Brown v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 April 2014
• Docket Number: 12–10293.,Nos. 11–15149,s. 11–15149
• Citation: 748 F.3d 1045
• Parties: James Joseph BROWN, Petitioner–Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

748 F.3d 1045

James Joseph BROWN, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent–Appellee.

Nos. 11–15149, 12–10293.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

April 7, 2014.

Janice Louise Bergmann, Federal Public Defender's Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Miami, FL, James Joseph Brown, Bennettsville, SC, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Harriett Galvin, Anne Ruth Schultz, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Kathleen Mary Salyer, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, Diana Margarita Acosta, U.S. Attorney's Office, Fort Pierce, FL, John Franklin Bash, III, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Washington, DC, for Respondent–Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. D.C. Docket Nos. 2:11–cv–14115–FJL, 2:04–cr–14032–KMM–1.

Before TJOFLAT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,^* District Judge.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 96–82, 93 Stat. 643, authorizes a magistrate judge, with the consent of the parties, to “conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.” Id. § 2, 93 Stat. at 643 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006)). In Appeal No. 12–10293, which must be decided before we reach Appeal No. 11–15149, the question presented is whether the consensual delegation of a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. I 2009)¹ to a magistrate judge for final disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)² violates Article III of the Constitution. However, we need not decide whether that delegation would violate Article III because we hold that that a § 2255 proceeding is not a “civil matter” for purposes of § 636(c), and therefore the Magistrate Judge lacked the statutory authority to enter final judgment on Brown's § 2255 motion.

This opinion proceeds in four parts. Part I sets out the circumstances giving rise to the appeals before us. In part II, we recount the history of the magistrate system to provide context to part III's analysis of the question Appeal No. 12–10293 presents. A brief conclusion follows in part IV.

I.

James Joseph Brown, the appellant, stands convicted of using a computer and America Online to knowingly persuade, induce, entice and coerce an individual who had not attained the age of eighteen years, to engage in sexual activity under circumstances as would constitute a criminal offense, and attempted to do so, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Supp. III 2005). As a career offender,³ he is serving a prison sentence of 235 months. ⁴ On March 24, 2011, Brown moved the District Court to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.⁵ Five days later, the court ordered the parties to file a joint statement as to whether they would consent to the Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On April 12, 2011, Brown and the Government filed a joint statement consenting to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction. On April 13, the District Court entered an order referring the case to the Magistrate Judge “to take all necessary and proper action as required by law, including, if necessary, the conduct of a jury or nonjury trial, and final judgment.” In other words, the District Court and the parties treated Brown's § 2255 motion as a civil matter that could be tried by the Magistrate Judge with the District Court's approval and the parties' consent.

On July 15, 2011, the Magistrate Judge, without an evidentiary hearing, entered an order denying Brown's § 2255 motion on the ground that the motion failed to state a basis for granting relief; he also denied Brown's motion for reconsideration.⁶ Brown timely appealed both rulings, Appeal No. 11–15149.

On November 28, 2011, Brown, citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir.2001), which held that “the consensual delegation of § 2255 motions to magistrate judges violates Article III of the Constitution,” id. at 372, moved the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), to vacate as void his order denying Brown's § 2255 motion. In Johnston, the Fifth Circuit concluded that § 2255 is a civil matter for purposes of § 636(c), which necessitated the determination of whether delegating a § 2255 motion to a magistrate judge violates Article III. 258 F.3d at 363–372.⁷ The Government responded to Brown's Rule 60(b)(4) motion with a statement requesting the Magistrate Judge to consider the merits of Brown's motion. The Magistrate Judge denied the motion, citing a lack of controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent and the fact that his decision on the merits of Brown's § 2255 motion was pending appeal. Implicitly, the Magistrate Judge's denial was a statement that the District Court's reference of the § 2255 motion for final judgment was not in error—i.e., that a § 2255 proceeding is a civil matter and that a magistrate judge's entry of final judgment disposing of the litigation does not violate Article III. Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge issued a certificate of appealability on the question:

Whether consensual delegation of a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to a United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) violates Article III of the Constitution?

This constitutional question is before us in Brown's second appeal, Appeal No. 12–10293.

Whether we reach the merits of Brown's first appeal depends on the outcome of this second appeal. In addressing the second appeal, “[w]e are mindful of the doctrine that a federal court should not pass on federal constitutional issues unless necessary to its decision.” Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. Harris Cnty., Ga., 89 F.3d 1481, 1486 n. 9 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”)); see also Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”). Therefore, before deciding whether Article III prohibited the Magistrate Judge from entering final judgment on Brown's § 2255 motion, we must considerwhether 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) permits a magistrate judge to enter judgment in the first instance. As we conclude in part III, infra, it does not.

II.

To provide context for our analysis of the issues presented by Brown's appeals, we first describe the creation and development of the magistrate system. This part is divided into five subparts: subpart A recounts the history of the precursor to the magistrate system—the commissioner system; subpart B details the 1968 Federal Magistrates Act; subpart C describes the Supreme Court's decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974), which curtailed the use of magistrates, as well as Congress's response to the Wingo decision; subpart D outlines the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 and the ancillary changes Congress has made to the magistrate system since that statute's enactment; finally, subpart E synthesizes the previous subparts to describe the Article I power Congress exercised in establishing the magistrate system.

A.

Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 4, 1 Stat. 333, 334, Congress granted circuit court judges ⁸ the power to authorize “one or more discreet persons learned in the law” to admit arrestees to bail in any federal criminal case, with the exception of capital cases.⁹ In 1812, Congress provided circuit courts with authority to allow such “discreet persons” to take affidavits in civil cases and to receive fees for such services. Act of Feb. 20, 1812, ch. 25, §§ 1–2, 2 Stat. 679, 679–82. In 1817, the “discreet persons” were given the title commissioner of the circuit court and the authority to take depositions in civil cases. Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 30, 3 Stat. 350, 350.

Over the next seventy years, Congress expanded the commissioners' authority to include “all the powers that any justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any of the United States may now exercise in respect to offenders for any crime or offense against the United States, by arresting,imprisoning, and bailing the same,” ¹⁰ certain proceedings in admiralty,¹¹ in bankruptcy,¹² and in civil rights,¹³ as well as other case matters.¹⁴

In 1891, Congress established the courts of appeals, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826–27, and soon thereafter abolished the circuit courts' commissioners, replacing them with United States Commissioners, who were appointed by the district courts, Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 252, § 19, 29 Stat. 140, 184. These commissioners, like the circuit court commissioners, were paid according to a fee schedule and performed the same duties those commissioners had performed, but they served a limited term of four years and were prohibited from holding other federal positions, civil or military. Id. §§ 19–20, 29 Stat. at 184. These commissioners were not Article III judges—they lacked life tenure and undiminishable salaries—and thus could not exercise the “judicial Power” of Article III.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, Congress began to expand the commissioners' jurisdiction over petty offenses. At first, commissioners were authorized to hear and determine certain minor offenses in specific federal areas, such as territories,¹⁵ federal highways,¹⁶ and national parks.¹⁷ Then in 1940, Congress granted commissioners jurisdiction to try and sentence...