Brown v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 19 August 1971
• Citation: 5 Cal.3d 509,487 P.2d 1224,96 Cal.Rptr. 584
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 487 P.2d 1224 Edmund G. BROWN, Jr., as Secretary of State, etc., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; CALIFORNIANS AGAINST the STREET AND ROAD TAX TRAP et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 29879. In Bank

Page 584

96 Cal.Rptr. 584

5 Cal.3d 509, 487 P.2d 1224

Edmund G. BROWN, Jr., as Secretary of State, etc., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent CALIFORNIANS AGAINST the STREET AND ROAD TAX TRAP et al., Real Parties in Interest.

L.A. 29879.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 19, 1971.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Marvin S. Shapiro and Charles H. Phillips, Los Angeles, Daniel H. Lowenstein, Modesto, W. N. Davis, Jr., Sacramento, for petitioner.

Thomas H. Crawford, Barbara Ashley Phillips, Roland Brandel and Richard G. Hildreth, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Thorpe, Sullivan, Clinnin & Workman and Vincent W. Thorpe, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

No appearance for respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

On application of Edmund G. Brown, Jr., as Secretary of State, we issued an alternative writ of mandate directing the respondent Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate or show cause why it should not vacate its order sustaining a demurrer and dismissing an action seeking the imposition of civil penalties on the real parties in interest for their alleged failure to comply with certain election campaign laws. We have concluded that the first amended complaint filed in the basic action states a proper cause against the particular demurrer and that the peremptory writ should issue.

It is alleged that defendants ¹ violated certain provisions of the Elections Code requiring that an 'association' disclose the names of contributors and the amount contributed by each, and the names of distributees and the amount distributed to each, in connection with the association's support of or opposition to ballot measures. ² These violations were alleged to have occurred during the November 1970 statewide elections in relation to Proposition 18, which failed to obtain the necessary majority of votes for adoption. In the words of the complaint, Proposition 18 would have authorized 'the use of a percentage of revenue derived from motor fuel tax and license fees for control of environmental pollution caused by motor vehicles, and for public transportation including mass transit systems, upon approval of the electorate in the area affected.' Defendants were opposed to Proposition 18 and, it is alleged, collected funds for the 'payment of expenses in a campaign to influence the action of the voters against the adoption of' the proposition. Civil penalties for the alleged failure to make the required disclosures are provided for pursuant to Elections Code section 11890. ³

Some of the defendants other than the three oil companies jointly interposed a demurrer on the ground that the disclosure statute was unconstitutional on its face. The trial court's order sustaining the demurrer provided: 'Demurrer sustained without leave to amend, on the ground that there is an invidious discrimination against those campaigning for and against propositions and is therefore unconstitutional; treating such proponents and opponents of Propositions differently than those opposing or favoring Candidates is discriminatory in the light of the Constitution.' (Italics added.) Demurrers on other grounds interposed by the three oil company defendants were taken off calendar, and the order of dismissal was thereupon entered.

Brief mention should be made of threshold issues going to petitioner's standing and the propriety of the remedy. Plaintiff in the basic action in its current posture is Edmund G. Brown, Jr., a 'citizen of the State of California.' He seeks a determination of penalties in such capacity after an earlier demurrer was sustained by respondent court on the ground that he was not a proper party plaintiff in initially bringing the action in his capacity as Secretary of State. ⁴ As plaintiff citizen in the basic action he has a remedy by way of appeal from the order of dismissal. He seeks, instead, by his collateral attack in his capacity as Secretary of State, a writ of mandate compelling the respondent court (1) to vacate orders sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action, and (2) to assume jurisdiction and proceeding with the action.

If mandamus is a proper remedy, and assuming that as Secretary of State in these proceedings petitioner is a stranger to the basic action, he nevertheless appears to be a 'party beneficially interested' (Code Civ.Proc., § 1086) upon whose petition mandate could issue. (See Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 356--357, 196 P.2d 562; Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L.A. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 100--101, 162 P.2d 627.) His beneficial interest is amply demonstrated by a showing that he bears overall responsibility for administering the disclosure laws the constitutionality of which is now challenged. The uncertainty engendered by the respondent court's order of dismissal requires final resolution in order that the Secretary of State may be properly and fully informed with respect to these public responsibilities.

