Brown v. Summit Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't
| Decision Date | 19 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-cv-00032-BNB |
| Parties | D. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. SUMMIT COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, JEFF WILSON, Deputy, JARED DENNIS, Detective, CORNELL, Deputy, JOHN MINOR, Sheriff, and OTHER DEPUTIES, Unknown names, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Plaintiff, D Brown, resides in Hollywood, California. She initiated this action on January 6, 2014, by filing a Complaint asserting a deprivation of her constitutional rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She filed an Amended Complaint on January 21, 2014. (ECF No. 11).
Ms. Brown has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Subsection (e)(2)(B) of § 1915 requires a court to dismiss sua sponte an action at any time if the action is frivolous, malicious, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A legally frivolous claim is one in which the plaintiff asserts the violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist or asserts facts that do not support an arguable claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
The Court must construe the Amended Complaint liberally because Ms. Brown is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not act as an advocate for pro se litigants. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint and has determined that it is deficient. For the reasons discussed below, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed, in part, and the remainder drawn to a presiding judge, and, if appropriate, a magistrate judge.
Ms. Brown claims in the Amended Complaint that the Defendants, the Summit County Sheriff's Department and its officers, have violated her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Plaintiff, her problems began when her husband, Neil Brown (N.B.), a police officer in Colorado and a citizen of Australia, conspired with the Defendants, his "friends and coworkers," to manipulate the judicial system and violate a California court-imposed restraining order against N.B. that prevented him from contacting Plaintiff and her children. (ECF No. 11, at 3). Ms. Brown alleges that N.B. kidnapped her children from a summer camp in California and that she has not seen the children since. Plaintiff believes that N.B. is hiding the children in Australia. She alleges that the Defendants, including the Sheriff, have refused to enforce both the restraining order against N.B. and the custody order she obtained from the California courts because N.B. is their "friend and fellow police officer" and he "should have the children." (Id. at 4, 7, 8). Plaintiff further alleges that a sheriff's deputy wrote a false report stating that N.B.'s children were taken from Summit County, even though the children had never lived in Summit County. According to Ms. Brown:
[N.B.] is attempting to hide behind the VOID second in time vexatious,harassing, parallel, Colorado case conflicting orders from his friend Eagle County Judge Moorhead, in knowing violation of UCCJEA, PKPA, VAWA when without jurisdiction to exercise jurisdiction on June 28, 2012 in an order that even stated they KNOW there is a 1st filed California proceeding with custody orders but violate the mandatory commands of the UCCJEA, PKPA and grant jurisdiction and home state to Colorado when that is NOT proper procedure or due process.
(Id. at 5).
Plaintiff further asserts that Colorado (Id. at 6). Ms. Brown also alleges that the Defendants arrested her on false felony stalking charges that were dismissed by the deputy district attorney approximately five months later. She further states that the Defendants refused to accept her complaint against N.B. and one unidentified deputy threatened to kill her if she returned to Summit County.
Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) that the Defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (the Extradition Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (); 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (); and, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (crime victims' rights) by not granting full faith and credit to orders issued by the California courts; (2) that Defendants have violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; and, (3) that Defendants have violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights by refusing to afford full faith and credit to orders and warrants issued by the California state courts. Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and abuse of process. She seeks injunctive relief and damages.
As an initial matter, Ms. Brown does not state an arguable claim for relief under § 1983 based on her allegations that the Defendants have violated the Extradition Act of 1793, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3182, by failing to enforce orders issued by the California courts. Although the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized that a government official's failure to comply with extradition laws is actionable under section 1983, see Ortega v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 875 F.2d 1497, 1500 (10th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases) and Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588, 595 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases), the federal cause of action belongs to the alleged fugitive. See id. The Court is not aware of any case holding that a third person may enforce the provisions of the Extradition Act under § 1983. As such, Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 claim based on the Defendants' alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3182.
Ms. Brown cannot pursue a cause of action under § 1983 based on the Defendants' alleged violation of the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. The PKPA "prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and State, are to be guided when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as to the faith and credit to be given by the court to the . . . judicial proceedings of [another] State." Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182-83 (1988) (citation omitted). The PKPA mandates that when a state enters an initial custody determination, a second state must enforce that determination providedthat the state made the determination in compliance with the PKPA. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). Conversely, if a state court's custody determination fails to conform to the PKPA's requirements, then the custody determination is not entitled to full faith and credit enforcement in another state. See id. at 176-77; see also § 1738A (). Colorado statutes and case law incorporate the requirements of the PKPA. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)-(d), (h) (); COLO. REV. STAT. (C.R.S.) §§ 14-13-201 to -203, C.R.S. (2010) (same); People ex rel. A.J.C., 88 P.3d 599, 611 (Colo. 2004) ().
The PKPA does not create an implied cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 187; see also Roman-Nose v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Services, 967 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1992). Instead, such conflicts are resolved in the state courts pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), 9 U.L.A. §§ 1-28 (1979), which prescribes uniform standards for deciding which State could make a custody determination and obligated enacting States to enforce the determination made by the State with proper jurisdiction. Id. at 181. The Colorado General Assembly has adopted the provisions of and comments to the UCCJEA. See § 14-13-101, C.R.S.; see also In re L.S., 257 P.3d 201 (Colo. 2011) ().
Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have a remedy in this Court to enforce the California child custody order, under federal or state law. The "[f]ederal courts have long disclaimed responsibility for domestic relations cases, leaving the power to issue and enforce 'divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees' to the states." Wyttenbach v. Parrish, No. 12-4074, 496 F. App'x 796, 797 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2012) (unpublished) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)). See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (). Ms. Brown makes a vague allegation that the Eagle County District Court refused to honor her California custody order in a 2012 proceeding. If Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the state district court's order, her remedy, if any, is in the Colorado appellate courts, and, ultimately, in the United States Supreme Court. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 18587.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have refused to enforce and give full faith and credit to the restraining order and accompanying orders issued by the California state court, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (), 18 U.S.C. § 2265 () and 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1) (crime victims' rights).
Ms. Brown cannot pursue a § 1983 claim again...
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