Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 22 July 1924
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 880.
• Citation: 101 So. 224,20 Ala.App. 178
• Parties: BROWN v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

101 So. 224

20 Ala.App. 178

BROWN v. STATE.

4 Div. 880.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

July 22, 1924

Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County; J. S. Williams, Judge.

Emmett Brown was convicted of arson in the first degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

McDowell & McDowell, of Eufaula, for appellant.

Harwell G. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Lamar Field Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKEN P.J.

The facts, as shown by this record, disclose that on January 2 1923, a building in the city of Eufaula, partly occupied by this defendant as a vulcanizing shop, etc., was destroyed by fire, and that in said fire two unfortunate people, father and daughter, who occupied living rooms on the second floor of said building, perished; that on or about March 12th 1923, this defendant was arrested upon a warrant sworn out by one Shaffer, a deputy state fire marshal, which charged the defendant with arson in the first degree, in that he willfully set fire to or burned said building, etc. On May 1, 1923, an indictment was returned into open court by the grand jury of said county charging him with the same offense. He was tried and convicted and the jury fixed his punishment at imprisonment in the pentitentiary for a term of ten years; he was duly sentenced accordingly, and appeals.

The controlling question presented is whether or not the corpus delicti was proven. Able counsel for appellant strenuously insist that it was not, and that the lower court erred in submitting this question to the jury and in admitting the alleged confession of the defendant. Counsel for appellant contend that the defendant was entitled to the affirmative charge on the grounds that the evidence adduced upon this trial in the court below failed to establish the corpus delicti.

The rule relating to the corpus delicti has many times been stated. It is that in every criminal case the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime has been committed. This may be shown by circumstantial evidence if the proof thereof be satisfactory under the required rules of evidence; and, if any facts are shown from which the jury may reasonably infer that the crime has been committed, the trial court is under the duty to submit the question to the jury, and, when the evidence attains this status, any other legal evidence tending to implicate the person charged is rendered admissible. A mere extrajudicial confession, uncorroborated by other facts, is not sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.

An elementary rule of law is that a defendant is not entitled to the affirmative charge, where there is a conflict in the testimony. In other words, the general charge should never be given when there is any evidence, however weak and inconclusive it may be, tending to make out the case against the defendant-the person accused.

The instant case has had our careful and attentive consideration. We are at a loss to understand how it can be seriously insisted that there is no evidence of the corpus delicti, or facts shown, if believed, from which the jury could reasonably infer that the crime had been committed. For instance, the testimony of state witness Kimpsey, who testified that he was in the employ of the defendant, and that on three separate occasions shortly prior to the time of the fire the defendant tried insistently to get him to set fire to and burn the building, and that, failing to do so he, "the defendant, stated that he would do it himself then," and that this was on the same day or the day before the fire occurred. There was other testimony given by this witness of similar incriminating import, and its tendency was very damaging to defendant. It is true that this witness Kimpsey was impeached by practically every method known to the law of evidence. The testimony of numerous witnesses tended to show that his general character was bad, and that they would not believe him on oath in a court of justice. This testimony appears without dispute or conflict, and no witness was offered to sustain the character of Kimpsey. He was further impeached by the testimony of several witnesses to the effect that he had made statements relative to his knowledge of this case on several prior occasions different to the statements made on the trial. From the undisputed facts, and from his general demeanor and conduct, it may be, as contended by counsel for appellant,...