Brown v. State
Citation | 409 P.2d 772,196 Kan. 236 |
Decision Date | 22 January 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 44422,44422 |
Parties | Orville Clyde BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Syllabus by the Court
In a proceeding under K.S.A. 60-1507, a prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claimed the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence imposed pursuant to the habitual criminal act (K.S.A. 21-107a) was imposed without notice to him prior to sentencing that the state intended to invoke the provisions of the habitual criminal act. The trial court in the exercise of its power of discretion found the claim of the petitioner to be substantial and granted an evidentiary hearing; but it heard only the state's witnesses, and refused to permit the petitioner to be present over the objection of his counsel. On appeal it is held: The trial court erred. It should have granted the petitioner a full evidentiary hearing by requiring him to be present, before it ascertained the fact placed in issue as to events in which he participated.
Matthew J. Dowd, Hutchinson, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellant.
Richard J. Rome, County Atty., argued the cause, and Raymond F. Berkley and Lane H. Cronhardt, Asst. County Attys., were with him on the brief, for appellee.
This is a proceeding instituted pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507, in which the district court of Reno County, Kansas, denied the petitioner's motion for discharge from the Kansas State Penitentiary. Appeal has been duly perfected.
The disposition of this case turns upon a question of procedure under the foregoing statute. The question is whether the petitioner's presence is required at the hearing on a motion attacking his sentence where there is a substantial issue of fact as to events in which he participated.
The facts upon which the disposition of this case turns are not in dispute.
The petitioner was originally charged with first degree robbery, second degree burglary and grand larceny, in violation of G.S.1949 (now K.S.A.) 21-527, 21-520 and 21-524. When the petitioner, an indigent, was called before the city court of Hutchinson, Reno County, Kansas, for a preliminary hearing on the 6th day of June, 1955, he requested the court to appoint counsel for him prior to the commencement of the hearing. This request was denied and the hearing was held with the petitioner conducting cross examination of the state's witnesses. As a result of this hearing he was bound over for trial to the district court on charges of first degree robbery, second degree burglary and grand larceny.
After the preliminary hearing the district court appointed Robert Upp, an attorney, to represent the petitioner in the criminal proceedings.
On the 6th day of October, 1955, in the district court the state dismissed the grand larceny charge, arraignment was waived, and the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to each count. The case was tried to a jury, and on the 10th day of October, 1955, the petitioner was found guilty of the charges of first degree robbery and second degree burglary. On the 13th day of October, 1955, the petitioner filed a motion for a new trial, and on the 15th day of October it was overruled.
The journal entry recites that on the 18th day of October, 1955, the petitioner was brought before the court
Upon this evidence the petitioner was sentenced, for having been previously convicted of three or more felony offenses, under the habitual criminal act (G.S.1949 [K.S.A.] 21-107a) for a term of thirty years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
In his motion to vacate the judgment and sentence the petitioner, among other things, alleges that prior to the date of sentencing on the 18th day of October, 1955, he had no notice whatsoever that the state intended to invoke the provisions of the habitual criminal act.
Prior to the hearing on the petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment and sentence the trial court appointed Matthew J. Dowd, an attorney, to represent the petitioner, an indigent.
Apparently the trial court was in doubt, after reviewing the files and records in the criminal proceeding, as to whether the petitioner had been given proper notice prior to sentencing under the habitual criminal act. As a result it granted an evidentiary hearing in which it permitted the state to call two witnesses, the former county attorney who prosecuted the criminal case against the petitioner, and Mr. Upp, the attorney appointed to represent the petitioner in the criminal proceeding.
The petitioner was not present at the hearing.
When the motion was called for hearing before the trial court, counsel for the petitioner formally objected to the hearing in the absence of the petitioner. On this point the record shows the following:
'Now I will attempt to cross examine, if the Court wishes to overrule my formal objection, but it will be next to worthless as far as I can see, and further, although we have arrived at a stipulation of facts, there are facts which are still in doubt and still in dispute upon which the moving party, Orville Clyde Brown, wished to offer testimony at this hearing.'
After this argument, and upon inquiry by the court, petitioner's counsel stated that a fact which was still in doubt and still in dispute was whether the petitioner was given notice prior to sentencing that the state intended to invoke the habitual criminal act. He stated the petitioner wished to offer testimony on this point at the hearing.
The trial court overruled the objection, heard the evidence of the state, and in its memorandum decision found 'The evidence clearly shows that the defendant was timely apprised of the proposed invocation of the habitual criminal act upon a conviction.'
Among the conclusions of law made by the trial court in its memorandum decision are the following:
'5. The defendant has failed to sustain the burden of proof on all factual allegations.
The petitioner filed a motion for rehearing on the ground that he was not present at the hearing on the 60-1507 proceeding. This motion was overruled on the 6th day of April, 1965.
Fundamental fairness in judicial procedure requires that the court may impose an enhanced penalty under the habitual criminal act only upon the basis of a supporting judicial determination of the essential facts made after the defendant in the criminal case has been notified and heard upon the issue of his prior convictions. The failure to comply with such procedure is a denial of due process of law and makes the enhanced penalty a legal nullity. This was the holding in United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 204 F.2d 624 (3rd Cir. 1953), where the court said:
(p. 628.)
This court has said in State v. Woodman, 127 Kan. 166, 272 P. 132:
'* * * After conviction, however, and before the allocution, the defendant should be timely apprised that a sentence under the act of 1927 [the habitual criminal act] will be demanded against him, so that he may show cause, if he can, why such higher penalty should not be imposed. * * *' (p. 172, 272 P. p. 135.)
After quoting the foregoing statement from the Woodman decision, the court said in State v. Messmore, 175 Kan. 354, 264 P.2d 911:
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in construing Kansas law has recognized that the determination of the status of the defendant as an habitual criminal is a judicial procedure, and that the defendant is entitled to notice thereof and an opportunity...
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