Brown v. United States 8212 6193

Citation36 L.Ed.2d 208,93 S.Ct. 1565,411 U.S. 223
Decision Date17 April 1973
Docket NumberNo. 71,71
PartiesJoseph Everette BROWN and Thomas Dean Smith, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES. —6193
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Petitioners were convicted of transporting and conspiring to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce to their coconspirator, whose retail store was searched under a defective warrant while petitioners were in custody in another State. The charges against petitioners were limited to acts committed before the day of the search. At a pretrial hearing on petitioners' motion to suppress evidence seized at the store, petitioners alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the store or the goods, and the District Court denied their motion for lack of standing. At petitioners' trial, the seized goods were introduced into evidence. In addition, police testimony as to statements by petitioners implicating each other were introduced into evidence in a manner contrary to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Bruton error was harmless in view of overwhelming independent proof of guilt and affirmed the District Court's ruling on standing. Held:

1. Petitioners had no standing to contest the admission of the evidence seized under the defective warrant since they alleged no legitimate expectation of privacy or interest of any kind in the premises searched or the goods seized; they had no 'automatic' standing under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, as the case against them did not depend on possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure; and they could not vicariously assert the personal Fourth Amendment right of the store owner in contesting admission of the seized goods. Pp. 227 230.

2. The testimony erroneously admitted was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury, and the Bruton error was harmless. Pp. 230—232.

452 F.2d 868, affirmed.

Lowell W. Lundy, Barbourville, Ky., for petitioners.

Mark L. Evans, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners were convicted by a jury of transporting stolen goods and of conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. The central issue now is whether petitioners have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure of merchandise stolen by them but stored in the premises of one Knuckles, a coconspirator. At the time of the seizure from Knuckles, petitioners were in police custody in a different State. Knuckles successfully challenged the introduction of the stolen goods seized from his store under a faulty warrant, and his case was separately tried.

The evidence against petitioners is largely uncontroverted. Petitioner Brown was the manager of a warehouse in Cincinnati, Ohio, owned by a wholesale clothing and household goods company. He was entrusted with the warehouse keys. Petitioner Smith was a truck driver for the company. During 1968 and 1969, the company had experienced losses attributed to pilferage amounting to approximately $60,000 each year. One West, a buyer and supervisor for the company, recovered a slip of paper he had seen drop from Brown's pocket. On the slip, in Brown's handwriting, was a list of warehouse merchandise, together with a price on each item that was well below wholesale cost. West estimated that the lowest legitimate wholesale price for these items would have been a total of about $6,400, while the total as priced by Brown's list was $2,200. The police were promptly notified and set up a surveillance of the warehouse. Ten days later, petitioners were observed wheeling carts containing boxes of merchandise from the warehouse to a truck. From a concealed point, the police took 20 photographs of petitioners loading the merchandise onto the truck. Petitioners then locked the warehouse, and drove off. They were followed and stopped by the police, placed under arrest, advised of their constitutional rights, and, with the loaded truck, taken into custody to police headquarters. The goods in the truck had not been lawfully taken from the warehouse and had a total value of about $6,500.

Following their arrest, and after being fully informed of their constitutional rights, both petitioners made separate confessions to police indicating that they had conspired with Knuckles to steal from the warehouse, that they had stolen goods from the warehouse in the past, and that they had taken these goods, on two occasions about two months before their arrest, to Knuckles' store in Manchester, Kentucky. Petitioners also indicated that they had 'sold' the previously stolen goods on delivery to Knuckles for various amounts of cash. Knuckles' store was then searched pursuant to a warrant, and goods stolen from the company, worth over $100,000 in retail value, were discovered. Knuckles was at the store during the search, but petitioners were in custody in Ohio.

Prior to trial, petitioners and Knuckles1 moved to suppress the stolen merchandise found at Knuckles' store. The prosecution conceded that the warrant for the search of Knuckles' store was defective. The District Court held a hearing on petitioners' motion to suppress the evidence. Petitioners, however, alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in Knuckles' premises or in the goods seized there, nor was any evidence of such an interest presented to the District Court. After the hearing, the District Court granted Knuckles' motion to suppress the goods seized, but denied petitioners' motion for lack of standing. The charges against Knuckles were severed for separate trial.

