Brown v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec.

Decision Date13 May 2022
Docket NumberM2021-00422-COA-R3-CV
PartiesLARRY BROWN ET AL. v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee

Session February 10, 2022

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 17-1197-III 17-1204-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

This case arises from the seizure of property owned by Appellants and the ensuing forfeiture action brought against them by Appellee Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. After Appellee voluntarily dismissed the forfeiture action, the Administrative Law Judge awarded Appellants a portion of their requested attorney's fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a). The Chancery Court of Davidson County reversed the award of fees on its finding that Appellee did not issue a "citation" as required for recovery of attorney's fees under section 4-5-325(a). The trial court also held that Appellants were not entitled to recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded

Herbert S. Moncier, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Larry Brown and Chandra Brown.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; Rob Mitchell and Mallory Kathryn Schiller, Assistant Attorneys General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security.

Kenny Armstrong, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Arnold B. Goldin, and Carma Dennis McGee, JJ., joined.

OPINION
KENNY ARMSTRONG KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE
I. Background

This case arises from the seizure of property owned by Larry Brown and his daughter Chandra Brown (together, the "Browns," or "Appellants") and the subsequent administrative forfeiture proceedings conducted under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-33-201 through 217. Law enforcement officers with the Eighth Judicial Drug Task Force executed a search warrant on April 7, 2015, at the home shared by the Browns after investigating Larry Brown for drug activity. During the search, officers seized property belonging to both Larry and Chandra Brown, including a 1996 Honda Goldwing motorcycle, a 2003 Chevrolet Z71 truck, a Troybilt pressure washer, $2, 741.00 in U.S. currency, a 1994 Winnebago Vectra motorhome, a Stihl weed eater, an Exmark Lazer Z lawn mower, and a 1992 Ford Superduty FSD truck. Notices of seizure were issued by the Eighth Judicial Drug Task Force, i.e., the seizing agency, and, on May 6, 2015, the circuit court issued a forfeiture warrant under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-204. Thereafter, Appellee Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security (the "Department") sent notice to the Browns of the issuance of the forfeiture warrant.

The Browns subsequently petitioned the Department for the return of the seized property, and the case was assigned to an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Following a hearing on January 26, 2017, the ALJ found that the Department failed (with one exception, the 2003 Chevrolet Z71 truck) to show any connection between the seized property and drug sales. Therefore, the ALJ ordered that the property be returned, except for the truck. On appeal to the Department's Appeals Division, the Division reversed in part but agreed that the Department failed to carry its burden (except with regard to the truck) and ordered that some of the property be returned. The matter was remanded to the ALJ and set for another hearing. Before that hearing occurred, the seizing agency returned all of the property (including the truck) to the Browns, and the Department filed a motion for an order of voluntary dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding. The Browns opposed dismissal and requested attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The ALJ granted the Department's motion to dismiss.

Approximately three months later, on September 13, 2017, the ALJ granted the Browns' motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a), awarding them $35, 000.00 of the $100, 752.50 they requested. As grounds for the award of fees, the ALJ found that there was no basis for the seizure of any of the property except the truck, and that the Department did not fulfill its statutory obligation to "release the property if there is no legal and factual basis for forfeiture" under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-204(g). The ALJ did not address the Browns' claim for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Department filed a "Petition for Reconsideration/to Alter or Amend Language [and] Motion for Stay." The Browns filed a Response and Cross-Petition to Alter, Amend and Revise the September 13, 2017 Order, seeking to recover all of their claimed attorney's fees in the amount of $100, 752.50. The ALJ denied both motions on October 23, 2017. Thereafter, both parties filed petitions for judicial review in the Davidson County Chancery Court ("trial court"), which petitions were consolidated into one action.

On March 25, 2021, the trial court entered an order reversing the ALJ's award of attorney's fees. In relevant part, the trial court held:

[T]he Court orders that the petition for judicial review of [Department] is granted; the September 13, 2017 Final Order of the ALJ awarding $35, 000 in attorney's fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325 is reversed; and the Browns are not entitled to recovery of attorney's fees under this statute.
As to the Browns' petition for judicial review for recovery from this Court or remand to the ALJ for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988, it is ORDERED that the petition is dismissed with prejudice. The Browns shall not recover because they have failed to demonstrate on the record asserted Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations on which to premise recovery of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988. The above ruling that [the Department] did not issue a citation and was not the initial entity for the seizure, this Court concludes, precludes liability under the Fourth Amendment. As to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, the Browns failed to provide sufficient analysis of the law and facts of record under Paratt v. Taylor, 451 US. 527 (1981) doctrine to establish a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violation for recovery of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 attorney's fees.

The Browns appeal.

II. Issues

The Browns raise the following issues for review:

1. Did the Chancery Court lack subject matter jurisdiction because there was not a Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-314(c) final order, or Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(a)(1) final decision, by the Administrative Judge, on the aspect of the Browns' claims for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) made applicable to Tennessee proceedings by Bloomingdale's by Mail v. Huddleston, 848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992) and Tennessee administrative proceedings pursuant to Wimley v. Rudolph, 931 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. 1996).
2. Did the Chancellor err by dismissing the Browns' 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) claims for attorney's fees.
3.Were letters issued by [the Department] within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a) "Citation[s]. . . for the violation of a rule, regulation or statute," or the functional equivalent of "Citations[s]. . . for the violation of a rule, regulation or statute."
4. Should this Court reverse the Chancery Court's denial of attorney's fees with instructions to remand to the Administrative Judge to render a final order on the Browns' pretermitted 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) claims, and for awards of attorney's fees for representation in the Chancery Court, and on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-325(a) and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
III. Standard of Review

Judicial review of civil forfeiture proceedings is primarily governed by the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). Nicholas v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., No. M2017-01674-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3831518, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2018); McEwen v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Under the version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322(h) in effect when the trial court rendered its decision, the agency's decision may be reversed or modified if the decision is shown to be:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5)(A) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record. . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). In forfeiture cases, this standard is slightly modified. Instead of the substantial-and-material-evidence standard under section 4-5-322(h)(5), the preponderance-of-evidence standard is used in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final agency order. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-213(a) (stating that in appeals of forfeiture cases "[t]he reviewing court shall use the preponderance of evidence standard in determining whether to sustain or reverse the final order of the applicable agency."); McEwen, 173 S.W.3d at 819-20.

IV. Analysis

Before turning to the issues, we pause to review the statutory scheme applicable to the forfeiture of Appellants' property. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 53-11-451(a), certain property is subject to forfeiture including controlled substances, vehicles used or intended for use to transport or facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, and all "moneys . . . used, or intended to be used, to...

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