Brown v. State, 96-196
| Decision Date | 19 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-196,96-196 |
| Citation | 944 P.2d 1168 |
| Parties | Terrice Darrell BROWN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Asst. Appellate Counsel; and Scott Klosterman (argued), Student Intern, for Appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Hugh Kenny (argued), Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.
Having entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of robbery pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), Terrice Brown appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.
We affirm.
Brown states the following issues:
I. Was the arrest of Appellant unlawful because it was made without a warrant and without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?
II. Did District Court err by denying Appellant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained after his arrest because the evidence was the product of an unlawful arrest?
The State rephrases the issues:
1. Was Appellant lawfully arrested for a violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-5-204(a), interference with a police officer?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence?
At approximately 2:50 a.m., Deputy Brett Stokes observed a car drifting across the center line as it traveled east on Interstate 80 near Rock Springs. Stokes followed the car for about two miles observing it drift from side to side. He stopped the car after he observed its tire brush the center divider as it exited off the interstate. Stokes testified that, given the early morning hour and the erratic driving, he suspected a DUI when he pulled the car over.
About an hour prior to this stop, Stokes had heard a radio transmission which described two black males with a sawed-off shotgun as suspects in a robbery occurring at a 7-Eleven in Rock Springs. As Stokes approached the car, he became wary because he could not see anyone in the vehicle. As he walked into view of the front seat, he saw two black males slouched down so that their heads were not visible over the top of the car seats. Stokes stopped his approach, returned to his vehicle and called for backup.
At least four police cars responded to Stokes' request for backup. With guns drawn, the police ordered the driver, appellant Brown, and the passenger, Tyrone Jackson, out of the car and onto their knees, whereupon the police cuffed them and placed them into separate cars. In response to a request for identification, Brown falsely stated his name was Glenn Crockett. As validation for that identity, Brown advised that he had been at a party and provided to police the phone number at the party address. However, when the police called the party, they were told that Glenn Crockett was still present at the house. They were informed that Tyrone Jackson had left the party with Terrice Brown thirty minutes earlier.
Once Brown admitted his identity, a check revealed that neither Brown nor Jackson had a valid driver's license. Stokes informed Brown he was under arrest for interference with a police officer for providing a false identity, and the Rock Springs police took Brown to the city jail. During the booking process, police discovered in Brown's sock a marked two dollar bill from the 7-Eleven robbery. Brown was then charged with aggravated robbery.
Brown filed a motion to suppress and/or dismiss, requesting suppression of all tangible and intangible evidence acquired after the police ordered him out of the car at gunpoint, asserting the evidence was the product of an unlawful arrest. The district court found the arrest lawful and denied Brown's motion following a hearing. Brown subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of robbery, in violation W.S. 6-2-401(a)(ii), reserving his right to appeal the court's adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. This timely appeal follows.
Generally, we do not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings unless the court has clearly abused its discretion. Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 807 (Wyo.1996); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo.1994). Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986). We give deference to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, recognizing that court has had the opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions. Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo.1995) (citing Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d at 218). The issue of law, whether an unreasonable search or seizure
occurred in violation of constitutional rights, we review de novo. Wilson, at 218.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 611 (Wyo.1992) (citing Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 940 (Wyo.1983)). In evaluating whether police-citizen encounters are constitutionally valid, we have identified three categories or tiers of interaction between police and citizen:
The most intrusive encounter, an arrest, requires justification by probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime. The investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime. The least intrusive police-citizen contact, a consensual encounter, involves no restraint of liberty and elicits the citizen's voluntary cooperation with non-coercive questioning.
Wilson, 874 P.2d at 220 (citations omitted). See also Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Wyo.1993).
Because in this case the reason for stopping the car is different from the articulable facts and suspicion which led Officer Stokes to implement intrusive measures after the stop, we employ three steps of analysis. In order for Brown's arrest to be valid, the initial stop must have been justified at the inception. Collins v. State, 854 P.2d at 691 (); see also United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir.1993) (). Second, articulable facts must have existed to demonstrate that Stokes had a reasonable suspicion to justify the intrusive measures used to ensure his safety. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.1993) (). Third, Stokes must have had probable cause at the time of Brown's arrest. See, e.g., Wilson, 874 P.2d at 220.
Brown does not challenge the constitutional validity of the first and third stages of the police encounter. Given that Stokes observed Brown cross the center line and hit the center divider as he exited off the interstate, Stokes had a reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence of a controlled substance to justify making the initial stop. See Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 115-116 (Wyo.1992) and W.S. 31-5-233. Likewise, Stokes had probable cause when he arrested Brown for interference with a police officer. We have previously held that providing false information to a police officer can constitute interference. Newton v. State, 698 P.2d 1149, 1150-1151 (Wyo.1985).
The crucial issue remaining is whether at the time the police ordered Brown out of the car at gunpoint they transformed the traffic stop into an arrest without probable cause. The State concedes that probable cause to make an arrest did not exist at the time the police ordered Brown out of the car, but argues that the arrest did not occur until after they confirmed that Brown had identified himself falsely.
To decide this issue, we must consider whether the facts Stokes learned during the first few moments of his investigation along with the information in the radio transmission are sufficient to justify the use of the intrusive measures. In this regard the case at bar is notably similar to Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804 (Wyo.1996), in that during the police investigation of both cases new facts came to light that created a new...
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