Brown v. Turner
| Decision Date | 10 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 11096,11096 |
| Citation | 21 Utah 2d 96,440 P.2d 968 |
| Parties | d 96 Chester B. BROWN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State Prison, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Ronald N. Boyce, Salt Lake City, of Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services, Inc., for appellant.
Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
Chester B. Brown appeals from a judgment of the District Court in a habeas corpus proceeding denying his release from the Utah State Prison. He seeks to overturn the judgments and sentences in two cases: the first a sentence of not to exceed five years imposed in March, 1963, pursuant to his plea of guilty to a bad-check charge, and the second imposed April, 1966, pursuant to his plea of guilty to a charge of grand larceny.
Plaintiff makes two contentions: (1) that his right to counsel was not accorded him, and (2) that he was not properly advised of the consequences of his plea of guilty.
This is another is the constantly increasing number of habeas corpus proceedings brought to obtain release from prison years after the original trial and after the time for appeal has long since passed. 1 In approaching the problems here presented it is appropriate to have in mind the proper scope and the limitations upon the use of habeas corpus after conviction. It is not a substitute for and cannot properly be treated as a regular appellate review. 2 It is an extraordinary remedy which is properly invocable only when the court had no jurisdiction over the person or the offense, or where the requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is substantially and effectively denied due process of law, or where some such fact is shown that it would be unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction. 3 If the contention of error is something which is known or should be known to the party at the time the judgment was entered, it must be reviewed in the manner and within the time permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or the judgment becomes final and is not subject to further attack, except in some such unusual circumstance as we have mentioned above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure governing appeals and the limitations of time specified therein would be rendered impotent.
If the established rules of procedure are followed they assure ample protection of the rights of one who is accused of crime. 4 After this has been done and a judgment has been rendered all presumptions favor its validity and the burden of showing to the contrary is upon one who attempts to upset it. When such an attempt is made the administration of justice is best served by directing the inquiry to this foundational question: Was substantial justice done and has guilt been established? While on the one hand we honor the observance of the rights of the individual in ordr to protect the innocent, on the other we cannot be oblivious to the necessity of protecting rights of the public to be kept safe from crime by encouraging effective law enforcement.
When a person has been duly convicted of a crime it is not the purpose of the law, nor the proper function of the courts, to be hypercritical in scrutinizing proceedings in an effort to discover some basis for relieving him from the penalty the law demands and the possibility of rehabilitation because of some technical defect or irregularity which had no actual adverse effect upon his rights or the outcome of the proceedings.
We turn attention to the issues raised by the plaintiff in the light of the principles we have discussed above as they apply to the particular facts of this case. In this connection it should also be kept in mind that the questions as to whether he was accorded the right of counsel and was properly advised as to the consequences of his plea of guilty are primarily questions of fact. The trial court having heard the evidence relating thereto and having found the issues against the plaintiff, it is our further duty to indulge the usual credit due his findings and judgment. 5
In March of 1963, when the plaintiff plead guilty to the bad-check charge before Judge Parley Norseth in Weber County, he was a man 51 years old who had seven times been convicted and sentenced to the Utah State Prison. He admits that he was told that he could have counsel if he so desired, but the complaint he makes is that Judge Norseth did not tell him that he would appoint an attorney if he could not afford to hire one, nor what the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Patterson v. State
...due process of law, or where some such fact is shown that it would be unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction. 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968) ; see also, e.g. , Clark v. Turner , 15 Utah 2d 83, 387 P.2d 557, 558 (1963) ("A petition for habeas corpus brought by one who is im......
-
Hurst v. Cook
...11, 773 P.2d 832 (1988); Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968). But see Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980); Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah 1980); Martinez v. Smith, 602 P......
-
Andrews v. Morris
...Codianna v. Morris, Utah, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1983). See also Chess v. Smith, Utah, 617 P.2d 341 (1980); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968); Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 The petitioners assert that they raised the "burden of proof" argument on direct appe......
-
Andrews v. Deland
...right has occurred, irrespective of whether an appeal has been taken.Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d at 1035. See also Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968) (court noted that habeas corpus is available for alleged errors which were known or should have been known to a party at the time jud......