Brown v. United States
Decision Date | 14 April 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 5846-5848.,5846-5848. |
Citation | 83 F.2d 383 |
Parties | BROWN et al. v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Harold Simandl and George R. Sommer, both of Newark, N.J., for appellants.
William F. Smith, of Trenton, N.J., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and AVIS, District Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury upon an indictment charging that the defendants "did willfully, knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously receive and conceal and facilitate the transportation and concealment of a quantity of narcotic drugs" fraudulently imported into the United States in violation of the "Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act," 21 U.S.C.A. § 174.
The question raised in this case concerns the propriety of the admission of evidence obtained in a search of a dwelling house authorized by an admittedly invalid search warrant.
On November 9, 1934, Frederick W. Morris, a secret service agent, upon an affidavit made by him obtained a search warrant from United States Commissioner Holland to search a frame dwelling house located at 737 Clinton avenue in the city of Newark, N. J. Ten days later, November 19, 1934, Morris, accompanied by secret service agent Sullivan; narcotic agents E. A. Feimster, William Schlossberg, and J. C. Peiper; and by state detectives Henry Morganroth and Frank Hill, searched the premises. The following day Morris made his return on the search warrant as follows:
Before the trial on motion of defendants' counsel to quash the search warrant, and suppress the evidence, the court, with the consent of the government, quashed the search warrant, but refused to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was obtained as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Was the search made and the evidence obtained as an incident to a lawful arrest or under the authority of the search warrant? The government insists that the search was not made and the evidence obtained by virtue of the search warrant. Morris testified at the trial that he rang the bell of the house; that Mrs. Gillman, mother of Lillian Brown, came to the door and he said to her, "We are officers," and then after agent Feimster had gone into the house ahead of him, he told her that he had a search warrant; that while he was talking to her a woman ran from a room on the right toward the rear and entered a room there; that Feimster ran after her and after talking with her a "couple of moments" said: "Here's Lil Brown here." Morris then instructed Feimster to take her into the living room, and he subsequently arrested her. It is the government's contention that the evidence was obtained as an incident to this arrest. But on the day following the search, November 20, 1934, when the evidence was obtained, Morris, who made the affidavit on which the warrant was issued, made a sworn return to the search warrant in which, in addition to what is stated above, he said:
The concealment and transportation of the property inventoried and mentioned above constituted the crime for which the appellants were indicted. Knowledge of this crime was obtained by the invalid search warrant.
Feimster said that while agent Morris was talking to Mrs. Gillman, he saw some one run toward the rear of the house and he rushed by Mrs. Gillman and ran back to the rear of the house "to see what Mrs. Brown was doing."
Morganroth said:
He further testified as follows:
Mrs. Gillman testified as follows:
It is evident that the government officers entered the dwelling under the guise of having a legal search warrant. Morris said: "I do swear that the above inventory (the evidence in question) contains a true and detailed account of the property taken by me on the warrant." When the search warrant was quashed, as it should have been, the evidence which Morris swore he obtained "by making the search as within directed" by the warrant should have been suppressed.
The officers had no warrant for the arrest of Lillian Brown or any one else in the house which the warrant authorized Morris to search. The government tries to justify the failure to suppress the evidence and its admission on the theory that Feimster rushed by Mrs. Gillman and...
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