Brown v. St. Louis County, 56582

Citation792 S.W.2d 398
Decision Date12 June 1990
Docket NumberNo. 56582,56582
PartiesSylvia BROWN, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Respondent.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Charles E. Foehner, III, Foehner & Vuylsteke, St. Louis, for appellant.

Thomas W. Wehrle, County Counselor, Don R. Williams, Associate County Counselor, Clayton, for respondent.

HAMILTON, Presiding Judge.

Appellant, Sylvia Brown (hereinafter Brown), appeals the dismissal of Count II of her First Amended Petition (hereinafter Petition) for personal injury arising out of a two-car automobile accident occurring on June 30, 1986, at the intersection of Jennings Station Road and Theodore Place in St. Louis County.

Count I of Brown's Petition alleged that on June 30, 1986, Appellant was driving her car in an easterly direction on Theodore at its intersection with Jennings. David Huddleston was driving his car in a southerly direction on Jennings Road and negligently allowed his car to collide with Brown's car, causing Brown severe and permanent personal injuries.

Count II of the Petition is against St. Louis County. Brown alleged that Jennings Station Road is a St. Louis County road, maintained by the County. She averred that, at the time of the accident, both her view and Huddleston's view were blocked by a truck that was parked on Jennings within 20 feet of the northwest corner of the intersection of Jennings and Theodore. She further stated that a substantial earth bank is situated at the corner of that intersection. Brown alleged that for St. Louis County to allow parking within 75 feet of the intersection on its northwest corner was "below" proper engineering and safety standards because such parking blocks the vision of drivers entering Jennings from the west on Theodore. Brown further alleged that the absence of a "No Parking" sign at that location is "below" proper engineering and road design standards.

St. Louis County filed a motion to dismiss Count II on October 16, 1988, which the trial court sustained. Brown subsequently filed a motion for rehearing of St. Louis County's motion to dismiss. The trial court overruled that motion on January 19, 1989.

Brown thereafter dismissed with prejudice Count I as against Huddleston on March 22, 1989. She then appealed the dismissal of Count II.

Her sole point on appeal merely asserts "[w]hether the circuit court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of plaintiff's petition." Supreme Court Rule 84.04(d), however, requires that "[t]he points relied on shall state briefly and concisely what actions or rulings of the court are sought to be reviewed and wherein and why they are claimed to be erroneous...." A point relied on that fails to follow these rules preserves nothing for review. Fairley v. State, 770 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Mo.App.1989).

Moreover, Brown's brief also fails to state wherein and why or even to assert that the trial court erred. Therefore, it fails to comply with Rule 84.04(d). In the argument section of her brief, however, Brown states that she is attempting to hold St. Louis County liable under Section 537.600.1(2) V.A.M.S.Supp.1990. This section provides an exception to governmental tort immunity when an omission by the public entity creates a dangerous condition upon the public entity's property. Because Brown has explained her contention in the argument section of her brief, we have the discretion to review it. See Fairley, 770 S.W.2d at 459.

Brown asserts that St. Louis County has waived its governmental tort immunity by failing to post "No Parking" signs within 75 feet of the intersection of Jennings and Theodore, thereby allowing motor vehicles to be legally parked in such a way as to create a dangerous condition. St. Louis County contends that Brown has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 537.600.1(2) provides that the immunity of a public entity from liability for negligent acts and omissions is waived in the instances of

(2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. In any action under this subdivision wherein a plaintiff alleges that he was damaged by the negligent, defective or...

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7 cases
  • Stevenson v. City of St. Louis School Dist., 59541
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 5, 1991
    ...created the condition or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Brown v. St. Louis County, 792 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Mo.App.1990). As used in § 537.600.1(2), dangerous condition has a narrow meaning and refers to defects in the physical condition of ......
  • Watley v. Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole, WD
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • December 1, 1992
    ...from the allegations, as viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate any basis for relief. Brown v. St. Louis County, 792 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Mo.App.1990). In comparison to attorney prepared pleadings, a pro se petition is held to a less rigorous standard and "is subject t......
  • Dale By and Through Dale v. Edmonds, 59340
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 12, 1991
    ...created the condition or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Brown v. St. Louis County, 792 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Mo.App.1990). In its order, the trial court found that the second element could not be Plaintiffs' sole point on appeal is that the t......
  • Miller v. Enyeart, WD
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • March 7, 1995
    ...treating the facts averred as true and construing all allegations liberally and favorably to the plaintiff. Brown v. St. Louis County, 792 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Mo.App.1990). We are satisfied that the petition states a cause of action for ejectment, quiet title and reformation of a written instr......
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