Brown v. The Wheatleigh Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil 3:18-cv-30056-KAR |
| Parties | MARK BROWN, Plaintiff, v. THE WHEATLEIGH CORPORATION, L. LINFIELD SIMON, SUSAN SIMON, and MARC WILHELM, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE EXEMPTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF MARK BROWN'S COMPLAINT FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT AND DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF (DKT NOS. 85, 96, 109)
Plaintiff Mark Brown (“Plaintiff”) is a former employee of the defendant The Wheatleigh Corporation (“Wheatleigh”), which was owned and operated by the remaining defendants L. Linfield Simon, Susan Simon, and Marc Wilhelm (“Wilhelm”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by misclassifying him as an exempt employee and failing to pay him overtime wages. Defendants assert that Plaintiff fits within the executive and administrative exemptions and was not entitled to overtime compensation. Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment as to the inapplicability of the executive exemption (Dkt. No. 85). Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion and have moved for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims on the basis that he has committed a fraud on the court (Dkt. No. 107). Defendants have also filed a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental brief regarding their continued assertion of the administrative exemption (Dkt. No. 109). The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 31). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion to dismiss based on fraud on the court is DENIED, Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED, and Defendants' motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is DENIED.
Wheatleigh is a 19-room luxury hotel and fine-dining restaurant located in Lenox, Massachusetts (Def. SOF ¶ 18; Pl. Resp. ¶ 18). Plaintiff was employed in a front-of-the-house position as Wheatleigh's Guest Services Manager (Pl. SOF ¶¶ 2-3; Def. Resp. ¶¶ 2-3). The parties dispute when Plaintiff's tenure as Guest Services Manager began - according to Plaintiff it was in 2015, while Defendants maintain that he did not hold the title until March 2016 and did not formally transition to the position until June 2016 - but agree that it ended in 2018 (Pl. SOF ¶ 2; Def. Resp. ¶ 2; Def. SOF ¶ 19; Pl. Resp, ¶ 19). The front-of-the-house department also included valet, reservations, front office, and concierge (Pl. SOF ¶ 3; Def. Resp. ¶ 3).
Plaintiff supervised certain employees during his time as Guest Services Manager, including Wheatleigh's valet and front office staff (Def. SOF ¶¶ 50-51; Pl. Resp. ¶¶ 50-51). Between April 11, 2016, and his final date of employment, he did not supervise Marc Wilhelm, Sophie Wilhelm, Jakob Koepernick, Steve Seeger, Markus Markl, Christian Hamel, or Julie Rodriguez, and between May 15, 2017, and his final date of employment, he did not supervise Brigitta Rainer (Pl. SOF ¶¶ 6-7; Def. Resp. ¶¶ 6-7).
The parties dispute whether Plaintiff hired or fired any employees while employed by Defendants. Plaintiff maintains that he did not have the authority to do so, while Defendants assert that Plaintiff hired his friend Marc Delgrande as a valet at Wheatleigh (Pl. SOF ¶¶ 14, 17; Def. Resp. ¶¶ 14, 17; Def. SOF ¶ 56; Pl. Resp. ¶ 56). The parties also dispute Plaintiff's role in the hiring of his niece Arleta Mongue as a server. According to Defendants, Plaintiff recommended that Mongue be hired as a server, and she was (Def. SOF ¶ 55). Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that he introduced Mongue to Restaurant Manger Christian Hamel and General Manager Marc Wilhelm, but was not involved in her hiring process (Pl. Resp. ¶ 55). The parties agree that Plaintiff participated in an interview of Julie Rodriguez, who was subsequently hired (Pl. SOF ¶16; Def. Resp. ¶ 16).
As the First Circuit has explained, it is “elementary that a federal district court possesses the inherent power to deny the court's processes to one who defiles the judicial system by committing a fraud on the court.” Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989). “A ‘fraud on the court' occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense.” Id. (citing Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1989); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir. 1976); England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960); United Bus. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 1172, 1186-87 (D. Kan. 1984); United States v. ITT Corp., 349 F.Supp. 22, 29 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 919 (1973)). “A finding of fraud upon the court ‘may be justified only by the most egregious misconduct directed to the court itself, and ... it must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.'” Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti, No. 19-CV-12258-DJC, 2021 WL 1131812, at *7 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-1330 (1st Cir. Apr. 29, 2021) (quoting United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 29 n.22 (1st Cir. 2005)). “Because dismissal sounds ‘the death knell of the lawsuit,' district courts must reserve such strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious.” Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118. “For example, dismissal is warranted where a plaintiff vigorously prosecutes a suit based upon a document he fabricated, Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118-19, or where a plaintiff deliberately conceals evidence of prior injury in order to enhance damages, Hull v. Municipality of San Juan, 356 F.3d 98, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2004).” Plasse v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 448 F.Supp.2d 302, 308 (D. Mass. 2006) ().
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint based on what they characterize as a “scheme of falsehoods, ” including Plaintiff's false statements regarding his term of employment at Wheatleigh, lies about the number of hours he worked, suppression of discoverable electronic communications, and miscellaneous other lies and misrepresentations under oath. Defendants claim that Plaintiff's fraud is not peripheral, but rather goes to the heart of his claims. The only alleged lies or misrepresentations that could be considered central to Plaintiff's claims are those regarding when he started as Guest Services Manager and the hours he worked as Guest Services Manager, which directly impact his potential damages. The remainder would have little to no effect on liability or damages in this matter, including when he started his employment at Wheatleigh (as opposed to when he started as Guest Services Manager), his employment at the Kemble Inn after he left Wheatleigh, and his attendance (or non-attendance) and degree (or lack thereof) from the University of Texas at Tyler. While this is likely powerful impeachment evidence, these are not lies that could themselves “generate an unfair resolution of the case.” Starski v. Kirzhnev, Civil Action No. 06-10157-DPW, 2011 WL 923499, at *10 (D. Mass. Mar. 15, 2011).
Regarding the alleged lies and misrepresentations about Plaintiff's tenure as Guest Services Manager and his hours, Defendants have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff “sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme” to inflate his damages as they claim. Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118. Plaintiff only approximated his start date as Guest Services Manager and even Defendants cannot identify with certainty what that date was. Crediting Defendants' approximations of March 2016 or June 2016, Plaintiff's belief as to his first day may be off by as little as three to six months. But even if he was off by an entire year or more, Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff knew his testimony was false or that it was part of a scheme to defraud this court. Indeed, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit averring that the dates he has provided to Defendants represent his best recollection (Dkt. No. 99-1 at ¶ 3). Similarly, with respect to Plaintiff's interrogatory answer that his hours varied, but that he almost always worked more than 40 hours per week, and at times as much as 100 hours per week in the busy season, Plaintiff explains in his affidavit that the estimation genuinely represented his belief regarding the hours that he worked (Dkt. No. 99-1 at ¶ 4). Defendants, of course, may dispute Plaintiff's recollection of the hours he worked and attempt to impeach his credibility through timecards and pay records, but Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff lied under oath, let alone that he was executing on a scheme to defraud this court.
Finally Defendants have identified three pieces of electronic communication - an email chain with a subsequent employer (Dkt. 97-6); Facebook messages between Plaintiff and Christian Hamel, a former co-worker and plaintiff in another case against the same Defendants (Dkt.97-7); and a post on Plaintiff's Facebook page concerning his subsequent employment at Kemble Inn (Dkt. 97-8) - that Plaintiff failed to turn over in discovery. Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff's failure to turn over these documents was deliberate. With respect to the communications with Hamel, Plaintiff has averred that he forgot that they existed and...
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