Brown v. The Camden & Atlantic Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1877
• Citation: 83 Pa. 316
• Parties: Brown <I>versus</I> The Camden and Atlantic Railroad Company.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 316

83 Pa. 316

Brown versus The Camden and Atlantic Railroad Company.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 22, 1877.

February 5, 1877.

January 22d 1877.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ. WILLIAMS, J., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 4, of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1875, No. 148 W. Ernst and G. W. Dedrick, for the plaintiff in error, argued the question of the application of the Act of 1867.

S. Dickson and J. C. Bullitt, for the defendant in error.—As the contract was made in Pennsylvania, and the loss presumably happened here, the case is governed by the law of this state: Wharton's Conflict of Laws, §§ 471-3; P. & O. Nav. Co. v. Shand, 11 Jur. N. S. 771; s. c. 3 Moore P. C. N. S. 272; Dike v. Erie Railway Co., 53 N. Y.

The carrier has a right to be informed of the value of packages delivered to him, and any concealment or misrepresentation will bar the right of recovery: Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298; Relf v. Rapp, 3 W. & S. 21; Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Ald. 21.

Counsel also argued the question of the constitutionality of the Act of 1867.

Mr. Justice SHARSWOOD delivered the opinion of the court, February 5th 1877.

It will not be necessary to decide whether the Act of Assembly of April 11th 1867, Pamph. L. 69, is or is not constitutional, nor whether that act has any application to foreign railroad corporations making contracts for the carriage of passengers and their baggage in this state. The charter of the defendants, which was in evidence in the court below, showed that they derived their existence and privileges from the state of New Jersey, and the contract was made at their wharf in Philadelphia to carry the plaintiff and his baggage to Atlantic City, over a road lying entirely in the state of New Jersey.

It is perfectly well settled by a host of authorities, which it would be an affectation of learning to cite, that it is the law of the place of performance by which the mode of fulfilling a contract and the measure of liability for its breach must be determined: Wharton on Confl., sect. 401; Story on Confl., § 233. Without looking further it is sufficient to refer to Mullen v. Morris, 2 Barr 85, where it was held that the endorser of a bill of exchange drawn on the city of New York and payable there was liable for interest according to the legal rate of that state. See, also, Allshouse v. Ramsay, 6 Whart. 331.

As the contract relied on in this case as the ground of the liability of the defendants was to be performed in the state of New Jersey, we must look to the law of that state to determine the extent of that liability. It is no answer to say that part of the undertaking was to carry the plaintiff and his baggage across the Delaware to Camden, and so in part within the limits of Pennsylvania. That river is conterminous between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and the inhabitants of both have equal rights of navigation and passage. By the compact between the two states of April 26th 1783, confirmed and ratified by the Act of September 20th 1783, 2 Sm. Laws 77, it was declared that "it is and shall continue to be and remain a common highway equally free and open...