Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 13 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | 3 Div. 964 |
| Citation | 686 So.2d 385 |
| Parties | Raymond Eugene BROWN v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Raymond Eugene Brown was convicted of four counts of capital murder for the killings of Linda LeMonte and Sheila Smoke. The appellant was sentenced to death. For a recital of the facts in this case, see Brown v. State, 571 So.2d 345 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), writ quashed, 571 So.2d 353 (Ala.1990).
On April 27, 1990, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment because the voir dire examination of the jury venire was insufficient to allow the trial court to make an independent determination as to whether the jurors' impartiality had been affected by the extensive publicity surrounding this case. See Brown, supra. On June 10, 1991, the United States Supreme Court vacated this Court's judgment and remanded the case to this Court for further consideration in light of Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). See Alabama v. Brown, 501 U.S. 1201, 111 S.Ct. 2791, 115 L.Ed.2d 966 (1991). On July 26, 1991, this Court again reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that both the facts and the applicable law in this case are distinguishable from Mu'Min. See Brown v. State, 586 So.2d 991 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). On April 10, 1992, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed this Court's judgment, concluding that trial court had "acquired adequate information from the venire to make an independent determination as to whether the jurors would be impartial" and remanded the case to this Court. See Brown v. State, 632 So.2d 14, 17 (Ala.1992).
On remand, this Court on September 18, 1992, in light of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), remanded this case to the trial court so that a hearing could be held to determine whether the prosecution could provide racially neutral reasons for the use of its peremptory strikes to remove blacks from the jury. See Brown v. State, 632 So.2d 17 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).
Pursuant to this Court's instructions, the trial court held a hearing and required the prosecutor in this case, Jimmy Evans, to give reasons for striking 20 of 23 blacks from the jury venire. Following the hearing, the trial court found that the prosecutor had given racially neutral reasons for each of the State's strikes. This cause is now before this Court on return to remand.
In this Court's September 18, 1992 opinion, we held that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination had been established by the defense based on the fact that the prosecution had used 20 of its 23 strikes to remove blacks from the jury and based on the history of the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office with regard to its use of peremptory strikes to remove blacks from the juries. The State urges this Court to reexamine its finding that the appellant established a prima facie case of discrimination.
The State argues that its pattern of strikes does not provide strong evidence of discrimination. We disagree. Here, there were 24 blacks on the venire. Defense counsel struck one black and the State struck 20 of the 23 remaining blacks on the venire. Thus, the State used 87% of its strikes to remove blacks leaving a jury that was 25% black.
Kidd v. State, 649 So.2d 1304 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). See also Ex parte Thomas, 659 So.2d 3 (Ala.1994).
The State also argues that the fact that the State struck whites before it struck any blacks is evidence that its pattern of strikes was not discriminatory. This Court rejected this argument Freeman v. State, 651 So.2d 576 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).
The State further argues that it is the district attorney's staff, and not the district attorney himself, that has shown a history of discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes. This Court in Freeman also rejected the State's argument that the district attorney is not responsible "for his staff's observation of or failure to observe the requirements of Batson and Branch." Freeman, 651 So.2d at 587.
During the hearing on the Batson motion, the district attorney stated that his reasons for striking the jurors were based on a reconstruction of the notes from when the jury was struck. The district attorney stated that before he strikes a jury, the jury list is divided by the individual characteristics of the potential jurors such as "age, sex, and race." (Record on Return to Remand (R.R.R.) 21.) In this particular case, the district attorney stated that he was trying to compose a jury "tailored to what we were going to do to try to debunk the insanity defense." (R.R.R. 22.) The district attorney stated that he wished to have persons on the jury who were older, mature, married, employed, and had children.
The following are the reasons given by the district attorney for his strikes:
Juror 7 (white male--age 60) was struck because he indicated that he was opposed to the death penalty and that religion was the most important thing in his life.
Juror 145 (white female--age 44) was struck because she had been cited for traffic violations in 1987 and because her husband was a psychologist.
Juror 127 (black female--age 20) was struck because she was single, young, and had no children. Her employment status was unclear. There was a question as to whether she worked at the Gayfers department store's warehouse. The district attorney had information that she worked at the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board warehouse and several investigations had been conducted there. The district attorney felt that "if she had worked at that A.B.C. warehouse, there was a possibility during the course of that investigation that she might have been interviewed and there might be some hostility to the office based on the investigation." (R. 34.)
Juror 37 (black female--age 26) was struck because she was single and had no children and because she had a minor history of traffic violations.
Juror 44 (black female--age 26) was struck because the district attorney believed she had a larceny conviction in 1987. Further, she worked at a prison and the district attorney's office was conducting an investigation of prisons at the time.
Juror 148 (black female--age unknown) was struck because she had a minor traffic violation and because she had a master's degree in psychology.
Juror 40 (black female--age 27) was struck because she was single, young, and had no children. She spoke in a loud and strong voice and the district attorney felt that she would not be easily persuaded by others.
Juror 79 (black female--age 28) was struck because she was single, relatively young, and unemployed.
Juror 46 (black female--age 33) was struck because she had been convicted of fraud.
Juror 134 (black female--age 30) was struck because she was single and had no children.
Juror 121 (black female--age 35) was struck because she was employed at Brockway Glass and the district attorney's office had conducted a major investigation of alleged embezzlement by employees. The district attorney did not feel "it was in the best interest of the State to have someone who may have been employed when there was an extensive employee embezzlement there." (R. 42.)
Juror 72 (black female--age 40) was struck because she had been convicted of fraud.
Juror 87 (black male--age 42) was struck because he had a minor traffic offense and a "child restraint violation." The district attorney did not know what the nature of that violation was and he had "no way of finding out at that particular time." (R. 43.)
Juror 117 (black male--age 22) was a college student. He was struck because he was young, unmarried, and had no children. The district attorney could not determine if he was employed.
Juror 143 (black male--age 21) was struck because he was single and had no children. He also had a traffic violation for driving on the wrong side of the road and the district attorney could not determine if that violation was the result of a plea on a charge of driving under the influence.
Juror 137 (black male--age 21) was struck because he was young and had no children and because he stated that religion was very important in his life. The district attorney also stated that he was unsure whether this potential juror would have trouble following the judge's instruction because he was a minister.
Juror 70 (black female--age 55) was struck because she was single and had no children and it was unclear whether she worked in the mental health facilities at Baptist Hospital.
Juror 2 (black female--age 48) was struck because she had a relative who had been convicted of larceny as a result of prosecution by the district attorney's office, and they lived at the same address. Furthermore, she indicated that she was a widow who did not want to be on the jury because she could not afford to take time off work.
Juror 19 (black female--age 61) was struck because her record showed a 1957 violation of the prohibition law and because she had a loud voice.
Juror 28 (black...
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