Brown v. State, No. 580S142

• Docket Nº: No. 580S142
• Citation: 275 Ind. 441, 417 N.E.2d 333
• Case Date: March 12, 1981

Page 333

417 N.E.2d 333 275 Ind. 441 Alan E. BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). No. 580S142. Supreme Court of Indiana. March 12, 1981.

[275 Ind. 443]

Page 335

Edward A. Pease, Thomas, Thomas & Pease, Brazil, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Thomas D. Quigley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

The defendant, Alan E. Brown, was convicted of rape, a class A felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and criminal confinement, a class B felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-3-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.). He was sentenced to fifty years and twenty years, the sentences to run concurrently. His direct appeal raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon a denial of his right to a speedy trial;

2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence without a proper foundation;

3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony of the prosecuting witness;

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to strike certain testimony and his motion for mistrial when defendant found out he had allegedly not been given a certain medical report;

5. Whether the trial court erred in admitting a certain map into evidence which was not drawn to scale;

6. Whether the trial court erred in questioning a certain witness about his conclusion regarding the location of the crime;

7. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for mistrial after some jurors allegedly overheard a conversation between a witness and another person;

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8. Whether the trial court erred in denying admission of the deposition of a defense witness; and

[275 Ind. 444] 9. Whether the trial court erred in giving certain instructions and refusing other instructions.

A summary of the facts most favorable to the state shows that on May 8, 1979, the victim was waiting at a bus stop in Terre Haute, Indiana. Defendant arrived at the bus stop about fifteen minutes later and sat down next to the victim. The victim started to rise when she saw her bus approach but was ordered to sit down again by defendant who showed her a knife in his hand. Defendant told her to remain seated for a few minutes and then forced her at knife point to get into an automobile. The victim tried to escape from the car but found that the passenger door was locked from the outside and there was no lock button on the inside.

Defendant drove the victim on a succession of gravel roads through Vigo County and into Clay County. There he forced her to get out of the car and undress. He raped her twice but stopped his sexual assault when he thought he heard someone approach. He then forced the victim to get back into the car and drove her back to Terre Haute. The victim identified defendant from pictures prior to trial and also identified his automobile and key chain.

I.

Defendant first contends that he was denied the right to a speedy trial and that therefore the charges against him should have been dismissed. He bases his argument on Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(B)(1) which provides:

"If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar."

Defendant first appeared in court on May 10, 1979, and entered a pro se plea of not guilty. Pauper counsel was appointed and apparently defendant made a request at that time that a trial date be set. He was given a date of June 14, 1979. A few days later defendant filed three [275 Ind. 445] motions concerning a reduction of bond, production of evidence and a change of judge. He later filed a motion for change of venue from the county and then, on June 1, 1979, a motion for psychiatric examination at court expense. When this latter motion was granted, the court vacated the original trial date because of the time required for the psychiatric tests. The trial date was later set for September 17, 1979; then it was twice reset, and the trial was finally held on October 16, 1979.

It is not clear from the record before us whether or not defendant's request that a trial date be set actually qualifies as a motion for a speedy trial. In any event, defendant's argument must fail on other grounds. There are numerous cases construing Ind.R.Crim.P. 4 which make clear that there is a duty upon the state to bring a defendant to trial within the framework of the protections that rule provides. However, it is also well settled that the time limitations of the rule shall be extended by the period of any delay caused by defendant's acts. Battle v. State, (1981) Ind., 415 N.E.2d 39; Bradberry v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 530, 364 N.E.2d 1183; Gross v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 46, 278 N.E.2d 583. Determination of what amount of delay is attributable to defendant's actions must be decided on a case by case basis. Fortson v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 161, 379 N.E.2d 147.

In the instant case, defendant moved for a psychiatric examination on June 1, 1979, and it appears from the record that all the examination reports were not available until September 28, 1979. This period of delay was properly chargeable to defendant and there was no error here. Fortson v. State, supra.

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II.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a key chain which was identified by the victim as the key chain she observed in defendant's possession during her confinement and rape. He argues that there was not a proper foundation or a complete chain of custody established prior to its admission. We do not agree.

The victim had given a description to the police of a rather unusual key chain which had been in her assailant's possession. The police took [275 Ind. 446] a key chain matching this description from defendant when they arrested him the day after the crime and locked it in the police property room until the trial. The victim positively identified the key chain when it was introduced into...