Brown v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 01 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-5705,86-5705
• Parties: Dewey BROWN, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Charlie Brown, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1157

838 F.2d 1157

Dewey BROWN, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Charlie Brown, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-5705.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 1, 1988.

Leon B. Kellner, U.S. Atty., Michael Minkin, David O. Leiwant, Linda Collins Hertz, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for U.S.

Mark J. Feldman, Miami, Fla., for Dewey Brown.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT and VANCE, Circuit Judges, and ALLGOOD ^*, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

In this wrongful death suit against the United States, the district court found liability and awarded damages in the amount of $49,328.50. On appeal, the United States argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claimant failed properly to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) (1982). Alternatively, the United States argues that it is entitled to a setoff equal to the amount received by the claimant in settlement of a state court suit involving different defendants but the same wrongful death. We find merit to the United States' alternative argument and accordingly reverse.

I.

In March 1983, Charlie Brown filed a medical malpractice suit in the federal district court. The suit arose from his treatment at two medical facilities, Jackson Memorial Hospital and the Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital in Miami. The complaint named five defendants: the United States, ¹ two physicians employed by Jackson Memorial, and two entities that owned and operated Jackson Memorial. ² The complaint alleged that Brown had received treatment at Jackson Memorial between October 1981 and February 1982, and then at the VA Hospital between February 1982 and April 1982, and that doctors at both facilities had negligently failed to diagnose the tongue and throat cancer from which Brown was then suffering.

With respect to the claims against the United States, Brown asserted jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346, 2671-2680 (1982). Brown had filed a claim with the VA eight months earlier and had therefore exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) (1982). ³ With respect to the claims against the Jackson Memorial defendants, Brown asserted federal jurisdiction under the theory of pendent party jurisdiction. ⁴

In March 1983, the district court dismissed those counts of the complaint that pertained to the four Jackson Memorial defendants. The court held that it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over those claims because the acts of negligence attributed to the Jackson Memorial defendants were separate and distinct from those attributed to the United States. ⁵ Brown then filed a medical malpractice suit in a Florida state court, naming as defendants the four parties dismissed from the federal suit.

Charlie Brown died before either the state court malpractice suit or the federal court malpractice suit reached trial. On February 1, 1984, Charlie Brown's attorney filed a wrongful death claim with the VA. One week later, the attorney moved the federal district court to substitute Dewey Brown, who had been appointed personal representative of Charlie Brown's estate, as party plaintiff in the suit originally commenced by Charlie Brown. At the same time, the attorney moved the court to amend the complaint so as to set forth an action for wrongful death under Fla.Stat. Sec. 768.19 (1985).

The United States opposed both motions, contending that Dewey Brown had failed to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite set forth in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) (1982). ⁶ Section 2675(a) provides that as a prerequisite to maintaining a suit against the United States under the FTCA, a plaintiff must present notice of his claim to the appropriate federal agency, in this case the VA. Only after the claim has been denied or six months have passed may the plaintiff sue in federal court on the claim. Id. Conceding that the decedent had satisfied this requirement with respect to the original personal injury suit, the United States argued that the wrongful death action was a new action and as such required a separate administrative filing. Although the decedent's attorney had in fact made a new filing setting forth a wrongful death claim, the requisite six months had not yet passed.

The district court held that the wrongful death claimant could rely on the filing made in connection with the original personal injury suit. The court observed that "[w]hile the measure of any damages recovered in this case under the Wrongful Death Act will vary from those potentially recoverable under the original malpractice claims, the underlying 'claims' are identical, and administrative proceedings on them have long since been exhausted." Accordingly, the court granted the motions to amend the complaint and the case proceeded to trial in June 1985.

Meanwhile, upon Charlie Brown's death, the state court malpractice suit against the Jackson Memorial defendants had also been transformed into a wrongful death suit. As in the federal court suit, Dewey Brown had been substituted as plaintiff. Furthermore, as in the federal court suit, the wrongful death claims were brought under Fla.Stat. Sec. 768.19 (1985). The parties to the state court suit entered into settlement negotiations, and, on July 8, 1985, Dewey Brown and Charlie Brown's surviving daughter signed a release with the defendants, settling the case for $237,500. The settlement agreement provided that "[t]his Release ... expressly excludes any and all claims ... against the United States."

Upon conclusion of the trial in federal court, the court entered a final judgment in favor of Dewey Brown. In its findings of facts and conclusions of law, the court stated that "[r]egardless of any prior negligence that may or may not have been attributable to [the Jackson Memorial defendants], [Charlie] Brown's death was more likely than not caused by the V.A. Hospital's negligence." The court awarded Charlie Brown's estate $2,753 in medical expenses and $5,077 in funeral expenses. It also awarded $41,500 to be applied for the benefit of Charlie Brown's daughter, representing her damages for lost support, lost parental companionship and guidance, and the pain and suffering she experienced as a result of her father's death.

The United States then moved the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) to amend the final judgment to reflect a setoff in the amount of the settlement between Dewey Brown and the state court defendants. The United States argued that it was entitled to the setoff because the amount paid by the state court defendants had been in settlement of damages identical to those claimed in the federal court wrongful death suit. The district court rejected this argument and denied the motion, concluding that the injury the United States caused was separate from any injury that the state court defendants may have caused.

II.

On appeal, the United States first argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this wrongful death action because Dewey Brown did not file a claim with the VA prior to bringing suit. The FTCA establishes that as a prerequisite to maintaining a suit against the United States, a plaintiff must present notice of the claim to the appropriate federal agency. The FTCA's filing requirement is satisfied if the claimant "(1) gives the agency written notice of his or her claim sufficient to enable the agency to investigate and (2) places a value on his or her claim." Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir.1980). The congressional purposes of the administrative claim procedure are "to ease court congestion and avoid unnecessary litigation, while making it possible for the Government to expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States." Id. at 288 (quoting S.Rep. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2515, 2516). By requiring this notice, Congress sought to ensure that the agency is apprised of the circumstances underlying the claim, so that the agency may conduct an investigation and respond to the claimant by settlement or by defense. Id. at 289; see Rise v. United States, 630 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir.1980).

The notice requirement does not require a claimant to enumerate each theory of liability in the claim. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th Cir.1983); see Rise, 630 F.2d at 1071; Adams, 615 F.2d at 289; Speer v. United States, 512 F.Supp. 670, 674 (N.D.Tex.1981), aff'd, 675 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.1982); see also Tidd v. United States, 786 F.2d 1565, 1567 (11th Cir.1986) ("Although a claimant has an obligation to give notice of a claim under Sec. 2675, he or she does not have an obligation to provide further information to assist settlement of the matter.") (emphasis in original). Compelling a claimant to advance all possible causes of action and legal theories is "overly technical" and may frustrate the purpose of the section 2675(a) notice requirement. Mellor v. United States, 484 F.Supp. 641, 642 (D.Utah 1978). A "claim" is not synonymous with a "legal cause of action." Nelson v. United States, 541 F.Supp. 816, 818 (M.D.N.C.1982); Mellor, 484 F.Supp. at 642. In this case, the claim filed by Charlie Brown provided the VA with the facts necessary to conduct a full investigation of the underlying circumstances. Requiring the appellee to exhaust the administrative claim procedure again would serve no useful purpose. ⁷ It is unlikely that the agency would conduct a second investigation or otherwise act any differently. ⁸

The United States also maintains that until the new claimant files an administrative claim the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because a "new, independent cause of action arose when Charlie Brown died." The Florida Wrongful Death ...