Brown v. State Of Ind.
Decision Date | 27 September 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 11S04-0911-CR-537.,11S04-0911-CR-537. |
Citation | 929 N.E.2d 204 |
Parties | Kenneth BROWN, Appellant (Defendant Below),v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Kimberly A. Jackson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Deputy Attorney Generals, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 11A04-0904-CR-213
We hold that a claimed error in admitting unlawfully seized evidence at trial is not preserved for appeal unless an objection was lodged at the time the evidence was offered. We also hold that such a claim, without more, does not assert fundamental error.
Linton police received an anonymous report that one Mark Green, the subject of a federal firearms warrant, had acquired methamphetamine from defendant Kenneth Brown. After Green was arrested, three Linton officers and a Clay County sheriff agreed to conduct a “knock and talk” investigation of Brown. The four officers arrived at Brown's home between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on the morning of July 8, 2005. When Brown answered the door, the officers asked permission to search the home. Brown granted access to one of the four, who found drugs and paraphernalia in the home. Brown was convicted of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, a Class B felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Class C felony; possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. This appeal challenges the admission of the items from his home into evidence at his jury trial.1 As explained below, we conclude that this issue was not preserved for appeal.
Brown filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence collected at his home, claiming that the officers' search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. That motion was denied, and the case was tried to a jury. Brown did not seek a continuing objection to the admission of the seized items, and when each of the items of evidence was presented to the jury, his attorney stated, “No objection.” After these exhibits were admitted, and the jury was released for lunch, Brown's attorney referred to his pretrial motion to suppress and stated:
[I]t's my understanding the court was going to overrule objections that we would make concerning the admissibility of evidence.... Just to make sure that the record is clear and to preserve the record for Mr. Brown's benefit, we would restate those objections that we previously wrote in our motion to suppress that we previously litigated for the court.
The judge responded,
The Court of Appeals held that Brown had not preserved his challenge to the admission of the evidence, but concluded that the issue was reviewable as fundamental error. Ultimately the Court of Appeals majority found the search of Brown's residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment or the Indiana Constitution. Brown v. State, 913 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). Judge Mathias dissented, finding a state constitutional violation. Id. at 1265 (Mathias, J., dissenting). We granted transfer.
The State argues that Brown waived any objection to the admission of the evidence found in the search by failing to object to its admission at trial. Brown responds that his belated statement outside the presence of the jury combined with his pretrial motion to suppress preserved the issue, and also contends that the admission of the evidence was fundamental error and therefore could be challenged on appeal despite his failure to object at trial.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that Brown failed to preserve his challenge to the admissibility of the evidence. Brown, 913 N.E.2d at 1258. A contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at trial is required to preserve the issue for appeal, whether or not the appellant has filed a pretrial motion to suppress. Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind.2000) (); Wagner v. State, 474 N.E.2d 476, 484 (Ind.1985) (). The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial judge to consider the issue in light of any fresh developments and also to correct any errors. Jackson, 735 N.E.2d at 1152. Here, Brown did not object when the evidence was introduced and affirmatively stated that he had no objection to its admission. His attempt to lodge a continuing objection was made only after the jury was presented with all of this evidence. The only practical means of granting relief at that point would be to declare a mistrial given that the jury was already exposed to virtually conclusive evidence of guilt on at least the possession counts. We therefore do not find persuasive Brown's contention that a party may resurrect an objection after the evidence has been admitted, at least without the trial court's recognizing a continuing objection which did not occur here.
A claim that has been waived by a defendant's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred. See, e.g., Trice v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ind.2002); Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 694 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind.2006). The error claimed must either “make a fair trial impossible” or constitute “clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind.2009). This exception is available only in “egregious circumstances.” Brown v. State, ...
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