Brown v. State, 671S171

Decision Date01 May 1972
Docket NumberNo. 671S171,671S171
Citation258 Ind. 412,30 Ind.Dec. 495,281 N.E.2d 801
PartiesLester Grey BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Jerome E. Levendoski, Fort Wayne, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Stephen D. Clase, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

GIVAN, Justice.

Appellant was charged by affidavit with first degree burglary. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged. Appellant was sentenced to the Indiana Reformatory for a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years.

The record discloses the following facts:

State's Witness Steven Irmscher testified that between midnight and daylight on October 22, 1967, he was at home with his parents at 3604 South Washington Street in the City of Fort Wayne. He was awakened by his dog growling. Upon investigation he found a man who he later identified as the appellant crouched on the stairway of the home. He called police from a neighbor's home giving them a description of the man hd had seen on the stairway. Within a few minutes the police arrived with the appellant in custody. Irmscher identified him as the man he had seen on the stairway. At the time Irmscher noticed the appellant had a fresh cut on his hand. There was also blood on the floor of the garage and on a door knob at the back of the house.

Police Officer David Racine testified that he was dispatched to the Irmscher home; that he had been given the description of the intruder; that as he approached the house he saw a man answering the description running diagonally toward him. The officer and his partner stopped the individual who he identified as the appellant.

The appellant agreed to return to the house for the purpose of identification.

Officer Kenneth Van Ryn testified that in making an investigation of the house he discovered the blood previously mentioned and sent samples to the laboratory. Testimony of Indiana State Police Laboratory Technician Keith Young established that the blood found in the home was human blood, Type A, which was the same type blood found on a bandaid worn by the appellant on his hand.

Appellant presented witnesses who testified that he had been to a party that night; however, the testimony of these witnesses did not contradict his presence at the Irmscher home.

Appellant's sole contention of error is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for mistrial predicated on the testimony of Officer Racine as follows:

'Q. Do you recall any other conversation?

A. No, it was a short time prior to that when we discovered that he had been an escapee at that time from Pendleton, I believe, and we asked him about this, and he said that he had--

MR. LEVENDOSKI: Your Honor, I believe I would like to have a motion outside the presence of the Jury.'

At that time the jury was excused and counsel made a motion for mistrial because of the reference of the police officer to the fact that the appellant was an escapee from Pendleton. We are here faced with another case in which we have what is known as an evidentiary 'harpoon' injected by a witness in the presence of the jury. In recent months we have repeatedly stated that it is improper for a witness to inject statements concerning unrelated prior crimes involving a person on trial. However, in the case at bar, although the statement by the...

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10 cases
  • Lindsey v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • May 23, 1972
    ...corrective action. There are a number of examples where our Supreme Court has considered such as harmless error. See Brown v. State, Ind., 281 N.E.2d 801 (decided May 1, 1972), and Moore v. State, Ind., 280 N.E.2d 57 (decided March 21, 1972). See also Duke v. State, 249 Ind. 466, 233 N.E.2d......
  • Gregg v. State, 1--675A99
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • November 30, 1976
    ...circumstances surrounding the case at bar, such error was harmless and does not require a reversal. In the case of Brown v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 412, 281 N.E.2d 801 at 802, our Supreme Court '. . . However, in the case at bar, although the statement by the officer was improper, we hold th......
  • Bousman v. State, s. 1--1274A178
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • December 29, 1975
    ...the conduct of the State does not constitute reversible error. See, Moss v. State (1973), Ind.App., 324 N.E.2d 820; Brown v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 412, 281 N.E.2d 801; Moss v. State (1975), Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 141, reh. denied 335 N.E.2d From the foregoing, it is evident that we also find......
  • Johnson v. State, 2--872A47
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • August 23, 1973
    ...to identify the gun in question. It is not urged that the attempts made were 'evidentiary harpoons' within the meaning of Brown v. State (Ind.1972), 281 N.E.2d 801, and Bonds v. State (Ind.1972), 280 N.E.2d 313. Even had there been prejudicial effect as speculated by Johnson, it would not n......
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