Brown v. Standard Casket Mfg. Co.

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KNIGHT, Justice.
• Citation: Brown v. Standard Casket Mfg. Co., 234 Ala. 512, 175 So. 358 (Ala. 1937)
• Decision Date: 14 June 1937
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 217
• Parties: BROWN v. STANDARD CASKET MFG. CO. et al.

175 So. 358

234 Ala. 512

BROWN v. STANDARD CASKET MFG. CO. et al.

3 Div. 217

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 14, 1937

Rehearing Denied June 29, 1937

Appeal from Circuit Court, Montgomery County; Walter B. Jones Judge.

Action for damages by Irma Lee Brown against the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company and the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

An affidavit of vice president of corporation sued for injuries sustained in collision by wife of employee of affiliated company riding in corporation's automobile with consent of employee of corporation, that corporation consented and approved of employee's carrying of members of families of employees of affiliated company in automobile, warranted new trial as being newly discovered evidence which was not merely cumulative or impeaching in character, where recovery had been denied solely on ground that wife was a mere licensee.

Charge 3, given at the request of defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company, is as follows: "If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the Brown-Williamson Tobacco Corporation car entered the intersection before the other car entered the intersection, then the court instructs you that the Brown-Williamson car had the right-of-way across the intersection."

Given charge 13 is to the same effect.

Other charges given for this defendant are as follows:

7. "It is your duty to consider all the testimony and you are not authorized to render any verdict against the Brown-Williamson Tobacco Corporation if after a fair consideration of all the testimony you are not reasonably satisfied that Mr. Darby was guilty of some wrongful act on the occasion complained of which directly and proximately contributed to the injury complained of."

(17) "If you believe from the evidence that the Arnold car approached the intersection at the rate of twenty-five or thirty miles per hour and entered the intersection at that rate of speed, then I charge you that Mr. Arnold was prima facie guilty of negligence on the occasion complained of; and I further charge you that in those circumstances the Arnold car did not have the right of way across the intersection."

(19) "If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the two vehicles did not reach the intersection at approximately the same time and that the truck reached the intersection ahead of the Arnold car, then I charge you that the truck had the right of way over the intersection; and I further charge you that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the Arnold car approached the intersection at the rate of twenty-five or thirty miles per hour, then Mr. Arnold forfeited any claim to the right of way which he may have otherwise had."

(21) "The law fixes the rate of speed for automobiles along South McDonough street at 20 miles per hour; and if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that Mr. Arnold came along South McDonough street at a more rapid rate of speed than 20 miles per hour, then I charge you that Mr. Arnold was prima facie guilty of negligence and, further, that in such case, Mr. Arnold forfeited any claim to the right of way which he may have otherwise had."

McCord & Knabe, Thos. B. Hill, Jr., and Wm. Inge Hill, all of Montgomery, for appellant.

London & Yancey, of Birmingham, for appellees.

KNIGHT Justice.

Suit by appellant against the appellees to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by appellant, as the result of a collision between an automobile, owned and operated by an agent or servant of appellee Standard Casket Manufacturing Company and a truck of the appellee Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company, which was at the time operated by one of its servants or agents.

The accident occurred in the daytime, at the intersection of McDonough street and Finley avenue, in the city of Montgomery.

The plaintiff, at the time she was injured, was riding in the car of the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company, which was proceeding north along the said McDonough street, and the accident occurred in the residential section of the city.

The plaintiff stated her case in four counts, but, before the conclusion of the trial, she withdrew count 4, and the cause was tried upon counts 1, 2, and 3, charging, in substance that her injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the two defendants, their agents or servants, in causing the automobile and truck to collide.

The court, at the written request of the defendant Standard Casket Manufacturing Company, gave the general affirmative charge in its behalf, but allowed the case to go to the jury as to the defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company. The jury returned a verdict for both defendants, and judgment was duly entered thereon. The plaintiff prosecutes the appeal from said judgment.

It is obvious that the action of the trial court in giving the affirmative charge in favor of the defendant Standard Casket Manufacturing Company, at its request, proceeded upon the theory that the servant or agent of this defendant, in permitting the plaintiff to ride to Montgomery, Ala., in the car of said defendant, was acting beyond the scope and line of his employment; and that, therefore, the defendant Standard Casket Manufacturing Company owed the plaintiff no duty other than not to negligently injure her after its said agent or servant Arnold discovered her peril, or not to wantonly or willfully injure her in operating the automobile. The trial court was of the opinion that, under the evidence, the said defendant's agent, as a matter of law, was not guilty of either subsequent negligence, or of any willful or wanton misconduct. In this conclusion we concur.

It appears from the evidence, without conflict, that the husband of the plaintiff was in the employ of the Brown Service Funeral Home; that he had quite recently been transferred by his company to Dothan, there to take charge of the company's business as district manager. This company was engaged in "writing funeral or burial insurance and providing funerals for its policy holders."

Mr. Arnold, the operator of the car of the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company, was in the employ of both the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company and the Brown Service Funeral Home. The plaintiff's husband was not connected in any way with the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company.

On August 31, 1935, Mr. Arnold was in Dothan on business of both companies, and on that day plaintiff's husband arranged with Arnold for her to ride with him to Montgomery in order to pack the household furniture of her husband, preparatory to the removal of the same to Dothan. The furniture was to be transferred from Montgomery to Dothan at the expense of the Brown Service Funeral Home.

It was on this trip from Dothan to Montgomery that the car of the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company figured in the collision with the truck of the defendant Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company--and in which plaintiff received her injuries.

There was no evidence in the case, until after the trial, tending, in the slightest degree, to show that the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company had any knowledge of, or had consented to, the arrangement made by plaintiff's husband with the said Arnold, its agent or servant, by which plaintiff was allowed to ride in the car of the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company to Montgomery.

As to Arnold, the agent or servant of the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company, the plaintiff was, no doubt, an invitee under the rule of our decisions. Wurtzburger v. Oglesby, 222 Ala. 151, 131 So. 9; First National Bank of Dothan et al. v. Sanders, 225 Ala. 417, 143 So. 578. But as to the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company the relation was ostensibly that of a mere licensee. Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., 206 Ala. 71, 89 So. 285; McCauley v. Tennessee C.I. Co., 93 Ala. 356, 9 So. 611; Lawrence v. Kaul Lumber Co., 171 Ala. 300, 55 So. 111; First National Bank of Dothan et al. v. Sanders, supra.

Under the evidence, the court committed no error in giving the general affirmative charge for the defendant Standard Casket Manufacturing Company.

While the Brown Service Funeral Home is not a party defendant to this suit, nevertheless, the plaintiff offered to show "to the court and jury, that Lee Edmundson is the president of the company and owns both of the companies, and Mr. Arnold was his agent, working for both companies at the time; offers to show to the jury and the court that Edmundson was President of the Brown Funeral Home, and is the main stockholder, controlling stockholder and director in the Standard Casket Manufacturing Company, and that Arnold is an agent of his, working for both companies, and was, on that date; and your Honor. ***"

The court refused to allow the plaintiff to make this proof, and to which ruling the plaintiff duly reserved an exception. In this ruling there was no error.

This court, in the case of Jefferson County Burial Society et al. v. Cotton, 222 Ala. 578, 133 So. 256, 259, held the legal fiction of distinct corporate existence may be disregarded in a case where a corporation is so organized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation. And it was further held in that case that, while "as a general rule the legal fiction of distinct corporate entity will be recognized and enforced to protect the corporation in the conduct of its business, the principle should not be carried so far as to enable the corporation to become a vehicle to evade just responsibility."

This statement of the rule is sound, and we are willing to reaffirm it. However, in that case both...