Jr., Esq.

Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Heather C. Giordanella, Esq.

Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Counsel for Plaintiff

Victor A. Afanador, Esq.

Christopher A. Khatami, Esq.

Susana Cruz Hodge, Esq.

Anthony David Zatkos, Jr., Esq.

Lite DePalma Greenberg & Afanador, LLC

Counsel for Defendants Cumberland County New Jersey, Charles Warren, Eugene J. Caldwell, II, Richard Smith and Jody Hirata

Stephen D. Holtzman, Esq.

Jeffrey S. McClain, Esq.

Lilia Londar, Esq.

Holtzman McClain & Londar, PC

Counsel for Defendants CFG Health Systems, LLC, Dr. Alan Dias and Kristina Smith

Michael Louis Testa, Sr., Esq.

Justin Robert White, Esq.

Testa Heck Testa & White, P.A.

Counsel for Defendant Loren Joynes

OPINION

NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

Defendants Cumberland County New Jersey, Charles Warren, Eugene J. Caldwell, II, Richard Smith and Jody Hirata (“County Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff Raymond Lamar Brown's amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 69. Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss. ECF No. 78. The parties jointly move to seal their briefs and certain exhibits. ECF No. 82.

For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss in part. The motion to seal will be granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter is one of many cases presently before the Court in which a pretrial detainee at the Cumberland County Jail (“Cumberland Jail” or “Jail”) alleges prison and county officials created unconstitutional conditions of confinement when they failed to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic that began in early 2020. A class action addressing the Jail's failures in COVID-19 testing, protection, and quarantine and isolation procedures and seeking only injunctive relief is presently pending before the Court. Brown v. Warren, 20-7907 (“Class Action”). Plaintiff Raymond Lamar Brown, a lead plaintiff in the Class Action, filed his original complaint pro se, ECF No. 1, and filed an amended complaint with leave of court after the appointment of pro bono counsel.^[1] ECF No. 58 (“Am. Compl.”). The County Defendants now move to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF No. 69.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. A motion to dismiss may be granted only if the plaintiff has failed to set forth fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests that make such a claim plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] complaint's allegations of historical fact continue to enjoy a highly favorable standard of review at the motion-to-dismiss stage of proceedings.” Id. at 790.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Exhaust

The County Defendants argue the complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and “inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). See also Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove; it is not a pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff.”). Although he was not required to, Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that “[u]pon information and belief, Plaintiff has exhausted the remedies available to him, in an attempt to rectify the adverse effects of the retaliatory actions taken against Plaintiff by Defendants as enumerated in the Amended Complaint.” Am. Compl. ¶ 41.

The County Defendants attach copies of the Jail's Inmate Handbook, Grievance Forms, and Plaintiff's medical and Cell History Records for the Court's consideration. “As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). A party's reliance upon factual materials outside the pleadings would generally require the Court to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 56, but the Court may consider a “‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.'” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426) (emphasis omitted). The Court may also “examine an ‘undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.'” Id. (quoting PBGC v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). The attached documents do not meet either exception.

The County Defendants assert “Plaintiff fails to attach these grievances, but the Court may consider them because they were submitted in accordance with the Handbook's Grievance Procedure.” ECF No. 70 at 14. The critical question “is whether the claims in the complaint are ‘based' on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly cited.” Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426 (citing In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993)). Contrary to the County Defendants' arguments, Plaintiff's claims are not “based on” the Inmate Handbook, Grievance Forms, or his medical and Cell History Records. The documents may contain proof of Plaintiff's claims, but the claims themselves are “based on” the County Defendants' alleged actions. Accordingly, the documents will not be considered in connection with the motion to dismiss.

The Court declines to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment as suggested by the County Defendants. This Court has expressed its concerns with the administrative remedy system at the Jail on several occasions, and a dismissal request based on failure to exhaust “depends on the reliability of the Prison's recordkeeping system.” Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2018). “Here, the record is bereft of evidence that the Prison's recordkeeping system is reliable. Without such evidence, we cannot determine if Defendants have met their burden to prove that [plaintiff] ‘failed to exhaust each of his claims.'” Id. (quoting Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013)) (emphasis in original). Discovery may yield information relevant to the exhaustion issue, so the Court concludes the parties should have the benefit of discovery before presenting dispositive arguments regarding exhaustion.

Plaintiff's assertion that he exhausted all available remedies is a legal conclusion that the Court need not accept as true on a motion to dismiss. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789-90 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that allegations “embod[ying] a legal point” are not entitled to the presumption of truth on a motion to dismiss). However, the Court will not dismiss the complaint on exhaustion grounds because Plaintiff is not required to plead or prove exhaustion in his complaint. Defendants may raise this defense in an appropriately supported motion for summary judgment. See Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018).

B. Claim-Splitting Doctrine

The County Defendants further argue that Plaintiff's claims are precluded by the claim-splitting doctrine, “the longstanding bar against having a single party-plaintiff simultaneously maintain two actions against the same defendant.” Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc)). They argue that Plaintiff's status as a representative in the Class Action warrants dismissal “because a final judgment in the Class Action would nevertheless preclude this action.” ECF No. 70 at 15.

Plaintiff's action is distinguishable from Walton. “There, a single plaintiff filed two separate employment lawsuits based on the same underlying facts, in the same court, against the same defendant.” Navient Corp., 967 F.3d at 286 (citing Walton, 563 F.2d 69-70). Plaintiff did not file the Class Action as a single plaintiff seeking damages for himself; it was filed with other class representatives on behalf of present and future inmates at the Cumberland Jail. Therefore, “a single plaintiff” did not file both actions. More significantly, the Class Action and Plaintiff's complaint serve entirely different purposes.

Plaintiffs in the Class Action...