Brown v. State

Decision Date17 July 1998
Docket NumberNo. 45S00-9212-PD-939,45S00-9212-PD-939
Citation698 N.E.2d 1132
PartiesDebra Denise BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Indianapolis, Ken Murray, Columbus, OH, Janet S. Dowling, Evans, Dowling & Youngcourt, P.C., Indianapolis, for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, Christopher L. LaFuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Petitioner Debra Denise Brown appeals the denial of post-conviction relief with respect to her convictions for Murder 1 and Attempted Murder, 2 and her sentence of death. 3 We earlier affirmed these convictions and this sentence on direct appeal. Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221 (Ind.1991), reh'g denied, 583 N.E.2d 125, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 833, 113 S.Ct. 101, 121 L.Ed.2d 61 (1992). We now affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Background

Debra Denise Brown and her companion, one Alton Coleman, were convicted and sentenced to death in separate proceedings for stomping a seven-year old girl to death and attempting to choke a nine-year old girl to death with a belt after sexually assaulting the latter. These crimes were part of a crime spree which also took Brown and Coleman to Ohio, Michigan and Illinois. About a month after the Indiana crimes were committed, Brown was apprehended in Illinois and turned over to the FBI, which had been actively engaged in the investigation.

Our discussion infra and our opinions on Brown's and Coleman's direct appeals contain additional details of their crimes, trials, and claims for relief. See Brown, 577 N.E.2d at 224-25; Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1059, 1060-61 (Ind.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2912, 115 L.Ed.2d 1075 (1991).

Discussion
I

Brown contends that she is entitled to post-conviction relief because the State violated its obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose prior to her trial certain psychological profiles and related materials compiled by the FBI. As noted in Background, supra, Brown and Coleman had been interstate fugitives. As such, the FBI prepared a psychological profile and related material on Brown to assist in her capture. During preparation for Brown's trial, Indiana authorities had in their possession a substantial volume of FBI materials. When the FBI sought to have these materials returned, Brown's trial counsel protested, contending that he had not yet had time to review all of the materials. Upon a representation from the State that the files contained no exculpatory material, the trial judge permitted the materials to be returned to the FBI.

In preparation for post-conviction proceedings, Brown obtained four documents in the possession of the FBI which she contends are exculpatory. Brown is, of course, correct that the State has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a criminal defendant. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). Brown raises several interesting questions as to whether the State had a pre-trial obligation to disclose these four documents. However, an allegation of a Brady violation requires a demonstration that the undisclosed favorable evidence "could be reasonably taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence" in the trial court's judgment. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. We elect to proceed to that inquiry first. Because we find that these four documents could not be reasonably taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the trial court's judgment, we hold that Brown is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this contention. 4

A

We note first that while Brown seeks to have both her convictions and her sentence reversed on the basis of this claim, she makes no specific argument as to how these four documents undermine confidence in the jury's guilty verdicts. Rather, her specific claims are that these documents contain important evidence of her psychological domination and control by Coleman, mitigating circumstances which should have been considered by the jury during the penalty phase.

Certainly the subject matter of these four documents comprise mitigating circumstances appropriate for consideration in a death penalty case. Our death penalty statute specifically itemizes the domination and control of another person as a mitigating circumstance. 5 Acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance is another statutory mitigating circumstance. 6 And the mental health of the defendant is frequently considered as a mitigating circumstance under the "catch-all" mitigator. 7 These four documents implicate each of these circumstances.

The first FBI document, Brown's Exhibit 31, states in pertinent part:

Coleman has a violent temper, and when he is upset he is uncontrollable. * * * Ever since Coleman's mother died of cancer, Coleman seems to have gone off his rocker. * * * Debra Denise Brown has lived with Coleman and his blind grandmother for the past two years. Brown has lost about 35 pounds during this time. She has been virtually a prisoner in the house. If she left without Coleman, he would beat her. During [an] interview with FBI agents, Brown was very docile. She admitted that scars and scratches on her face were from Coleman. It is believed that she is completely under the control of Coleman.

(R. at 1894-96.) 8 The second and third FBI documents, Brown's Exhibits 32 and 33, contain essentially the same information. (R. at 1898; 1902.) The fourth FBI document, Brown's Exhibit 36, is an extensive report prepared by the FBI regarding her background, including an interview with Lottie Mae Brown, Brown's mother. The report indicates that:

1. Brown's father had severe mental problems, drank to excess, and physically abused family members including the children.

2. Brown had experienced a drug overdose which required hospitalization in 1980 and may have been using drugs regularly.

3. Brown's personality changed drastically after she met Coleman.

4. Brown moved in with Coleman and would not talk to her family, but would look to Coleman to answer for her.

5. Brown's mother felt that Coleman completely controlled Brown and that she would do whatever Coleman asked her to do; Brown's mother also believed that Coleman was beating Brown and using her as a prostitute.

6. Brown's mother had seen Brown with her face "all beaten up" during the time Brown was living with Coleman.

(R. at 1931.)

B

From the very outset of the penalty phase, defense counsel made it clear that his principal argument would be that Brown should not be sentenced to death because she had been acting "under the substantial domination of Alton Coleman." (T.R. at 3344.) In a powerful fourteen page opening statement to the jury at the beginning of the penalty phase, defense counsel spent thirteen pages of it emphasizing Coleman's control over Brown. (T.R. at 3385-3400.) Specific testimony to this effect was presented by defense counsel throughout the penalty phase.

Counsel proceeded to make his argument primarily through expert testimony. First, a Dr. Batacan, a psychiatrist who had examined Coleman, testified as to Coleman's manipulative personality. Then a Dr. Periolet, another psychiatrist who had examined Coleman, testified that one characteristic of Coleman's sociopathic personality was that he would assess who he could control. Counsel then called a Beverly Perkins, Coleman's ex-wife, who testified that Coleman used physical violence and threats of harm to her family whenever she tried to leave their apartment to do something by herself.

Next counsel called a Dr. Kelly, a psychiatrist, who testified as to the results of his examination of Brown. Dr. Kelly had examined Brown twice and also discussed the results of his examination with a psychologist, Dr. Rogers, who had independently examined her. In compiling the results of his examination, Dr. Kelly also examined additional hospital records, school records and the report of another psychologist, Dr. Suran, concerning Brown. Dr. Kelly testified as to Brown's difficult upbringing, based on his conversation with members of her family, including her mother and sister. He discussed her poor school record, a serious auto accident in which she had been involved, and her record of truancy from school. He noted that her school records showed an IQ at the age of 12 of 59 and a current IQ of 74.

In Dr. Kelly's expert opinion, Brown suffered from the mental illness of dependent personality disorder. Among the causes of the dependent personality disorder identified by Dr. Kelly were her limited intelligence and difficult family upbringing. Dr. Kelly also gave his expert opinion that Brown was under the domination and control of Coleman at the time of the crime and that she was a good candidate for rehabilitation.

Defense counsel also called a Dr. Suran, a clinical psychologist, who had conducted a diagnostic psychological evaluation of Brown, including a social history. Dr. Suran reported that Brown scored 75 on the Wechsler IQ test and that she functioned as mildly retarded. His examination showed her to have "a very depraved background" and that she never evolved to the level of emotional development consistent with her age. More specifically, in his interview with her dealing with her family and background, he learned that she had been the subject of "frequent and repeated physical abuse, sexual abuse, and a very strong sense of rejection and abandonment." Dr. Suran found Brown to be the victim of severe environmental deprivation.

It was Dr. Suran's expert opinion that Brown suffered from borderline retardation, depression, and had a dependent personality or passive dependent personality. Dr. Suran also made...

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