Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 19 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 49S00-0004-CR-256.,49S00-0004-CR-256.
• Citation: 751 N.E.2d 664
• Parties: Douglas BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

751 N.E.2d 664

Douglas BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 49S00-0004-CR-256.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 19, 2001.

Katherine A. Cornelius, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Adam M. Dulik, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant Douglas Brown was convicted of murder for shooting another man to death. In affirming his conviction, we agree with the trial court that the prosecution offered sufficient race-neutral justifications for peremptorily excluding two potential African-American jurors; that Defendant was provided with his statutory right to consult with his father; and that there was no evidence to support instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter.

Background

The facts most favorable to the verdict show that on December 26, 1998, Defendant shot one Porter Moore outside an Indianapolis home from which Moore sold drugs. That evening, Moore drove to the house with some friends and went inside while his companions remained in the car. Soon after Moore went into the house, Defendant and another man approached the occupants of Moore's car and asked where they could find a friend of Defendant's named Roosevelt Caruthers. Moore's friends replied in a rude manner. Defendant later told police that he had witnessed Caruthers argue with several of Moore's associates at the house earlier in the day. Defendant told police he came to the house in order to find Caruthers.

After his confrontation with the occupants of the car, Defendant walked towards the house. At this time, Moore left the house and passed by Defendant. Defendant made a comment to Moore about the occupants of the car, to which Moore made no reply. This lack of response apparently insulted Defendant. He cocked a gun, pointed it at Moore, and pulled the trigger. The gun misfired. Defendant later told police that Moore's eyes bulged like he was angry or scared. Moore then dove into his car. Defendant fired again, this time striking Moore in the face and killing him.

Defendant was charged with Murder¹ and Carrying a Handgun without a License.² A jury convicted him on both counts and the trial court sentenced him to 60 years on the murder charge and 365 days for the handgun offense, which was to be served concurrently with the murder sentence.

Discussion

I

Defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor made what he contends were racially-based peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Batson held that a State denies a "defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded." Id. at 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712. For that reason, a litigant may not use peremptory challenges "to exclude potential jurors from serving solely because of race." Williams v. State, 700 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind.1998). See also Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570, 578 (Ind.1996)

("Race-based peremptory challenges are a form of racial discrimination which the State cannot condone.").

To contest an opposing party's use of peremptory challenges under Batson, a litigant must "establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination." Lee v. State, 689 N.E.2d 435, 440-41 (Ind.1997),reh'g denied. The moving party will make out such a prima facie case by showing "(1) that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the jury pool; and (2) that the facts and circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used those strikes to exclude potential jury members from the jury because of their race." Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 786. Once the moving party establishes this prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party, who must "provide a race-neutral explanation for challenging [a] juror." McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997). This "second step of [the Batson ] process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible ...." Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curium). Instead, the prosecutor must provide a facially valid explanation for the use of the peremptory challenge and "`[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'" Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion)). Although the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party to present a facially valid reason for the peremptory challenge, the moving party retains the overall burden of proof to establish "purposeful discrimination." Id.

Defendant claims the State violated these principles by using peremptory challenges to remove two black women from the jury.³ The trial court concluded that Defendant made a prima facie case that the challenges were based on race and the State does not contest this conclusion. See Appellee's Br. at 6-8. The trial court then accepted the State's explanations for both challenges, which Defendant contends was error. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court could conclude that the State offered facially valid race-neutral reasons for the challenges.

First, Defendant contests the exclusion of potential juror Chandra Sherrell. The State contends that it had a race-neutral reason for challenging this potential juror in that she indicated that she would have trouble judging credibility and therefore would hold the State to a high burden of proof. See Appellee's Br. at 8 (citing Supp. R. at 122.) The State points to the potential juror's statements during voir dire to the effect that she "wasn't prepared to judge anybody" and that she "couldn't possibly be sure a hundred percent that someone was guilty or not guilty." Appellee's Br. at 8 (citing Supp. R. at 110-11.) Further, the potential juror said that she would have trouble gauging credibility and that she "wouldn't feel comfortable deciding who's guilty and who's not guilty." (Supp. R. at 111-13.) Therefore, the potential juror said, the State's proof "would have to be a strong thing, without a shadow of a doubt ...." (Supp. R. at 112.)⁴ It is evident from these statements that the potential juror believed that she would have difficulty judging credibility, and that she would favor Defendant to compensate for this perceived deficiency. The State therefore presented a valid race-neutral reason for removing the potential juror from the panel.

Second, Defendant challenges the removal of potential juror Catherine Reynolds. The State contends that it used a peremptory challenge on this potential juror because she "said that she would rather not be a juror because she had a niece who was killed by her niece's son." Appellee's Br. at 7 (citing Supp. R. at 72.) During voir dire, the State asked the potential juror for her thoughts on the jury selection process. The potential juror replied that she would rather not sit on the jury because her grandnephew had killed her niece, who was a police officer. She stated that she would have personal difficulty sitting on the panel, as she did when she had served on a previous jury. While it is clear that the potential juror believed that she had a bias and should not serve on the jury, it is unclear whether this bias cut for or against the State. The trial judge acknowledged as much by noting that "we don't know whether or not she would be prejudiced against the State or the Defense...." (Supp. R. at 96.) It is conceivable that she would be biased against Defendant because a member of her family had been the victim of the crime with which Defendant was charged. However, it is equally conceivable that she would be biased against the State because another member of her family had been the accused of the crime with which Defendant was charged. The latter scenario is a valid race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Willoughby, 660 N.E.2d at 578

("An explanation is neutral if it is `based on something other than the race of the juror. At [the explanation stage] of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'") (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59,

111 S.Ct. 1859). Because the moving party bears the overall burden of proving racial discrimination, we resolve this conflict in favor of the State and conclude that the State has presented a valid race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. See Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 105-06 (Ind.1995),

reh'g denied.

II

Defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court admitted his statement to police despite what Defendant characterizes as a violation of Indiana Code § 31-32-5-1 (1998). This statute provides that rights guaranteed to a child⁵ under the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, or "any other law" may be waived only under a narrow set of circumstances:

(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child if the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;

(2) by the child's custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if:

(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;

(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;

(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and

(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver; or

(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:

(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver; and

(B) the child has been emancipated under IC XX-XX-XX-X or IC XX-XX-XX-XX, by virtue of

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