Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 12 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 20110481,20110141.,s. 20110481 |
| Citation | 738 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,308 P.3d 486 |
| Parties | Debra BROWN, Appellee and Cross-appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Appellant and Cross-appellee. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John E. Swallow, Att'y Gen., Patrick B. Nolan, Scott W. Reed, Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Alan L. Sullivan, Christopher Martinez, Elizabeth Fasse, Christine R. Poleshuk, Salt Lake City, for appellee and cross-appellant.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 In 1995, a jury convicted Debra Brown for the murder of Lael Brown. Fourteen years later, in 2009, Ms. Brown filed a petition for a post-conviction determination of factual innocence pursuant to Utah's Post–Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA).1 The post-conviction court granted Ms. Brown's petition and held an evidentiary hearing. The court interpreted Part 4 of the PCRA to allow its determination of factual innocence to be based on a combination of newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence. It then, based on the evidence Ms. Brown presented at her factual innocence hearing, determined that Ms. Brown established her factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. It therefore vacated her 1995 murder conviction, and the State appealed.
¶ 2 We affirm the post-conviction court. We hold that a post-conviction determination of factual innocence can be based on both newly discovered evidence and previously available evidence. Further, because the State did not properly challenge the post-conviction court's factual findings, we affirm the post-conviction court's ultimate determination that Ms. Brown is factually innocent.
¶ 3 On Sunday, November 7, 1993, Ms. Brown told police that she discovered her long-time employer Lael Brown (Lael) dead in his bed.2 Lael had been shot in the head three times. Ms. Brown told police that Lael had been feeling sick and that she had delivered soup to him the day before. She claimed that Lael did not answer his door at the time, so she left the soup on his doorstep. She further claimed that she discovered the soup was still sitting on Lael's doorstep the next day. She stated that when Lael again did not answer his door, she used a key Lael had given her to let herself into his house where she discovered his body.
¶ 4 On September 9, 1994, police arrested Ms. Brown and charged her with Lael's murder. At Ms. Brown's 1995 trial, the State presented a circumstantial case that largely depended on Ms. Brown's inability to offer an alibi during the time the State argued Lael must have been murdered. First, the State presented evidence showing no signs of forced entry into Lael's home. The State claimed Lael always locked his doors and that the front door locked automatically. Further, the State offered evidence that Ms. Brown had access to Lael's house. She had been in his home on previous occasions to clean and paint and had one of only two known keys to Lael's house. The second key belonged to Lael and was found on his key ring.
¶ 5 The evidence at trial also showed that Lael was shot with a .22 caliber handgun. An expert testified that the murder weapon could have been Lael's Colt Woodsman, which was missing from Lael's home after the murder. Testimony indicated that Lael was seen alive Friday evening but was not seen following his usual routine of drinking coffee at Angie's Restaurant on Saturday morning. Lael did not answer his phone on Saturday, and no one saw him working around his house, even though his truck was parked at home. Lael also did not return Saturday to finish repairs for a tenant that he had started the evening before.
¶ 6 The medical examiner, Dr. Grey, testified at trial that, based solely on the physical evidence, Lael was likely murdered between 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 6, and 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, November 7. Dr. Grey also testified that “association factors,” like Lael's regular routine and the time he was last seen alive, could expand the time-of-death estimate beyond what the physical evidence suggested. Based on these factors, Dr. Grey agreed that Lael could have been murdered between Friday evening, when Lael was last seen alive, and Sunday morning.
¶ 7 Ms. Brown accounted for her whereabouts during the time Lael could have been murdered, except for a period between 6:40 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 6. At about 6:40 a.m., Ms. Brown left her then-boyfriend's house after spending the night. And at around 10:00 a.m., Ms. Brown's son saw her making soup. The State put on evidence that Lael's neighbor, Paulette Nyman, heard two gunshots on Saturday at about 7:00 a.m.
¶ 8 Finally, the evidence at trial showed that the only property missing from Lael's home after his murder was his wallet, his .22 caliber Colt Woodsman, his October bank statement, and canceled checks from October and previous months. Copies of the bank statement and canceled checks later showed that several checks were made payable to Ms. Brown, but these checks had apparently been forged.
