Brown v. Turner
Decision Date | 04 August 1966 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 1877. |
Citation | 257 F. Supp. 734 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
Parties | Joel C. BROWN, Petitioner, v. R. L. TURNER, Warden, and the State of North Carolina, Respondents. |
Joel C. Brown, pro se.
T. Wade Bruton, Atty. Gen., of N. C. by Theodore C. Brown, Jr., Staff Atty., Raleigh, N. C., for respondent.
DALTON, District Judge, sitting by designation.
This cause comes before the court upon a petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed in forma pauperis, by a State prisoner pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Issues have been joined by the respondent who has filed Answer to Petition and a Motion to Dismiss.
The petitioner is at present incarcerated in Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina. He was tried in the Superior Court of Wake County in September of 1963 on charges of incest and carnal knowledge of a female child under the age of sixteen years, to which charges he pleaded guilty, and he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years on the first conviction and a term of five years on the second conviction, the sentences to run consecutively. The petitioner did not appeal this conviction, but in September of 1964 he petitioned for a Post-Conviction Hearing in the Superior Court of Wake County. In March of 1965 this hearing was held with the petitioner appearing in person and represented by court-appointed counsel. As a result of this hearing the court held that the petition should be denied. A petition to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for writ of certiorari was denied in May of 1966.
This petition was filed on June 23, 1966. The petitioner's allegations as to violations of his constitutional rights are brief and not entirely clear, but they seem to be that he was arrested without a warrant; that there was an unreasonable delay in taking him before a magistrate for a preliminary hearing; that he was questioned without the benefit of counsel and was not advised of his right to remain silent; and that his plea of guilty was the result of threats by a deputy sheriff to see that he received a long sentence if he did not plead guilty to the charges.
Since the petitioner alleges certain facts surrounding his arrest and trial which are denied by the State, it must first be determined whether this court must hold a hearing to investigate the petitioner's allegations. It is well settled that this court need not hold another hearing on the same questions which were before the State court if the petitioner has received in the State court a full and fair hearing as to the questions of fact. At the same time, if the petitioner has not received such a full and fair hearing this court would be obliged to grant him another hearing on his allegations. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). It appears from the record that in the Post-Conviction Hearing held in March of 1965 the petitioner, who was represented by counsel, testified at length as to his claims. There was also testimony by the officer who arrested him and by the attorney who represented him at his trial, both of these witnesses being examined by the petitioner's counsel. There is nothing to indicate that the petitioner received anything but a full and fair hearing at this time and, this being the case, this court is at liberty to accept, and does accept, the findings of fact made by the court at this hearing.
As a result of this hearing and upon a consideration of the record as a whole the Superior Court of Wake County found the following facts:
Upon these facts, which this court believes to be supported by the evidence and to have been fully and fairly brought out, this court is of the opinion that the petitioner's constitutional rights have not been violated and that his request for relief must be denied.
The allegation that there was an unreasonable delay in taking the petitioner to a magistrate is plainly without merit. Petitioner is obviously relying on the McNabb-Mallory rule which prohibits the use of evidence obtained as a result of illegal detention. However this rule is not one that has its basis in the Constitution, but is instead a rule which applies only to the Federal courts, not to the State courts. United States ex rel. Glinton v. Denno, 309 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 886, 9 L.Ed.2d 769 (1963). Moreover, any harm which resulted to the petitioner from the detention would have been his confession or the effect his...
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