Brown v. Solary

• Decision Date: 04 February 1896
• Parties: BROWN et al. v. SOLARY et ux.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

19 So. 161

37 Fla. 102

BROWN et al. v. SOLARY et ux.

Florida Supreme Court

February 4, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Marion county; J. J. Finley, Judge.

Bill by Antonio Solary and wife against Charles M. Brown and others to quiet title and to enjoin a trespass. From decrees overruling a demurrer to the bill and overruling the pleas certain defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The basis for equitable interference in the removal of a cloud from the title to real estate is that a deed or other instrument, apparently valid, but void in fact, may be vexatiously or injuriously used against the rightful owner after the evidence to invalidate it has been lost, and the owner, being in possession, cannot immediately protect his right by any legal proceeding. In such case a court of equity will grant relief, and direct the deed or instrument to be delivered up and canceled.

A court of equity grants relief by injunction against a trespass on real estate when the threatened injury cannot be adequately compensated in damages at law, or where, under the circumstances of the case, the injured party has no adequate remedy at law. The foundation for the jurisdiction in such cases is, in general, the irreparable nature of the injury the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, the destruction of the estate in the character in which it has been enjoyed, or the prevention of a multiplicity of suits.

The question of title and possession enter into the consideration in cases of trespass, as well as when an instrument is sought to be removed as a cloud upon title; and in cases of trespass the complainant's title must be admitted, or legally established, and the nature of the injury must be irreparable. The decision in the case of Woodford v. Alexander, 17 So. 658, 35 Fla. 333, is disapproved. The application of the law to the facts of the case was erroneous, and the decision should not be followed.

The mining and taking of phosphate rock, from the soil of land valuable chiefly on account of the phosphate, amounts to a destruction of the estate in the character in which it has been enjoyed, and the injury resulting therefrom is of such an irreparable nature as to authorize a court of equity to enjoin it, on proper bill by the real owner.

When a court of equity has, by virtue of its original or concurrent jurisdiction, cognizance of a case for one purpose, it will proceed to a complete adjudication of the entire case, even to the settlement of purely legal rights, which otherwise would be beyond the scope of its powers.

Where a court of equity has acquired jurisdiction to enjoin a trespass in digging and taking phosphate from the soil of land, it also has the authority to decree and account of the phosphate already taken from the soil, and the damages resulting from the trespass.

A bill is not multifarious, on the ground of a joinder of two separate and distinct causes of action, when an injunction, within the jurisdiction of the court to grant, is asked for, and also an account of the damages resulting from the act sought to be enjoined is prayed.

A bill is not multifarious on account of the joinder of parties defendant where the object of the suit is single, and there is one general point in issue, rendering the interest common to all the defendants.

Where the object of the suit is single, and it is shown that some of the defendants have interests in distinct questions growing out of the suit, such defendants are necessary parties, in order to conclude the entire matter.

T. acquired a tax title to land, and conveyed an undivided half interest to M. T. and M. subsequently conveyed their entire interest in one part of the land to S., S., and P., and their entire interest in the other part to B. A bill was filed by the true owner of the land against S., S., P., B., and others, alleging that the tax deed was void for specified reasons, and praying an injunction and account against B. and the other defendants, who had entered upon the land under color of the void tax deed, and committed an irreparable injury. Held, that T. and M., who had parted with their entire interest in the land, who were in no way shown to be connected with the trespass on the land, and against whom no fraud was charged or relief asked, were not necessary parties.

In determining the sufficiency of a plea, every fact stated in the bill and not denied by the plea must be taken as true, and the facts stated in the plea must be considered as true.

To a bill filed by the owners in fee of land, alleging that the defendants, with design to defraud and injure complainants, had entered upon the land under color of a void tax deed, and had committed irreparable injury, by digging and taking from the soil phosphate of great value and quantity, the exact value of which could not be ascertained without an accounting, and praying for an injunction and account of the phosphate dug, a plea was interposed, alleging, simply, that defendants were not committing the trespass and injury alleged at the time the bill was filed. Held, that the plea was no sufficient answer to the bill, and was rightfully overruled.