¶ 9 A jury convicted Ms. Brown of aggravated murder. In 1996, she appealed her conviction to us. She challenged, among other things, the sufficiency of the evidence the jury relied on to convict her.3 We recognized that there was no direct evidence tying Ms. Brown to the murder and that the State's case against her was entirely circumstantial.4 We noted that a large part of the State's circumstantial case was Ms. Brown's inability to offer an alibi during the time the State argued Lael must have been murdered.5 But we also recognized that a jury can base its verdict on sufficient circumstantial evidence.6 Specifically, we concluded that the jury, based on the evidence available, could have drawn the following reasonable inferences: First, because there were no signs of forced entry, the jury could have inferred that Lael's murderer likely gained access to his house by key and shot Lael while he was asleep in bed.7 Second, because the medical examiner testified to a time of death between 9:00 p.m. on Friday and 3:00 a.m. on Sunday and a neighbor testified to hearing gunshots at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, the jury could have inferred that Lael was murdered at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday.8
¶ 10 Third, because Lael's gun, which was the same caliber as the murder weapon, was missing, the jury could have inferred that the murderer used Lael's gun to shoot Lael.9 Fourth, because Ms. Brown had been in Lael's home to clean, the jury could have inferred that she knew where Lael kept his gun and financial papers.10 Fifth, because the only things missing from Lael's house were his wallet, gun, and October bank statement, the murderer likely had a personal interest in that property and, due to her forgeries, the jury could have inferred that Ms. Brown had such an interest.11 Sixth, Ms. Brown gave inconsistent statements concerning her reason for leaving soup on Lael's doorstep, and the jury could have wondered why, given that she had a key, she did not put the soup inside.12
¶ 11 Seventh, the defense could not account for Ms. Brown's whereabouts around 7:00 a.m. when gunshots were heard, but the defense could account for her whereabouts prior to 6:40 a.m. and after 10:00 a.m. on Saturday.13 Finally, because the murderer likely entered by key, and only Lael and Ms. Brown were known to have keys to Lael's house, the jury could have inferred that Ms. Brown was the murderer.14 Based on these reasonable inferences, we determined that the evidence was sufficient to support Ms. Brown's conviction for Lael's murder.15
¶ 12 In 2002, the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center (RMIC) began investigating Ms. Brown's conviction. In 2009, based on new evidence that the RMIC believed challenged the State's circumstantial case, Ms. Brown petitioned the post-conviction court for relief. She filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Part 1 of the PCRA and a petition for post-conviction determination of factual innocence under Part 4 of the PCRA.
¶ 13 In her petition under Part 1 of the PCRA, Ms. Brown made five claims for relief.16 The State moved for summary judgment on each of those claims, arguing that summary judgment was proper because Part 1 of the PCRA either foreclosed her requested relief or her claims were untimely under Part 1's statute of limitations. Ms. Brown disputed that her claims were time-barred and argued alternatively that the PCRA's statute of limitations is unconstitutional because it does not have an “interests of justice” exception. The post-conviction court ultimately granted the State's motion for summary judgment and found the PCRA's statute of limitations to be constitutional.
¶ 14 Next, in response to Ms. Brown's petition for a post-conviction determination of factual innocence under Part 4 of the PCRA, the State filed a motion to dismiss on May 11, 2009. The post-conviction court denied the State's motion, however, because it found that “a bona fide issue does exist as to whether [Ms. Brown] is factually innocent.” After discovery, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on January 18–24, 2011.
¶ 15 At the January 18–24 hearing, Ms. Brown presented evidence that she characterized as newly discovered. First, she presented evidence “challenging the State's theory that she was the only person who had a motive to kill Lael.” This evidence showed that Lael did not discover Ms. Brown's forgeriesbefore his murder. It also showed that bank statements from months other than October were missing from Lael's home. Further, the evidence showed that Lael's former tenant, Bobbie Sheen, was angry that Lael had evicted him.
¶ 16 Second, Ms. Brown presented evidence “challenging the State's theory that she was the only person who had access to Lael's home.” This evidence showed that people other than Ms. Brown had a key to Lael's house. It also showed that Lael's house was not...
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