Brown v. State

Decision Date25 July 1968
Docket NumberNo. 328,328
Citation244 A.2d 444,4 Md.App. 612
PartiesColumbus Joseph BROWN v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Calvin E. Johnson, Baltimore, with Andrew J. Graham, Baltimore, on brief, for appellant.

Henry J. Frankel, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State's Atty. for Baltimore City, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Columbus Joseph Brown, the appellant, was convicted under two separate indictments for robbery with a deadly weapon, in a trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Judge Thomas J. Kenney presiding without a jury. He was given two concurrent sentences of fifteen years. Brown was also convicted of some collateral charges but there is no complaint as to merger. Although the two cases were tried jointly, they were entirely separate crimes and will be so treated in this opinion.

The testimony with regard to the first Indictment, No. 1963, can be summarized as follows: William J. Watson, while driving a cab in the City of Baltimore, picked up two men and two women at or about 1:00 A.M. on July 18, 1966. When he arrived at their destination, the male sitting on the left rear placed a hard piece of metal on the back of his head and told him he was being held up. The second male, who was sitting on the front seat with the driver, took his money, as directed by the first male. After they ran away, the driver jumped out of his cab, sought assistance from another cabdriver and soon thereafter, discovered a police car cruising in the area. He stopped the police car and as he entered it, he saw a woman who resembled one of his passengers, running across a park near the scene of the hold up. The police gave chase and eventually caught her. She was Rebecca Johnson, one of the State's witnesses. The driver was unable to identify the two males.

Rebecca Johnson and Juanita Husband, both testified that Brown came to their house with one James L. Sadler, and requested that they accompany them to Brown's house for the evening to listen to records. All four people were in their twenties and were previously acquainted. They agreed to go and Brown called a cab. Before they arrived at their destination, Brown requested the driver to stop because he did not have enough money to proceed farther, and informed them they would have to walk. As they were getting out of the cab, Brown pulled a pistol and held up the driver. Both women denied taking any part in the hold up and both denied having knowledge of the crime prior to its commission. Neither woman was charged with the offense.

The accomplice, James L. Sadler, implicated Brown as a co-perpetrator of this offense. He also stated that the women knew of the crime before it was committed. Brown claimed to have been in Chicago at the time of the robbery.

On appeal Brown contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for the reason that all three persons who identified him as one of the criminals were his accomplices; and that there was no corroboration of their testimony. We do not agree. The test as to whether or not a person is an accomplice depends upon whether or not he can be tried and convicted for the same offense. 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, § 448 (Anderson's 12th Ed.). The trial judge, in his opinion, stated that he accepted the testimony of the two women as accurate and we cannot say that his finding was clearly erroneous, Maryland Rule 1086. If that testimony be accepted there is no question but that the two women were not accomplices in the crime. In Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549, 553 the Court of Appeals said:

'Polly admitted that she made no objection when appellant placed the baby in the tub of water, and that she did not notify the police. But the fact that a person witnesses a crime and makes no objection to its commission and does not notify the police does not make him an accomplice. To be an accomplice a person must participate in the commission of a crime knowingly, voluntarily, and with common criminal intent with the principal offender, or must in some way...

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9 cases
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 10 de fevereiro de 1969
    ...Vios v. State, 5 Md.App. 200, 246 A.2d 313; Barnes v. State, supra; Wilkins v. State, supra; Baldwin v. State supra; Brown v. State, 4 Md.App. 612, 244 A.2d 444; Rath v. State, 3 Md.App. 721, 240 A.2d 777; Austin v. State, supra; Carroll v. State, 3 Md.App. 50, 237 A.2d 535.We note that if ......
  • Bailey v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 8 de abril de 1969
    ...State is, of course, another question, not here before us.7 See, for example, Jones v. State, 4 Md.App. 616, 244 A.2d 459; Brown v. State, 4 Md.App. 612, 244 A.2d 444; Gunn v. State, 4 Md.App. 379, 243 A.2d 15; Sparkman v. State, 3 Md.App. 527, 240 A.2d 328; Grice v. State, 2 Md.App. 482, 2......
  • Barrow v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 11 de maio de 1984
    ...not to have confirmed Kyle's identification, we do not find that such action tainted his identification. See, Brown v. State, 4 Md.App. 612, 615-16, 244 A.2d 444 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 729 (1969). Moreover, Kyle's identification was shown to be reliable. Kyle had the opportunity to v......
  • Bowen v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 23 de janeiro de 1969
    ...5 Md.App. 144, 245 A.2d 626; Tucker v. State, 5 Md.App. 32, 245 A.2d 109; Baldwin v. State, 5 Md.App. 22, 245 A.2d 98; Brown v. State, 4 Md.App. 612, 244 A.2d 444; Carroll v. State, 3 Md.App. 50, 237 A.2d 535; Crosby v. State, 2 Md.App. 578, 236 A.2d 33; Logan v. State, 1 Md.App. 213, 228 A......
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