Brown v. State, No. SC01-1275

• Citation: 846 So.2d 1114
• Decision Date: 24 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. SC01-2713., No. SC01-1275
• Parties: Paul Anthony BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Paul Anthony Brown, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

846 So.2d 1114

Paul Anthony BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Paul Anthony Brown, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent.

Nos. SC01-1275, SC01-2713.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 24, 2003.

John J. Bonaccorsy, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Judy Taylor Rush, Kenneth S. Nunnelley, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Paul Anthony Brown, an inmate under sentence of death, appeals an order of the circuit court denying a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9) Fla. Const. These cases have been consolidated. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of Brown's postconviction motion and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Brown was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death based on the following facts:

On November 6, 1992, Roger Hensley ("Hensley") was found dead on the bedroom floor of an apartment in Ormond Beach, Florida. He had been stabbed multiple times and his throat had been slashed. The police found two steak knives on the floor in the living room, one of which was covered in blood. Investigators documented blood spatter in several areas of the victim's bedroom and bathroom, as well as fingerprints and bloody shoe prints inside the apartment. Investigators also discovered several empty beer bottles and a bag of a substance presumed to be marijuana. Missing were the victim's white Nissan pick-up truck and keys thereto.

In October of 1992, Brown traveled from Tennessee to Daytona Beach where he met Scott Jason McGuire ("McGuire"). McGuire moved into Brown's motel room and the two spent the next two weeks consuming alcoholic beverages and smoking crack cocaine. At some point Brown decided to return to Tennessee. According to McGuire, Brown offered him $1000 to drive Brown to Tennessee but McGuire's vehicle did not work.

Thereafter, on November 5, Brown and McGuire approached Roger Hensley outside of a bar and, with Hensley driving, accompanied him to his apartment. McGuire testified that during the drive, Brown held a gun behind Hensley's seat. McGuire also claimed that during before [sic] entering Hensley's apartment, Brown whispered, "How would you like to do it?," to which McGuire made no response. Inside, the three men each drank a bottle of beer, shared half of a marijuana cigarette, and talked about various things, including employment possibilities. Hensley invited Brown and McGuire to spend the night. However, before retiring to his bedroom, Hensley dropped a few dollars on the table and stated, "I don't know what you guys' game is. If you've come here to rob me, this is all the money I have. You can take it." McGuire assured Hensley that they were not there to rob him and Hensley went to bed.

After Hensley left the room, Brown told McGuire he was going to shoot Hensley and steal his truck. McGuire objected to the use of the gun because of the noise. Appearing angry at McGuire's response, Brown walked to the kitchen and got two steak knives, handing one to McGuire. McGuire threw the knife to the ground and denounced any intention of taking part in murder. Brown said he would take care of it himself and, in a symbolic gesture, dragged his hand across his throat.

Brown told McGuire to stand by the door to block Hensley's escape and he entered the bedroom where Hensley was lying on the bed. McGuire then heard what he thought were stabbing sounds and heard the victim say "no." Upon hearing something hit the floor, McGuire approached the bedroom where he noticed Hensley lying on the floor covered in blood and "making sounds" as if he was "struggling to breathe." Brown was rummaging through the victim's bedroom looking for car keys. He found the victim's wallet and removed a twenty-dollar bill. Brown, who had blood on his hands, arms, and pants, then tried to wash it off. McGuire did not have any blood on him, but attempted to wipe his fingerprints from everything in the apartment that he had touched.

Ten or fifteen minutes later, the two left the victim's apartment in Hensley's truck, stopped at their motel room to collect their belongings, and drove to Tennessee. There, Brown burned his bloody pants in a stove and McGuire departed on foot a day or two later. Brown was arrested on November 8 at a farmhouse in Tennessee by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) on unrelated charges.

While in the custody of the F.B.I., Brown stated, "I'm a murderer, not only a bank robber", and declared that he and another man named "Scott" killed "a white male" in Daytona Beach and stole his truck. Brown explained how the two met the victim and went back to the victim's "motel room", where they smoked "crack" cocaine and then stabbed and killed the victim. Brown claimed that it was McGuire's suggestion that they find someone who owned a car, steal the car, and kill the owner. He also claimed that he stabbed the victim several times in the chest and once in the back but that McGuire slit the victim's throat. Brown's statements to the FBI were admitted in evidence at trial.

Brown also testified at trial and denied any involvement in the homicide, claiming instead that McGuire killed Hensley while Brown was asleep as a result of smoking marijuana. Brown testified that he awoke to find Hensley standing over him with a bloodied knife. He claimed that McGuire had stabbed Hensley once in the back and was attempting to slit his throat. Brown also claimed that after they left the apartment, McGuire threatened to frame him for the murder if Brown told anyone about it.

Brown v. State, 721 So.2d 274, 275-76 (Fla. 1998) (footnotes omitted).

Brown was charged with first-degree murder and first-degree felony murder, and was convicted by a jury. Id. at 276. Following the penalty phase proceeding, the jury voted twelve to zero to recommend the death penalty. Id. at 277. On a finding of four aggravating circumstances¹ and two nonstatutory mitigating circumstances,² the trial court accepted the jury's unanimous recommendation and sentenced Brown to death. Id. We affirmed Brown's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 275.

Brown filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 on November 3, 2000. He filed an amended 3.850 motion on February 12, 2001, and a second amended motion on April 26, 2001, raising twenty-one claims.³ The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing, which was held on April 26-27, 2001. Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court entered a comprehensive order denying Brown all relief. Brown appeals that denial to this Court and also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.

3.850 APPEAL

Brown raises three claims in his 3.850 appeal: (1) that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and (3) that the cumulative effect of the errors resulted in an unfair proceeding.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Brown raises numerous subclaims, in which he presents conduct that he believes represents ineffective assistance of counsel. We have rearranged the order of the subclaims presented by Brown, and will discuss them in the following order: (1) insufficient impeachment, (2) failure to object, (3) opening the door to damaging testimony by FBI agent Robert Childs, and (4) improper argument.

The framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court said:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of law and fact subject to plenary review based on the Strickland test. See Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999)

. Therefore, this Court must engage in an independent review of the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court's factual findings. See id.⁴

Insufficient Impeachment

Brown argues that trial counsel was deficient in his cross-examination of Scott McGuire, and he raises several instances of alleged ineffective performance in that regard.⁵ However, these instances satisfy neither the requirement of deficient performance nor the requirement of prejudice under Strickland.

Noting that Brown's own detailed oral and written confessions convicted Brown, the trial court found that the matters raised as examples of insufficient impeachment were relatively insignificant matters. Furthermore, the judge ruled that if counsel's performance was indeed deficient, there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been affected.

We conclude that collateral counsel's argument that counsel should...