Brown v. The ESAB Grp.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:22-cv-155-KS-MTP
• Parties: CALEB BROWN PLAINTIFF v. THE ESAB GROUP, INC., ENOVIS CORPORATION Formerly COLFAX CORPORATION; and JOHN DOE BUSINESS 1-5 DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

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CALEB BROWN PLAINTIFF v. THE ESAB GROUP, INC., ENOVIS CORPORATION Formerly COLFAX CORPORATION; and JOHN DOE BUSINESS 1-5 DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-155-KS-MTP

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division

March 27, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KEITH STARRETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This cause comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [5] filed by the Defendants, The ESAB Group, Inc. (“ESAB”) and Enovis Corporation (“Enovis/Colfax”). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for ruling. Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the relevant legal authority, and otherwise being duly advised in the premises, the Court finds that the motion will be granted in part and denied in part for the reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND

This cases arises from an employer/employee relationship, whereby Plaintiff worked as a business development manager for nine years with ESAB.^[1]Although it is unclear from Plaintiff's complaint what type of business is involved, Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from manganese toxicity, which he contends he contracted while working at ESAB.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in state court on or about September 20 2022 [5-1], which Defendants timely removed to this Court on November 16, 2022 based on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. [1]. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action:

1) Battery and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (related to alleged manganese toxicity exposure) [5-1] at ¶ 18;

2) Bad Faith, Breach of Contract and Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (related to allegedly being denied workers' compensation and short-term disability benefits) [51] at ¶ 19;

3) Wrongful Discharge (related to alleged termination in violation of public policy for allegedly reporting executives involved in theft/embezzlement) [5-1] at ¶ 20;

4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Slander and Defamation (related to alleged statements Defendants made to Plaintiff's physician) [5-1] at ¶ 21;

5) Unspecified “whistleblower” claim (related to Plaintiff allegedly reporting safety concerns about manganese toxicity) [5-1] at ¶ 22;

6) Intentional Interference with Employment Relationship against Enovis' predecessor (COLFAX) (related to allegedly setting in motion Plaintiff's termination from ESAB) [5-1] at ¶ 23;

7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (general allegation) [5-1] at ¶ 24; and

8) Title VII claims for religious discrimination, disability discrimination and retaliation [5-1] at ¶ 25.

Defendants now move for partial dismissal on all but the wrongful discharge (McArn) claim. In response, Plaintiff concedes that the statute of limitations bars his claims for battery and slander/defamation. Plaintiff further concedes his claim for religious discrimination.^[2]Therefore, those particular claims will be dismissed. As for the other claims Defendants urge the Court to dismiss, the Court will address each in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Each claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund v. (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

First, the Court should identify and disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”' Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or elements.'” Morgan v. Hubert, 335 Fed. App'x 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

B. Analysis

In addition to those claims that Plaintiff affirmatively conceded and have been dismissed, the breach of contract claims and retaliation claim also readily warrant dismissal. The Court will then analyze the sufficiency of the pleading for the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with a contract, and disability discrimination.

1. Claims for bad faith, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing

First, Defendants moved to dismiss the bad faith, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claims related to allegedly being denied workers' compensation and short-term disability benefits because Defendants contend that there is no contract between the parties concerning workers' compensation insurance or short-term disability insurance and Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claims related to workers' compensation benefits. [6] at p. 11-14. In his opposition brief, Plaintiff wholly failed to respond to these arguments. Accordingly, Plaintiff has waived his opposition. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”); Hagan v. Jackson, No. 1:13CV268-HSO-RHW, 2014 WL 4914801 (S.D.Miss. Sept. 30, 2014). In other words, his failure to pursue these claims beyond the Complaint constituted abandonment. See Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 679 (5th Cir. 2001).

Aside from the waiver issue, the Court finds that Defendant's arguments in this regard have merit. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the following:

The Defendants, in bad faith, undertook a course of action to deny claims made by Brown for workers' compensation and short-term disability. This bad faith involved mis-reporting Brown's claims in an effort to prevent investigation and inquiry into Brown's claims of manganese toxicity. Defendants are therefore liable to Brown for the bad faith denial of Brown's claims, breach of contract, and the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

[5-1] at ¶ 19.

To set forth a breach of contract claim, a claimant must prove “(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract and (2) that the defendant has broken, or breached it.” Montera v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 561 F.Supp.3d 684, 690 (S.D.Miss. 2021) (quoting Bus. Commc'ns., Inc. v. Banks, 90 So.3d 1221, 1224-25 (Miss. 2012)). Insurance policies are contracts that can be enforced through a breach of contract action. Id. However, a person or entity cannot be held liable for breach of an insurance contract that it was not a party to. See, e.g., Rogers v. Nationwide Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 433 F.Supp.2d 772 (S.D.Miss. 2006) (holding that a breach of contract claim could not be sustained against the broker who sold, but was not a party, to the insurance policy alleged to have been breached). Likewise, “the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises from the existence of a contract between the parties.” Am. Bankers' Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Wells, 819 So.2d 1196 (Miss. 2001). As such, like the underlying claim for breach of contract, a claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing or bad faith cannot be asserted against a non- party to the contract. Id. (dismissing claims of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against non-parties to the contract from which the duties were alleged to arise); see also Rogers, 433 F.Supp.2d at 776 (“it is clear that an agent, as a non-party to the contract, has no implied duty of good-faith and fair-dealing with regard to the performance of the contract and thus, cannot be liable under a bad-faith theory of recovery.”)

In Paragraph 19, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants were parties to either the workers' compensation or short-term disability insurance contracts. Simply because certain policies may relate to his employment, such policies do not automatically establish a contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of any contract between the parties, and therefore there can be no breach of contract claim and related claims of bad faith or breach of good faith and fair dealing upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims of bad faith, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claims will be dismissed.^[3]

2. Retaliation claim

The same fate is true for Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation...