Brown v. Sudduth

• Decision Date: 16 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 09–60037.,09–60037.
• Citation: 675 F.3d 472
• Parties: Eric Laquinne BROWN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Robert G. SUDDUTH, Investigator, Pontotoc City Police, in Individual and Official Capacities; Mike McGowan, Investigator, Pontotoc County, in Individual and Official Capacities; Franky Daniels, Ex–Sheriff, in Individual and Official Capacities; Larry Poole, Sheriff, in Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

675 F.3d 472

Eric Laquinne BROWN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Robert G. SUDDUTH, Investigator, Pontotoc City Police, in Individual and Official Capacities; Mike McGowan, Investigator, Pontotoc County, in Individual and Official Capacities; Franky Daniels, Ex–Sheriff, in Individual and Official Capacities; Larry Poole, Sheriff, in Individual and Official Capacities, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 09–60037.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 16, 2012.

Eric LaQuinne Brown, Leakesville, MS, pro se.

Gary Erwin Friedman, Mark D. Fijman, Saundra Brown Strong, Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., Jackson, MS, Daniel J. Griffith, Michael Stephen Carr, Benjamin Elmo Griffith, Griffith & Griffith, Cleveland, MS, for Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before GARZA, CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:

Eric Laquinne Brown, a Mississippi state prisoner who is serving a life sentence for murder and manslaughter, appeals from the judgment in favor of the defendants in his Section 1983 suit. Proceeding pro se at trial and now on appeal, Brown alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated (1) by delay in holding a probable cause determination after his arrest and (2) by his warrantless arrest. After the jury announced a verdict for the defendants, Brown filed a Rule 50(b) motion for a judgment as a matter of law. The district court denied the motion and entered judgment on the verdict. Brown timely appeals, raising numerous issues. We AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Pontotoc is a city of about 5,500 people in northeast Mississippi. Early on Saturday morning, January 23, 1999, the Pontotoc Police Department received a call from the Memphis Police Department. Pontotoc Police Investigator Robert Sudduth returned the call soon after he began work at 6:00 a.m. Sudduth learned that Memphis police officers had discovered the body of Shorelonda Moore inside a partially burned car. The victim was dressed in a McDonald's restaurant uniform. The car bore a Pontotoc County license plate and belonged to the victim, who lived in the City of Pontotoc and worked at the local McDonald's.

Immediately, the investigation centered on Eric Brown, the plaintiff in the present suit. Pontotoc police were familiar with Moore and Brown due to several domestic disputes between them. Moore and another woman, Tenille Johnson, had previously each had a child by Brown. Moore was over six-months pregnant with a second of Brown's children when she died. Brown married Johnson only days before Moore's death.

As the investigation progressed that morning, Sudduth learned from the McDonald's manager that Moore had worked the previous day. The manager stated that Brown had telephoned the restaurant several times on Friday, and that Brown and Moore were to meet after Moore's shift. One of Moore's friends told investigators that Moore and Brown had plans to leave town for the weekend. Brown's neighbor told Sudduth that Brown had been away from home Friday night, and officers could not locate Brown at home Saturday morning.

On Saturday afternoon, a Pontotoc officer stopped a vehicle for failing to display a license plate. Brown was the driver, traveling with his wife Johnson. By then, Brown was wanted for questioning in connection with Moore's death. Sudduth and other officers were dispatched to the scene. Brown at trial claimed he was arrested during the traffic stop. The defendants introduced evidence Brown was arrested after being taken to the police station. The arrest report showed his arrest was at 2:00 p.m. It was not until Tuesday at 8:30 a.m. that a municipal judge found probable cause to arrest Brown.

Brown was indicted for the murder of Shorelonda Moore and for manslaughter due to the death of her unborn child. He pled guilty in 1999 and is currently serving a life sentence in a Mississippi state prison. In January 2002, he filed this Section 1983 claim for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There have been three earlier appeals from dismissals of his claims. Each time we reversed. The appeal we resolve today is the first taken from a judgment entered after a jury trial.

Brown's pro se brief presents 13 issues. The principal argument meriting analysis is that no bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance existed preventing him from receiving a probable cause determination within 48 hours of his arrest. Relatedly, Brown challenges his warrantless arrest.

In less detailed fashion, we also review his remaining issues. These include that the district court erred by informing the jury venire that Brown was an inmate, that certain jury instructions were erroneous, that a deposition should not have been admitted into evidence, that reversible error occurred with other evidentiary rulings, that the court's response to a jury note was error, that defense discovery violations necessitated a pre-trial conference, and that his motion for court-issued witness subpoenas should have been granted.

Not presented is the question that usually must be answered in a case such as this of whether “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Two of Brown's earlier appeals were from district court rulings that Heck barred his claim of an illegal arrest; each time we reversed.¹ No party raised the issue again on remand or in the briefing on this appeal. The parties have treated Heck as if it were sufficiently addressed in the earlier appeals. We believe it was.

DISCUSSION

Brown argues the district court should have entered judgment as a matter of law on his claims that his constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested without a warrant and when he was incarcerated for 66 hours before a magistrate determined there was probable cause for the arrest.

This court gives de novo review to a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Brennan's, Inc. v. Dickie Brennan & Co., 376 F.3d 356, 362 (5th Cir.2004). Such a judgment is proper when “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). This will only occur if “the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant's favor” that jurors could not reasonably have reached a contrary verdict. Dickie Brennan & Co., 376 F.3d at 362. We credit the non-moving defendant's evidence and “disregard all evidence favorable to [the plaintiff] that the jury is not required to believe.” Coffel v. Stryker Corp., 284 F.3d 625, 631 (5th Cir.2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). After a jury trial, our standard of review is “especially deferential.” Brown v. Bryan Cnty., Okla., 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir.2000).

I. Timely Judicial Determination of Probable Cause

In 1975, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a fair determination of probable cause to be made “promptly after arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Sixteen years later, the Court endeavored “to articulate more clearly” what the Fourth Amendment required. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991).

This caselaw created two distinct presumptions. “Judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein.” Id.; see also Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 83, 114 S.Ct. 1280, 128 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). Delays less than 48 hours also can violate an arrestee's rights when “unreasonable,” that is, “for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661. Any probable cause determination before the 48–hour mark is presumptively reasonable and the burden of showing otherwise falls to the person arrested. Id. In evaluating such contentions, “courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility.” Id. Beyond 48 hours, “the calculus changes.” Id. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. In that situation, “the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id.

The Court acknowledged that nothing in “the Constitution compels a specific time limit.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661; see 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(g) at 58 (4th ed. 2004). Also the Court rejected the view that under Gerstein “a probable cause determination [was] to be made as soon as the administrative steps incident to arrest were completed.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 54, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

We give pro se briefs a liberal construction. Mayfield v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir.2008). Liberally construed, Brown's brief presents three Fourth Amendment questions relevant to the Rule 50 motion. One is that there were no extraordinary circumstances that warranted an exception to the 48–hour rule. A second argument is that the delay here was for impermissible reasons. The third claim we examine, in Part II of the opinion, is that Brown's warrantless arrest was unconstitutional.

1. Extraordinary Circumstances

A foundational fact is how long the delay was from arrest until the probable cause determination. Officer Sudduth testified that Brown was not arrested at the traffic stop, was given his Miranda warnings at the police station around 2:00 p.m., and the arrest occurred at about that time. Rational jurors would be entitled to find the officer's statements...