Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 22 December 1989
• Docket Number: C4-89-854,Nos. C2-89-853,s. C2-89-853
• Citation: Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1989)
• Parties: Jacob S. BROWN, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 180

449 N.W.2d 180

Jacob S. BROWN, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

Nos. C2-89-853, C4-89-854.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 22, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

Record on appeal does not support defendant's contention that district court erred in accepting guilty pleas or that district court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on defendant's pro se motion for permission to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Susan K. Maki, Asst. State Public Defender, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Michael Richardson, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

COYNE, Justice.

Defendant, Jacob S. Brown, appeals from an order of the district court denying him postconviction relief from his convictions of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder, for which he is serving concurrent terms of life imprisonment and 130 months in prison. Defendant argues that the district court (1) erred in refusing to allow him permission to withdraw the guilty pleas on which the convictions are based or (2) at least erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the denial of relief. If, however, defendant renews his petition to withdraw his guilty pleas and pleads factual allegations supporting the need for an evidentiary hearing, then the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing.

This proceeding arises out of the events of the morning of December 17, 1987, when defendant went to the residence of his estranged friend, Carmen Larson, to pick up some personal property. While there defendant attempted to discuss their relationship. According to defendant's testimony at the guilty plea hearing, when he refused Larson's request that he leave, Larson went to her bedroom and grabbed a baseball bat. Defendant admitted that he took the bat from Larson and began hitting her on the head with it. He also admitted that he went into a bedroom and beat Larson's friend, Michelle Raisch, with the bat. Finally, he admitted that he twice grabbed a knife from the kitchen and stabbed Larson a total of 10 times and Raisch at least 21 times. Larson died later that day. Raisch survived and identified defendant as the assailant.

Police arrested defendant at the apartment he shared with his mother. In a warranted search, the police seized a garbage bag containing defendant's bloody clothing from a dumpster behind the apartment building. Police also learned that defendant was under investigation for the theft of a government vehicle and that Larson not only was the government's primary witness against defendant but had given a statement.

The grand jury indictment charged defendant with first and second-degree murder in the killing of Larson and with attempted first and second-degree murder and assault in the first degree in the attack on Raisch.

Represented by counsel, defendant waived his right to a jury trial. On the day set for trial, defendant agreed to enter guilty pleas to first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder. After accepting the pleas, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of life in prison and 130 months.

Later, defendant's attorney filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking an order making the sentences run concurrently pursuant to a "side agreement" not made a part of the public record at the time the guilty pleas were entered. As we understand the terms of this agreement, defense counsel was informed that he should wait six months and then petition for postconviction relief. The sentence then would be modified, provided defendant's behavior in prison was not inconsistent with such a modification.

Because the district court granted the petition for postconviction relief filed by defendant's trial counsel and ordered that the sentences run concurrently, the agreement does not affect the course of this appeal. We are compelled, however, to reiterate our disapproval of covert agreements. As we said in Smude v. State, 310 Minn. 225, 227, 249 N.W.2d 876, 877 (1976), one of the reasons for requiring record disclosures of plea agreements is to deter the making of undesirable bargains by subjecting them to public scrutiny. The side agreement in this case not only was not open to public scrutiny but was highly unorthodox in content.

The issues on this appeal relate not to the sentence but to a pro se motion filed by defendant seeking permission to withdraw his guilty pleas and face trial on the indictment. The circumstances relating to this motion are not clear from the record. Defendant's brief, filed by the state public defender, states, "At the hearing on [the postconviction] petition, [defendant] made a pro se motion requesting that he be allowed to withdraw his pleas of guilty." The district court file supplied to us on appeal does not contain copies of the pro se pleadings allegedly filed by defendant, but the state public defender's brief on appeal contains copies of them. At the outset of the hearing, the district court told defendant that defense counsel had requested that the sentences be made to run concurrently. Defendant said that he was "considering" withdrawing his guilty pleas. The district court told him that "that would be another matter." Neither defendant nor his attorney expressly requested...