At petitioners' trial, stolen merchandise seized from Knuckles' store was received in evidence. The events leading to petitioners' arrests upon leaving the warehouse and while they were in possession of stolen goods were fully described by police officers who were eyewitnesses. The 20 photographs taken of the crime in progress were admitted into evidence. There was additional incriminating testimony by the owner of the service station from whom petitioners rented trucks used in the thefts, and by five witnesses who saw petitioners unloading boxes from a truck late at night and carrying the boxes into Knuckles' store. The prosecutor also introduced into evidence, over petitioners' objections, portions of each petitioner's confession which implicated the other in a manner now conceded to be contrary to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Those considerable parts of each petitioner's confession which did not implicate the other were admitted without objection. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that a Bruton error had occurred, but went on to conclude that the independent proof of petitioners' guilt was 'so overwhelming that the error was harmless,' citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). The Court of Appeals also held that the stolen merchandise seized pursuant to the defective warrant was properly admitted against petitioners, stating:

'This ruling (of the District Court) was correct because appellants claimed no possessory or proprietary rights in the goods or in Knuckles' store, and it is clear that they cannot assert the Fourth Amendment right of another.' 452 F.2d 868, 870 (1971).


Petitioners contend that they have 'automatic' standing to challenge the search and seizure at Knuckles' store. They rely on the decision of this Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), establishing a rule of 'automatic' standing to contest an allegedly illegal search where the same possession needed to establish standing is 'an essential element of the offense . . . charged.' Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390, 88 S.Ct. 967, 974, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). That case involved (a) a seizure of contraband narcotics, (b) a defendant who was present at the seizure,2 and (c) an offense in which the defendant's possession of the seized narcotics at the time of the contested search and seizure was a critical part of the Government's case. Jones, supra, 362 U.S., at 263, 80 S.Ct. at 732. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Jones, emphasized the 'dilemma' inherent in a defendant's need to allege 'possession' to contest a seizure, when such admission of possession could later be used against him. Id., at 262—264, 80 S.Ct., at 731—732. Mr. Justice Frankfurter quoted the words of Judge Learned Hand:

'Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma.' Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (CA2 1932).

The self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones decision, can no longer occur under the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution. Subsequent to Jones, in Simmons v. United States, supra, we held that a prosecutor may not use against a defendant at trial any testimony given by that defendant at a pretrial hearing to establish standing to move to suppress evidence. 390 U.S., at 389—394, 88 S.Ct. at 973—976. For example, under the Simmons doctrine the defendant is permitted to establish the requisite standing by claiming 'possession' of incriminating evidence. If he is granted standing on the basis of such evidence, he may then nonetheless press for its exclusion; but, whether he succeeds or fails to suppress the evidence, his testimony on that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1069 cases
  • Lance W., In re
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 1 Febrero 1985
    ...where the government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, supra; Jones......
  • United States v. Volpe, Crim. No. H-76-37-H-76-41 and H-75-123.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • 15 Marzo 1977
    ...claim. In the case of United States v. Galante, 547 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1976) the Court said: "This case falls squarely within the holding of Brown. The petitioners in that case were charged with transportation of stolen goods in interstate commerce and conspiracy to commit that crime. The st......
  • State v. McLucas
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 15 Marzo 1977
    ...the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure." Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1569, 36 L.Ed.2d 208. A person may have a possessory interest in the premises searched even though he has no title to the premis......
  • Com. v. MacKenzie
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 21 Agosto 1992
    ...does not require reversal of a conviction where the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972). In applying this standa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
    • United States
    • Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol. 72 No. 2, December 2021
    • 22 Diciembre 2021
    ...Rev. 455, 455. (101.) Id. at 456-61. (102.) 464 U.S. 548 (1984). (103.) Id. at 549-50. (104.) Id. at 553 (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 232 (105.) Id. at 553, 555. (106.) Id. at 553. (107.) Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)). (108.) Eva Kerr, ......
    • United States
    • Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal Vol. 47 No. 1, March 2021
    • 22 Marzo 2021
    ...2012 WL 6742665 (D. Or. Dec. 31, 2012). (130) Id. at * 1. (131) Id. (132) Id. (133) Id. at *10. (134) Id. (citing Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (135) Id. (136) United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442 (1976) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335(1973)). (137) Unite......
  • A Comprehensive Consideration of the Structural-Error Doctrine.
    • United States
    • Missouri Law Review Vol. 85 No. 4, September 2020
    • 22 Septiembre 2020
    ...(47.) Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230-32 (48.) Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1983). (49.) United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-12 (1983). (50.) Kentucky v. Whor......
  • U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in Fourth Amendment Cases (1961–2009)
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Review No. 36-4, December 2011
    • 1 Diciembre 2011
    ...selected forreview via the writ of certiorari process.Cases CitedBerger v. New York, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967).Brown v. United States, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1973).Dalia v. United States, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979).Herring v. United States, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009).Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT