Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 16 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2007-KA-01330-COA.,2007-KA-01330-COA.
• Citation: 19 So.3d 85
• Parties: William Presley BROWN, II, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

19 So.3d 85

William Presley BROWN, II, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2007-KA-01330-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

December 16, 2008.

Rehearing Denied July 21, 2009.

Certiorari Denied October 15, 2009.

Justin Taylor Cook, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Ladonna C. Holland, attorney for appellee.

Before LEE, P.J., CHANDLER and ISHEE, JJ.

CHANDLER, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. William Presley Brown II was convicted of murder and sentenced by the Warren County Circuit Court to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. He appeals this conviction, arguing that: (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers unlawfully seized his vehicle without probable cause, and (2) the trial court erred in not granting his circumstantial-evidence and accessory-after-the-fact jury instructions. We find that neither of these arguments has merit. Therefore, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On the evening of October 15, 2005, Vicksburg police responded to a report of a dead female lying face down next to a garbage dumpster at the Vicksburg Hotel, an apartment complex in downtown Vicksburg. Officers later identified the deceased woman as Chenara Young and determined that she had died as the result of blunt force trauma. Officer Billy Brown and Sergeant Virgil Woodall also concluded that Young had been moved to the location due to the presence of blood smears and the lack of blood pooling near the body. They suspected that a vehicle had been used in moving the body due to Young's weight, which was later determined to be in excess of three hundred pounds.

¶ 3. At approximately 2:20 a.m. on the morning of October 16, 2005 (eight hours after the discovery of Young's body), Officer Daniel Thomas responded to a complaint of a suspicious truck that was parked across from a sports bar where another car usually parked.¹ Officer Thomas observed what appeared to be a bloody smear and drip marks on the tailgate and in the bed of the truck. The driver's side front-seat cover had been removed, and there was a large red stain on the Styrofoam padding of the seat. The seat cover was bundled up in the truck's bed. The truck was located less than two blocks from the location where Young's body was found. Sergeant Woodall was called to the scene and determined that the substance could possibly be blood. Based on the truck's proximity to the crime scene, the substance located on the truck, the stain on the driver's seat, the suspicion that a vehicle was used in the crime, and the absence of the truck's owner, the officers had the truck towed half a block away to the city's impound lot to be secured until further tests could be done and a search warrant could be obtained. No tests were done at the truck's original location to determine if the substance was blood.

¶ 4. The next morning, a group of investigators did a presumptive blood test and determined that the substance on the truck's tailgate was, in fact, blood. Then, they obtained a search warrant for the vehicle.² Inside the vehicle, they found a wallet belonging to the defendant, Brown. The truck was titled in another individual's name without any evidence that it had been signed over to Brown. Through the course of their investigation, officers were able to determine that Brown lived at the Vicksburg Hotel, and they obtained a search warrant for his apartment. Upon execution of the search warrant, officers discovered blood stains and spatters on the living room carpet and walls, bloody clothing and pillows in the living room, human feces on the living room carpet, bloody clothes and shoes in the bedroom closet, and blood in the bedroom and bathtub. The blood was later analyzed and determined to be the Young's blood.

¶ 5. An arrest warrant was issued for Brown and he was taken into custody. After waiving his Miranda rights, he gave two videotaped statements. In those statements, Brown gave the following story. In the predawn hours of October 14, Brown went to a nearby convenience store where he was approached in the parking lot by Young, whom he did not know. She propositioned him to exchange sex for money. He declined the offer, but they decided to go back to his apartment and smoke crack. The two were joined by another man who is only referenced in the record as "the man with the crooked eye." The trio went to purchase crack. Then, they proceeded to Brown's apartment to smoke it. According to Brown, Young and the man with the crooked eye got into an argument over the drugs, and the man with the crooked eye picked up Brown's baseball bat and began beating Young. Brown went to the kitchen to get a knife. When he got back to the living room, the man with the crooked eye was gone. Brown told Young to leave, but she was unable to do so due to the seriousness of her injuries. Some time later, Young died. Instead of calling authorities, Brown attempted to dispose of Young's body by dragging it to the service elevator and ultimately dumping it in the parking lot. Brown explained that Young was found partially nude because he and she were going to engage in sexual activity at some point, but never did.³ Brown also told officers that he parked his truck nearly two blocks away from the Vicksburg Hotel after he saw the officers investigating Young's dead body in the parking lot.

¶ 6. Brown was subsequently tried and convicted by a jury in the Warren County Circuit Court for the murder of Young. He appeals that conviction alleging that: (1) his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers unlawfully seized his vehicle without probable cause, and (2) the trial court erred in not granting his circumstantial-evidence and accessory-after-the-fact jury instructions.

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER BROWN'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN OFFICERS IMPOUNDED HIS VEHICLE WITHOUT A WARRANT.

A. Standing

¶ 7. As a threshold matter, the State renews its argument that Brown lacks standing to challenge the seizure of the truck on Fourth Amendment grounds because no evidence was presented at the suppression hearing regarding the issue of ownership. Whether a defendant has standing to challenge a seizure is a question of law; therefore, we address this issue de novo. United States v. Kye Soo Lee, 898 F.2d 1034, 1037 (5th Cir.1990). "The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." Lyons v. State, 942 So.2d 247, 250(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). "[T]he question of whether a defendant can claim the protection of the [F]ourth [A]mendment hinges `not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" Lee, 898 F.2d at 1038 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. 421).

¶ 8. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that when a person has borrowed an automobile from another, with the other's consent, the borrower becomes a lawful possessor of the vehicle and has standing to challenge its search. Id. We have no direct evidence in the trial record about whether Brown was lawfully in possession of the truck. But, the State never presented any evidence that he was not in lawful possession of the vehicle. Therefore, there is no indication from the record that Brown lacked standing.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 9. Brown argues that the officers seized his truck without probable cause; therefore, all evidence that derived from the seizure was inadmissible as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." The analysis of whether there has been an unlawful seizure is subject to a mixed standard of review. Dies v. State, 926 So.2d 910, 917(¶ 20) (Miss.2006). The determination of the existence of probable cause is reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). However, that de novo review is limited to the "trial judge's decision based on historical facts reviewed under the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards." Id. (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113(¶ 11) (Miss.1999)). The basic elements of "a determination of ... probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the ... search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount ... to probable cause." Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657. "In determining whether evidence should be suppressed, a trial court's findings of fact are not disturbed on appeal absent a finding that the `trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.'" Clair v. State, 845 So.2d 733, 734-35(¶ 4) (Miss. Ct.App.2003) (quoting Taylor v. State, 733 So.2d 251, 255(¶ 18) (Miss.1999)).

C. The Alleged Fourth Amendment Violation

¶ 10. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974). In Cardwell, the Supreme Court found that no significant expectation of privacy was infringed by a search limited to an examination of the vehicle's tire and the taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle. Id. at 591, 94 S.Ct. 2464. The Supreme Court stated that "the invasion of privacy, `if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.'" Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (quoting Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974)). This is because when a person knowingly...