Brown v. State

Decision Date07 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. 51, Sept. Term, 2006.,51, Sept. Term, 2006.
Citation916 A.2d 245,397 Md. 89
PartiesRandy Paul BROWN, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Brian M. Saccenti, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on brief), for petitioner.

Kathryn Grill Graeff, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER,* WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

RAKER, J.

Petitioner, Randy Paul Brown, Jr., was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. The marijuana that formed the basis of petitioner's conviction was taken from him after he had been seized by law enforcement officials and admitted to having the drugs on his person. The issue we must decide in this case is whether the Circuit Court erred in denying petitioner's motion to suppress the marijuana and other contraband found in his possession as the inadmissible fruit of an unconstitutional seizure of the person. Specifically, we address whether it was reasonable for police to detain petitioner after he knocked on a door of a residence in which police were executing a search warrant. We shall hold that the seizure of petitioner was reasonable; it was justified by the officers' need to determine petitioner's identity and connection to the residence and to protect the officers' safety. We shall also hold that the Circuit Court's denial of petitioner's motion to suppress was not error.

I.

In November, 2003, the Anne Arundel County Police Department conducted an investigation into the residence located at 6415 Cedar Furnace Circle, Glen Burnie, Maryland. James William Miller had been identified by a confidential police informant as a drug dealer and was the target of the investigation. From the investigation, the police learned that drugs were sold from the residence and that customers would go to the house, knock on the door, enter, and obtain drugs inside the residence. Detectives Daniel DeVoe and T. Davis obtained a search and seizure warrant to search the house.

Around midnight on December 4, 2003, the police executed the search warrant at the residence. In the process of executing the warrant, police seized drugs and related paraphernalia. The following facts are gleaned from the hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress.

At approximately 1:00 a.m., while the police were still inside the house collecting and recording evidence, petitioner knocked on the door of the residence.1 Detective DeVoe opened the door and saw a white male who was later identified as petitioner. Detective DeVoe testified at the suppression hearing that Brown took a step into the house, at which time DeVoe identified himself as a police officer and took Brown by the arm "to take him from the living room area to the kitchen area to keep him away from everybody else to figure out why he was at this residence." Before they reached the kitchen, DeVoe asked Brown if he had any weapons or drugs on him and Brown responded that he had "a quarter pound in his waist." The detective seized the clear bag containing a leafy substance tucked in Brown's waistband and placed him under arrest. Other officers searched Brown's car and recovered a similar green vegetable substance which they believed to be marijuana.

Petitioner testified at the suppression hearing. His version of the initial encounter at the door of the house differed from that of Detective DeVoe. Brown testified that after he knocked on the door, the officer pulled him into the house by his shirt. He testified that the officers started asking him questions, that he did not say anything to them, and that they searched him and patted him down.

Petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury for Anne Arundel County and charged with several violations of the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from his person and vehicle, claiming that the evidence was seized unlawfully. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and denied the motion to suppress, reasoning as follows:

"And accepting some facts in the way that the Defendant would like me to accept the facts, I do agree with him that I think he had no choice but to come into the house one way or another.

On the other hand, I do agree with [the prosecutor] that at that point the police were justified in escorting him into the house whether he wanted to or not given the fact that he had just come up to the home where the search warrant was ongoing.

And the knowledge, and training, and experience of the officers when — not only when the search warrant was executed as being valid and its execution was apparently valid at the time in the middle of the night at the time that it happened in December of last year. So there is no question that I think he was fair game to at least address the reasons why he was there.

The thing to me, it turns on whether or not he voluntarily told them as an impulse at the time that he was ushered into the house and disclosed to them that I have no weapons, I have no drugs, or I do have drugs or no weapons, or whatever it was.

I think he was, without a doubt, was very startled when he walked into that circumstance or was escorted into that circumstance. At that point he realizes 6, 8, 10 officers around, whatever it was. They no doubt had the badges around their neck. And I think that was probably apparent.

They had guns. The Defendant didn't say anything about seeing a gun, but the idea of police officers being present one way or another would certainly imply that they would have weapons in that sort of scenario.

So I put myself in the standpoint of him at that time, the impulse of being put in that position. And I disagree with [the defense counsel] to the extent that they had to ask him first and politely well why are you coming here tonight in the middle of an executed search warrant.

When they have many officers involved, they have to be concerned about their own safety, not to mention the safety of people that are in the premises. They have got people lined up on the couch that are apparently in handcuffs.

And I think skipping the formalities of asking why you are here I think was probably justified under the circumstances of the ongoing warrant. And to say do you have any weapons or drugs on you I don't think was inappropriate.

He heard the question. And I sense from all of the circumstances of the case, the fact that he was cooperative afterward, the fact that he was cooperative not only afterward in the home, didn't cause a problem there, spoke with the policeman back in the kitchen, apparently, out of the area where the other folks were.

And then even cooperated back at the station after having Miranda warnings issued, admitted, again, as we said before, his role with the car, the fact that the backpack was his and what not.

And I just sense from all of this that being startled by that standpoint when asked impulsively do you have any weapons or drugs that he is the type of fellow that would have said yes, I do knowing that being in that position — although he only had a split second basically to make that decision or a couple of short seconds.

I believe, effectively, that the officer probably did ask him in the way that he did and that he volunteered very quickly yes, I do have these in his pants `cause I think he knew that he was going to get searched or at least impulsively thought that he may get searched anyway and he volunteered that information in the split second when he decided to think about his own safety maybe if nothing else.

But I believe in the context of that confrontation he volunteered that that information was there and that kind of set the stage for all the other things that occurred, which I think were proper in the case.

That is a difficult question, but, in effect, I believe the officer in his description of the facts happened more closely the way he said as opposed to the way Mr. Brown indicated. So for those reasons, I will deny the motion."

Petitioner entered a not guilty plea and proceeded to trial on an agreed statement of facts. The court convicted him of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of Md.Code (2002, 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article, and sentenced him to a term of incarceration for two years, without eligibility of parole.2 Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Brown v. State, 168 Md.App. 400, 896 A.2d 1093 (2006). We granted a writ of certiorari filed by petitioner to address the following questions:

"(1) Under Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249, 872 A.2d 87 (2005), may the police detain a person who knocks on the door of a house an hour or so after the police entered it pursuant to a search warrant whenever the circumstances do not show that the person `clearly [is] unconnected with any criminal activity and . . . clearly present[s] no potential danger,' or only if the State demonstrates that the police had individualized reasonable articulable suspicion or that the law enforcement interests outweighed those of the individual?

(2) If Cotton requires that the police have individualized reasonable articulable suspicion or that the law enforcement interests outweigh those of the individual before the police may detain such a visitor, were the police justified in detaining petitioner, who knocked on the door of a house an hour or so after the police entered it when they were in the process of transporting arrestees and cataloging evidence, and where there was no indication that petitioner was connected to the residence or the drug activity?"

Brown v. State, 394 Md. 307, 905 A.2d 842 (2006).

II.

Brown presents one argument — that his detention was unlawful. He argues that the police violated his right to be free from an unreasonable seizure when they detained him while the...

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