COUNSEL

R. L. Anderson, for appellants.

A. W. Cockrell & Son, for appellees. Appellees filed a bill in chancery against Charles M. Brown, E. W. Agnew, D. J. Gillen, the Marion Phosphate Company (a corporation organized under the laws of Georgia), George J. Baldwin, the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad Company (a corporation organized under the laws of Florida), James H. Smith, Norman R. Smith, and J. P. Pulcifer, the material allegations of which are: That complainants were seised in fee of the E. 1/2 of S.E. 1/4 of section 26, township 16 S., of range 18 E., situate in Marion county, the title to which was derived as follows: Vincent Botto obtained a patent from the United States government for the land in October, 1883, and thereupon took possession, and in June, 1884, conveyed the land by warranty deed to Louisa Mazza, who subsequently, and before the filing of the bill, was married to Antonio Solary. That on the 4th of March, 1888, an instrument of writing in the form of a tax deed, purporting to convey the land to William T. Tompkins, was inscribed upon the records of deeds for Marion county, a copy of the instrument being filed as a part of the bill, and on the 19th of May following Tompkins and wife, claiming an interest in the land solely by virtue of said instrument of writing, executed a formal conveyance, purporting to operate as a quitclaim deed, to Joseph B. McMurtry, for an undivided half interest in said land. On the 2d of [37 Fla. 105] August, 1888, Tompkins and wife and Joseph B. McMurtry executed a deed, purporting to convey all that part of said land west and northwest of the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad to the defendants James H. and Norman R. Smith and J. P. Pulcifer. On the 10th of December, 1889, Tompkins and wife and Joseph B. McMurtry executed a deed purporting to convey all that part of said land east of the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad to defendant Charles M. Brown. Copies of the deeds from Tompkins and wife to McMurtry, from Tompkins and wife and McMurtry to the Smiths and Pulcifer, and from Tompkins and wife and McMurtry to Brown, are filed as exhibits to and parts of the bill of complaint.

The tax deed to Tompkins purports to have been made upon a sale of the lands in 1887 for the nonpayment of taxes assessed for the year 1886. The bill alleges various grounds impeaching the validity of the tax deed; but, as it is not contended here that the grounds alleged are not sufficient, if true, to avoid the deed, they are not specially mentioned.

The bill further alleges that the defendants Brown, Agnew Gillen, Baldwin, the Marion Phosphate Company, and the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad Company, combining and confederating to injure and defraud complainants, did severally, jointly, and unlawfully enter upon the land, under color of the pretended tax deed, and divers other pretended claims or rights unknown to complainants, and had been and were then mining said lands for phosphate therein, and had taken and were taking phosphate from the soil thereof, of great value, the exact value of which complainants were unable to learn without an accounting under the order of the court; that phosphates were being taken in great quantities, and the lands were valuable chiefly for the presence of the phosphates therein; that said defendants had committed and were committing great and irreparable injury to the land, and were destroying the value thereof; and the trespass, injury, and damage had not only been and was irreparable, but had been and was continuous in its nature, and complainants had no adequate relief except through an accounting and the process of injunction.

The special prayers of the bill are for an injunction restraining the defendants from entering upon the land and mining phosphate thereon; that the rights of complainants in the land be recognized, validated, and established by decree of the court; that, the tax deed be set aside and declared void; that an account be decreed of the phosphate dug and taken by defendants from the land, and of the damage done to the land by the defendants; and that they be required to pay the several amounts found to be due.

Defendants Brown, Agnew, and the Marion Phosphate Company appeared and demurred to the bill. The grounds of the demurrer are: (1) On the face of the bill, complainants were not entitled to any relief in a court of equity. (2) The bill shows that complainants have a clear, adquate, and complete remedy at law. (3) The bill is multifarious. (4) The bill is vague indefinite, contradictory, and repugnant. (5) The copy of the...