Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 20 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 62217-5,61376-1 and 61375-3,s. 62217-5 |
| Citation | 130 Wn.2d 430,924 P.2d 908 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | John F. BROWN, Jr., and Priscilla J. Brown, husband and wife; Maynard H. Linder and Deloris J. Linder, husband and wife; John L. Miller and Darlene L. Miller, husband and wife; Truman Winegar and Phoebe Winegar, husband and wife; and B.F. George and Nina George, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The STATE of Washington, Respondent/Cross Appellant. Paul Herman HARDER, a single person; Eloise Potts, a widow; and Robert H. and Norma M. Spencer, husband and wife, Respondents, v. The STATE of Washington, Appellant. Norman and Arlene BAILEY, husband and wife; Belsby Ranches, Inc., a Washington corporation; U.S. Bank of Washington, as Trustee of the Wilmer Trust; James W. and Doris G. Potts, husband and wife; Harold and Agnes Clem, husband and wife; Baker-Boyer Bank, as Trustee of the Rosalia Baker-Smith Trust; Gertrude Simpson, a married person dealing in her sole and separate property; Theodore K. Simpson, a married person dealing in his sole and separate property; Francis W. Simpson, a married person dealing in his sole and separate property; John B. Simpson, a married person dealing in his sole and separate property; Thomas A. Simpson, a married person dealing in his sole and separate property; Mary Rickel, a single person; Margaret Smith, a single person; Charles Lowe, a single person; Judy Lowe, a single person; Michael L. and Linda Hall Siler, husband and wife; L. Laverne and Mary Elizabeth Siler, husband and wife, Maurice Allert, a married man dealing in his sole and separate property; Evonne Donna Carlson, a single person; C. Louise Cox, a single person; Eva Ellwart, a single person; Mary Hill, a single person; Amy Hill, a single person; James Hill, a single person; and Marie Hill, a single person, Respondents, v. The STATE of Washington, Appellant. |
Kenneth D. Beckley, Attorney at Law, Ellensburg, for appellants Brown, Linder, Miller, Winegar, and George.
Keller, Rohrback, T. David Copley, John H. Bright, III, Seattle, for the State.
Dan J. Cadagan, III, Attorney at Law, Spokane, for respondents Bailey, Belsby Ranches, Inc., Simpson, Carlson, Cox, Ellwart, Harder, Potts, and Spencer.
This case involves a dispute over title to property formerly used as a railway in Adams, Kittitas and Whitman counties. The dispute is between abutting property owners claiming reversionary interests and the State, which purchased the property from the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company (Milwaukee) for a rails to trail project. The property owners claim the property reverted to them when Milwaukee discontinued its rail service because Milwaukee held only right of way easements in the property. The State claims fee simple title based upon the original interest conveyed when Milwaukee acquired the property either by deed or charter from the federal government. We hold the original deeds conveyed fee simple title to Milwaukee, and therefore, the State, based on the facts the deeds are in statutory warranty form, expressly convey fee simple title, and contain no express or clear limitation or qualification otherwise. In addition, we hold the property Milwaukee obtained by charter did not revert to the property owners, based on the fact Congress authorized the sale before abandonment pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. § 912. We affirm the trial court's decision in Kittitas County and reverse the trial courts' decisions in Adams and Whitman counties.
Milwaukee acquired most of the property at issue between 1906 and 1910 for the purpose of constructing a railway across eastern Washington, linking Tacoma and Seattle to Idaho and eventually the Missouri River. F.H. Wilson, A Brief Record of the Milwaukee Road (1935). Milwaukee acquired most of the property by 37 deeds and the remaining parcels by charter from the federal government under the General Railroad Right of Way Act of 1875 (the 1875 Act). 1 Most of the deeds at issue in this case are on preprinted forms with blank lines containing handwritten descriptions of the property conveyed. The following deed from Whitman County is typical of most of the deeds at issue in this case. The underlined portions indicate the handwritten sections of the deed.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That Geo. D. Brown and Annie L. Brown his Wife of Spokane County, State of Washington, for and in consideration of Ten & 00/100 Dollars, to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do ____ hereby convey and Warrant unto the CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, its successors and assigns, a strip of land, one hundred feet in width, extending over and across from the South side to the East side of the following described tract of land situated in the County of Whitman, State of Washington, and described as follows, to-wit: Southeast Quarter 1/4 Section Twenty Three (23) thence to the North side of Section Twenty Four (24) and thence to the Eastside of the Southwest Quarter ( 1/4) of the Southeast ( 1/4) of Section Thirteen (13) all being in the Township Nineteen (19) North of Range Forty (40) E. Wm. Except such land owned by the International Land Co.....
HEREBY CONVEYING a strip, belt or piece of land fifty feet in width on each side of the center line of the Railway of said Company, as now located and established over and across said land. Also conveying the following extra widths for excavations, embankments, depositing waste earth, and borrowing pits, as follows: Two strip[s] of land each fifty (50) feet in width and bordering one on either side of the strip of land first above described and extending from station # 576 to the Eastside of the Southwest Quarter.... And said Grantors for the consideration aforesaid, for themselves and for their heirs, assigns and legal representative, further grant _____ to said Company, its successors and assigns, the right to protect any cuts which may be made on said land, by erecting on both sides thereof, and within one hundred and fifty feet from said center line, portable snow fences....
HEREBY GRANTING AND CONVEYING to said Company, its successors and assigns, a fee simple title to said strip of land, together with all rights, privileges and immunities that might be acquired by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
....
Clerk's Papers (Bailey) at 532.
Milwaukee sold the property it acquired under these deeds and charter to the State as part of reorganization proceedings instigated under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1174. Milwaukee instigated the proceedings in 1977 following three years of losses totaling $100 million. In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 611 F.2d 662, 665 (7th Cir.1979) (hereinafter cited as CMSP & P ), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir.1980).
In response to the reorganization proceedings, Congress passed the Milwaukee Railroad Restructuring Act (Restructuring Act), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-922. The Restructuring Act provided short-term funding and required continuation of service on all lines until a reorganization plan was approved or Congress expressly permitted abandonment. The Restructuring Act also authorized the reorganization court to sell any of Milwaukee's rail properties as of October 15, 1979. 45 U.S.C.A. § 903(a). By April 1980, no reorganization plan had been put forward, and the reorganization court authorized immediate abandonment but ordered:
the Trustee to fully pursue all possibilities for sale of portions of these lines for continued rail operation or other public use before he disturbs any track or facilities west of Miles City, Montana, or takes any other step which would impede such sales.
Clerk's Papers (Bailey) at 494.
Unable to sell any portions of the lines for rail purposes, the trustee sought permission to sell Milwaukee's property in Adams, Kittitas and Whitman counties to the State of Washington. The reorganization court authorized the sale in December 1981 and shortly thereafter the trustee conveyed the property to the State by quitclaim deed. 2
Following the sale, the property owners sued the State to quiet title in the property in three separate actions. 3 In Kittitas County, the superior court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action and quieting title in the State. Conversely, in Adams and Whitman counties, the trial courts on summary judgment found full fee title reverted to most of the property owners when Milwaukee discontinued its rail service. As to the charter parcels, which are located in Adams County, the trial court stated: "I think clearly ... what the railroad gets on charter ... is an easement that will revert when the line is abandoned." Clerk's Papers (Harder) at 413. On this issue, the trial court granted summary judgment to the property owners because it found the property reverted to them before the sale to the State.
The State appealed Bailey and Harder, and the property owners appealed Brown. The appeals were consolidated and transferred here pursuant to RAP 4.3.
Many courts have considered whether a railroad deed conveys fee simple title or an easement. See A.E. Korpela, Annot., Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 A.L.R.3d 973 (1966). The decisions are in considerable disarray and usually turn on a case-by-case examination of each deed. See Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of Property § 8.9, at 460 (2d ed. 1993).
In general, when construing a deed, the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce. 4 Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wash.2d 533, 535, 225 P.2d 199 (1950); Zobrist v. Culp, 95 Wash.2d 556, 560, 627 P.2d 1308 (1981). In this case, where the original parties utilized the statutory warranty form deed and the granting...
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