Brown v. State

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ELLINGTON.
• Citation: Brown v. State, 560 S.E.2d 316, 253 Ga. App. 741 (Ga. App. 2002)
• Decision Date: 14 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. A02A0212.,A02A0212.
• Parties: BROWN v. The STATE.

560 S.E.2d 316

253 Ga. App. 741

BROWN v. The STATE.

No. A02A0212.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

February 14, 2002.

Richard A. Jones, Atlanta, for appellant.

G. Channing Ruskell, Solicitor-General, Anthony B. Williams, Asst. Solicitor-General, for appellee.

ELLINGTON, Judge.

Kim Lynn Brown appeals his conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol, OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(5). Finding no error, we affirm.

1. Brown contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of his breath alcohol tests, asserting that the officer who conducted the traffic stop lacked the requisite articulable suspicion to make the stop. On appeal, we view the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to uphold the trial court's decision. Givens v. State, 218 Ga.App. 415, 417(1), 461 S.E.2d 579 (1995). When the facts are not in conflict, "this [C]ourt's responsibility in reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is to ensure that there was a substantial basis for the decision." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Wright, 221 Ga.App. 202, 204(1), 470 S.E.2d 916 (1996).

So viewed, the record in this case shows the following: at approximately 1:30 a.m. on April 8, 2001, a concerned citizen called 911 to report a suspected drunk driver. The caller told the dispatcher that the suspected drunk driver was driving a white Ford truck with tag number 962JDB. The caller reported that he was driving directly behind the suspected drunk driver while traveling westbound on Highway 92 and that both vehicles were approaching the intersection of Highway 5 and Highway 92. The dispatcher notified police units to be on the lookout for the truck and gave a specific description of the truck, the tag number, the direction the truck was traveling, and its location. Within two minutes, Officer Copeland of the Woodstock Police Department spotted the truck at the intersection of Highways 5 and 92. After the truck went through the intersection, Officer Copeland pulled in behind it, checked the tag number, and confirmed that it was the reported truck. The officer activated his emergency lights, but the truck did not pull over immediately. After about a quartermile, the officer turned on his siren and the truck pulled over.

In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that "the information received from dispatch provided sufficient articulable suspicion for the officer to stop the Defendant's vehicle. Even though it was reported by a concerned citizen, the information was specific as to the exact vehicle, including tag number, and exact location." The fact that the concerned citizen was not identified at the motions hearing does not change this conclusion.¹

A dispatcher who reports a crime at a specified location gives police an articulable suspicion to investigate and detain individuals at the scene, particularly where police observations on arriving at the scene corroborate the dispatcher's report. Even if the dispatcher's information comes from a citizen or an unidentified informant, the investigatory detention is valid, for patrolling officers are not required to question dispatchers about the source of the information.... [Further, c]orroboration only solidifies the existence of an articulable suspicion.

(Footnotes omitted.) Overand v. State, 240 Ga.App. 682, 683(1), 523 S.E.2d 610 (1999). See also McDaniel v. State, 227 Ga.App. 364, 366(2), 489 S.E.2d 112 (1997) (dispatcher's call to look out for specified vehicle and officer's observation of vehicle fitting the description give rise to an articulable suspicion and justify stop); State v. Wright, 221 Ga.App. at 205(3), 470 S.E.2d 916 (concerned citizen's call giving description and location of vehicle being driven erratically, followed by almost simultaneous observation of vehicle by police, gives articulable suspicion to justify a traffic stop); Givens v. State, 218 Ga.App. at 417(1), 461 S.E.2d 579.

The evidence presented in this case supports the trial court's determination that the officer had the requisite articulable suspicion to stop Brown's truck. State v. Wright, 221 Ga.App. at 205(3), 470 S.E.2d 916. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion to suppress on this basis.

2. Brown contends the results of his breath tests should have been suppressed because the State allegedly failed to reasonably accommodate his request for an independent breath test. We disagree.

OCGA § 40-6-392(a)(3) provides that a person who undergoes a chemical test at the request of a law enforcement officer is entitled to have a qualified person of his own choosing administer an additional test. Law enforcement officers have a corresponding duty not to refuse or...