Brown v. State

• Citation: 674 N.E.2d 1129,89 N.Y.2d 172,652 N.Y.S.2d 223
• Parties: , 674 N.E.2d 1129, 65 USLW 2355 Ricky BROWN et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 19 November 1996
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 223

652 N.Y.S.2d 223

89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 65 USLW 2355

Ricky BROWN et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 19, 1996.

Whiteman Osterman & Hanna, Albany (Scott N. Fein, Paul C. Rapp, Philip H. Dixon, D. Scott Bassinson and Lisa M. Codispoti, of counsel), for appellants.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Albany (Denise A. Hartman and Peter H. Schiff, of counsel), for respondent.

James A. Gardner, Stephentown, Christopher Dunn and Norman Siegel, New York City, for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.

Stenger and Finnerty, Buffalo (Michael L. Jackson of counsel), and Michael Deutsch, New York City, for Center for Constitutional Rights, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

This is a purported class action brought on behalf of nonwhite males who were stopped and examined by police officers between September 4, 1992 and September 9, 1992 while the police were investigating a crime in the City of Oneonta. The claimants seek monetary damages from the defendant alleging illegal and unconstitutional acts by the State of New York, the New York State Police, the State University of New York and the State University of New York, College at Oneonta (SUCO) and various officers and employees of those entities.

Before answering, the State moved to dismiss alleging that the claim was facially defective because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and the claim failed to state any cause of action. The Court of Claims granted the motion, holding (a) that constitutional torts are not cognizable in the Court of Claims; (b) that direct actions for violations of the New York State Constitution's Bill of Rights, specifically the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to equal protection under the law, are not cognizable claims in any court in the State absent some link to a common-law "traditional" tort; (c) that actions for negligent training and supervision are not cognizable claims in the Court of Claims where the underlying harm--in this case, constitutional violations--are themselves not matters within the court's jurisdiction; and (d) that actions based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 do not lie against States. The Appellate Division affirmed.

The primary issues presented to this Court are whether, absent either a statute expressly authorizing such claims or a traditional common-law tort theory supporting money damages, the Court of Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction of these tort claims against the State and whether claimants state causes of action against defendant based upon rights secured to them by the State and Federal Constitutions and various State statutes.

The order should be modified. The Court of Claims has subject-matter jurisdiction of the claim. Notwithstanding jurisdiction to hear claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, however, claimants do not state causes of action under that statute. The causes of action seeking damages based upon provisions of the New York Constitution are facially sufficient and should be reinstated. For purposes of deciding this appeal, we assume the truth of the factual allegations asserted by claimants.

I

The claims arise out of an incident occurring in the early morning of September 4, 1992 when a 77-year-old white woman was reportedly attacked at knifepoint in a house outside Oneonta city limits, near the State University campus. The victim described her assailant as a black male and police determined that he may have cut his hand during the alleged attack.

Having failed to identify a suspect during the morning following the attack, the New York State Police and SUCO security personnel prevailed upon SUCO officials to prepare a computer generated list from the University computer system containing the name and address of every African-American male attending the University. Using this list, State Police, SUCO security personnel and local law enforcement officers sought to question each student named on it. African-American students were interrogated in their dormitories, on the SUCO campus, in off-campus apartments and on the streets in and around the City of Oneonta. The interrogations were systematic, consisting of a "stop" followed by questions regarding potential involvement in the incident, requests for alibis, and an inspection of the students' hands and forearms.

When these efforts failed to yield any suspects, the State Police and local law enforcement officials embarked on a five-day "street sweep" in which every nonwhite male found in and around the City of Oneonta was stopped and similarly interrogated. In the nearly four years since the incident, no one has been arrested for the crime.

Claimants instituted this action asserting that the conduct of defendants was racially motivated and denied them rights guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitutions. ¹

II

These claims sound in constitutional tort. ² Analysis starts by defining what is meant by that term.

A constitutional tort is any action for damages for violation of a constitutional right against a government or individual defendants. Constitutional tort claims were first recognized after the Civil War when Congress authorized civil damage actions against those "who, under color of" State law, or custom have deprived others of constitutional rights (Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 U.S. Stat. 13). Those statutes, now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. remained relatively obscure until the 1961 decision of the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492. In Monroe, the Court held that a plaintiff whose constitutional rights have been infringed by one acting under color of State law can bring a Federal action under section 1983 even where the State provides an adequate remedy at common law (but see, Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 8). The statute was intended to create "a species of tort liability" in favor of persons deprived of their constitutional rights (see, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 [quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 988, 47 L.Ed.2d 128] ).

In addition, in 1971, the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for damages based upon duties defined in the Federal Constitution (see, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619). The Court did not predicate recovery on the civil rights statutes but implied a cause of action for damages based on the guarantees against unlawful searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment. A number of States have similarly recognized causes of action against individuals and governments for constitutional torts based upon local law (see, e.g., Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921; Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal.3d 458, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592; Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, 390 Mass. 652, 459 N.E.2d 453; Newell v. City of Elgin, 34 Ill.App.3d 719, 340 N.E.2d 344; see generally, Friesen, State Constitutional Law p 7.05[2]; and see, p 7.07[1] [for a list of States viewing favorably damage remedies for violation of State constitutional provisions] ).

Although the Supreme Court has drawn on common-law principles to define the scope of liability in these actions, and constitutional and common-law torts frequently protect similar interests, the causes of action are not coextensive (see generally, Whitman, op. cit., at 14; Wells and Eaton Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 201, 233; and see, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S., at 258, 98 S.Ct., at 1049, supra ). The common law of tort deals with the relation between individuals by imposing on one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other and assessing damages for harm occasioned by a failure to fulfill that obligation (Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 53, at 356 [5th ed.] ). Common-law duties arise in virtually all relationships and protect against most risks of harm. Constitutional duties, by contrast, address a limited number of concerns and a limited set of relationships. Constitutions assign rights to individuals and impose duties on the government to regulate the government's actions to protect them. It is the failure to fulfill a stated constitutional duty which may support a claim for damages in a constitutional tort action.

Claimants ask that we recognize a damage remedy against the State based on the New York Constitution as Congress, the Supreme Court and several State courts have done before us based on the Federal and State Constitutions.

III Jurisdiction

The first question presented is the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to entertain constitutional tort claims.

Under the common law, a State is immune from suit unless it waives its sovereign immunity. The provisions applicable here are contained in article VI, § 9 of the State Constitution, which continues the Court of Claims and authorizes the Legislature to determine its jurisdiction, and the Court of Claims Act, which contains the waiver of immunity and the jurisdictional and procedural provisions necessary to implement the constitutional section. The Court of Claims declined to exercise jurisdiction in this case because it believed the statutes were not sufficiently broad to waive the State's immunity from suit for constitutional torts.

Sovereign immunity has been described as an "outmoded" holdover of the notion that the King can do no wrong (Breuer, The New York State Court of Claims: Its History, Jurisdiction and Reports, at 13). While the State and its agencies must pay for property taken for public purposes, in the absence of consent, immunity is otherwise a complete protection under the common law (see generally, Restatement [Second] of Torts § 895B). In the past, New York waived immunity and compensated aggrieved parties for very few claims and they...