Brown v. United Cerebal Palsy/Atlantic & Cape May, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 August 1994
• Citation: 278 N.J.Super. 208,650 A.2d 848
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court
• Parties: , 10 IER Cases 424 Marguerite BROWN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY/ATLANTIC & CAPE MAY, INC., Defendant.

Page 208

278 N.J.Super. 208

650 A.2d 848, 10 IER Cases 424

Marguerite BROWN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED CEREBRAL PALSY/ATLANTIC & CAPE MAY, INC., Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Atlantic County.

Decided Aug. 1, 1994.

Diane L. Newman, for plaintiff.

Jeffrey D. Light, for defendant.

SELTZER, J.S.C.

This motion implicates the extent to which New Jersey recognizes an employer's claim against an employee for damages resulting from the employee's job performance. It requires a resolution of what one federal court has termed the "difficult issue of determining current New Jersey law." Dome Petro., Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 43, 48 (3rd Cir.1985).

The dispute between these parties was initiated by plaintiff's suit alleging that she had been wrongfully terminated from her position as Executive Director of defendant. Defendant's answer denied any wrongful termination and affirmatively advanced a claim for damages resulting from a breach of contract and negligence. Defendant moved to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, asserting that New Jersey does not recognize an employer's cause of action against an employee for either negligent performance of duties or for breach of an implied contractual provision to perform non-negligently.

Prior to 1961, New Jersey appeared to accept "as a fundamental rule in the law of agency that an agent or employee is generally liable to his principal or employer for loss sustained by the latter due to the former's negligence or defalcation." Male v. Acme Markets, Inc., 110 N.J.Super. 9, 12, 264 A.2d 245 (App.Div.1970). See also Marchitto v. Central R.R. Co., 9 N.J. 456, 469, 88 A.2d 851 (1952); Schustrin v. Globe Indem. Co., 44 N.J.Super. 462, 466, 130 A.2d 897 (App.Div.1957); Marano v. Sabbio, 26 N.J.Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (App.Div.1953). This is the general rule which appears to be recognized universally. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 379 (1958); Annotation, Servant's Tort Liability to Master, 110 A.L.R. 831 (1937); Annotation, Liability Insurer's Subrogation Rights, 53 A.L.R.3d 621 (1973).

In 1961, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that such a rule was "anachronistic" insofar as it permitted an employer, liable to a third party for the negligence of an employee under the doctrine of respondent superior, to recoup the loss from the negligent employee. Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 540, 170 A.2d 241 (1961). The Eule Court, quite clearly, if not explicitly, rejected the general rule, at least in the context of liability incurred as the result of negligence in operating a motor vehicle. It opined that the liability of the employer to third parties is derived from the doctrine of respondent superior which in turn "rests on a public policy that the employer bear the burden as an expense of the operation he expends through the employment of others." The employee should not, therefore, be required to bear that cost by way of indemnification to the employer. ¹

That pronouncement, although dicta, is entitled to great, if not conclusive weight. State v. Wein, 162 N.J.Super. 159, 163, 392 A.2d 607 (App.Div.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 80 N.J. 491, 404 A.2d 302 (1979). Where dicta appears to contravene a previously announced rule, a lower court is obligated to determine which rule would be adopted as a result of an appeal. State v. Dolton, 146 N.J.Super. 111, 115, 369 A.2d 17 (App.Div.1977). Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue since Eule was decided, I have little doubt that if it were to do so it would adopt the language it used in 1961.

Such a rule is consistent with the approach that New Jersey has taken in requiring a business entity to assume the costs attendant on the conduct of that business. It is analogous to our rule prohibiting an employer from seeking indemnification from a co-employee who negligently injures an employee to whom the employer is liable under our workers' compensation laws. N.J.S.A. 34:15-8. Cf. Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992) (imposing, as a cost of business, products liability responsibility on a manufacturer who produced products which were considered safe at the time but thereafter determined to be unsafe).

This rationale suggests that the Eule rejection of employee liability to an employer for indemnification of third party claims should not be limited to automobile negligence. An employer's business necessarily and foreseeably will involve acts of negligence on the part of an employee. As a matter of policy then, the employer, not the negligent employee, should bear the cost of loss occasioned in the conduct of the employer's business. Accordingly I have no hesitation in determining that our law prohibits an employer from recouping from an employee any sums the employer may be required to pay to a third party as a result of the employee's negligence. ² That portion of the counterclaim which alleges damages within this class fails to state a cause of action under our law and is therefore dismissed. I turn now to that portion of the counterclaim which alleges damages suffered by the business unrelated to third party claims.

It is not clear why corporate losses sustained as a result of a third party claim should be treated differently from losses sustained as the result of an employee's negligent injury to corporate property without third party involvement. Nevertheless, the cases treat the situations differently and it would be improper for a trial court to anticipate a change in the law without a clear indication from an appellate court that such a change is appropriate. Goddard v. Orthopedic Consultant Assoc., P.A., 177 N.J.Super. 319, 426 A.2d 542 (App.Div.1981).

The latest appellate pronouncement is Fried v. Aftec, Inc., 246 N.J.Super. 245, 587 A.2d 290 (App.Div.1991). Plaintiff, relies on Fried to support her claim that New Jersey does not recognize a cause of action based on poor performance. That case, like this, involved a discharged management level employee whose wrongful discharge suit was met by a counterclaim alleging corporate losses resulting from the employee's breach of contract and/or negligence.

In affirming the dismissal of the counterclaim, the Appellate Division, after noting that claims based on negligence and breach of contract must be treated similarly, held that [A] contract for commercial employment requires nothing more than reasonable diligence ("standard care") on behalf of the employee to perform its terms. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 379(1) (1958).

[Id. at 258, 587 A.2d 290.]

This language suggests that a departure from a standard of care of reasonable diligence will impose liability. This is the quintessential definition of negligence. The court, however, further held that:

[A]n employee whose best efforts resulted in poor performance, causing a loss of profits, does not become liable for such losses in a breach of contract action.

[Ibid.]

This sentence may be read to imply that a performance not reaching a level of due diligence will not impose liability if it is nevertheless the actor's best effort. Apparently negligence (the failure to exercise due diligence) is not enough to impose liability.

Not only does this latter formulation appear to contradict the sentence it immediately follows, it is also diametrically opposed to the decision in Male v. Acme Markets, supra. Male involved the ability of a corporation to recover from its employee damages sustained as a result of a shortage in the employee's cash drawer. The Appellate Division, after noting the general rule of an employee's liability to his employer, held that the employee was liable for the losses (which could only have occurred as a result of negligence or defalcation).

While Male clearly says that an employer may recover from a negligent employee damage to the employer from that negligence, Fried is not nearly so clear. The same ambiguity is contained in the cases on which Fried relies.

Carmichael v. Lavengood, 112 Ind.App. 144, 44 N.E.2d. 177, 180 (1942) is cited for the proposition that:

[I]n the absence of an express agreement by which the agent expressly agrees to be so bound, the agent is not an insurer of the success of his undertaking and he does not guarantee his principal against incidental losses, and if he acts with good faith and with due care, he is not liable for losses which result from a mere mistake.

This language is confusing because it mixes the concepts of requiring good faith and due care with the suggestion that a "mere mistake" (which is normally the result of a failure to exercise due care) will not impose liability when a mistake typically evidences a want of due care. The court then goes on to state:

It is the duty of an agent in all transactions involving the subject matter...