It further appears that mandate is the proper remedy in these circumstances. By declaring the disclosure statute unconstitutional the respondent court has refused to assume jurisdiction over the basic action to extract civil penalties (see In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 145--146, 65 Cal.Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273), and mandate should issue to compel a determination on the merits (robinson v. superior court (1950) 35 cal.2d 379, 383--384, 218 P.2d 10; Sampsell v. Superior Court (1948) 32 Cal.2d 763, 773, 197 P.2d 739) where the remedy by appeal is inadequate. (County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593.) Appended to the petition are several declarations and exhibits by which it is made to appear that the public interest requires a more rapid determination of the constitutionality of the disclosure statute than can be provided in the normal course of appellate review. At least two statewide initiative measures and scores of local ballot measures, many of which are of a controversial nature and will involve substantial campaign expenditures, will be submitted to the voters during the remainder of the current year. In the absence of a speedy final determination of the viability of disclosure laws, both proponents and opponents of the measures will be forced to respond or not respond to legislative direction at their own risk. The Secretary of State has prepared but because of this uncertainty not forwarded instructions to proponents of statewide initiative, referendum and recall petitions relating to their responsibilities under the disclosure laws. The public welfare thus requires an early resolution which can be achieved only by mandamus in the interest of orderly compliance with and administration of the particular laws. The issue of the absence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law has, moreover, already been determined by the granting of the alternative writ. (County of Sacramento v. Hickman, supra, 66 Cal.2d 841, 845, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593; Corona etc. Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 846, 850, 40 Cal.Rptr. 745, 395 P.2d 817.)

The substantive ground urged in support of the claims of unconstitutionality of the particular disclosure statutes (fn. 2, supra) is, according to defendants, an invalid legislative classification which treats persons or associations who support or oppose candidates for public office differently from persons or associations who support or oppose ballot measures. ⁵ In either case such persons and associations are required to make disclosure statements which are filed with the Secretary of State or other public official. But, it is claimed, the statements required of persons supporting or opposing ballot measures are so significantly more onerous as to constitute an invidious discrimination rendering those laws unconstitutional under Fourteen Amendment equal protection prohibitions. Defendants concede the propriety and even the desirability of disclosure requirements in the case of both candidates and election ballot measures and are not opposed to requirements which would be as onerous in one case as in the other.

The disclosure provisions affecting candidates for public office are set forth in Elections Code, division 8, chapter 1 (§ 11500 et seq.). Such provisions require, generally, the filing of campaign statements by candidates for public offices and by the treasurers of committees organized for the purpose of conducting the election campaign of any candidate or political party. In the broad sense, the provisions require a showing of contributions to and expenses paid by any candidate or committee. ⁶ In addition to the Elections Code requirements, Government Code section 3750 further requires the filing of statements by candidates and their supporting political committees listing contributions in excess of $500 with the names of the contributors.

Defendants particularly complain of certain differences in disclosure requirements which are claimed to impose a greater burden on proponents and opponents of ballot measures as compared to candidates and the treasurers of their political committees. Some of these differences are hereinafter set forth. 1. There is a lesser requirement for itemization of contributions in the case of candidate elections.

In the case of ballot measures, there are no itemization requirements where the total contributions are not more than $1,000 (Elect. Code, §§ 11801, subd. (a), 11830), and in the event the total exceeds $1,000 only those contributions of $25 or more need be itemized. In the case of candidates, contributions in excess of $500 are required to be itemized (Gov. Code, § 3750) and it is expressly provided that all contributions whatever the amount be set out 'in detail' on an 'itemized statement' for each of 15 different categories. (Elec. Code, §§ 11503, 11504.)

On the face of the statutory provisions, the foregoing itemization requirements appear to be...