Brown v. United States
| Decision Date | 10 May 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. LR-71-C-78.,LR-71-C-78. |
| Citation | 342 F. Supp. 987 |
| Parties | Levon BROWN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
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John T. Lavey, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff.
Robert J. Brown, Chief Deputy Pros. Atty., Pulaski County, Little Rock, Ark., for Monroe Love and O. A. Allen.
James H. Rhodes, Asst. U. S. Atty., E. D. Ark., for United States.
This is an action brought by Levon Brown, an inmate of the Federal Correctional Institution at Sandstone, Minnesota, against the United States, Monroe Love, Sheriff of Pulaski County, Arkansas, and O. A. Allen, a subordinate of Love and generally referred to as the Head Jailer of Pulaski County. The purpose of the suit is to recover pecuniary damages which plaintiff claims to have sustained as a result of episodes which occurred in the Pulaski County Jail in Little Rock, Arkansas, during the period from January 4, 1969, to about April 14 of that year in which Brown was confined in the jail as a federal prisoner in the actual custody of the Sheriff and his subordinates in charge of the jail.1
The complaint, as amended, alleges diversity of citizenship between Brown, on the one hand, and the individual defendants, on the other hand. The amount of his demand is $50,000. Jurisdiction of the claim against the Government is based on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346, and to some extent on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a). Jurisdiction of the claim against the individual defendants is based upon diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332, and on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3), read in connection with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Plaintiff is represented by capable counsel appointed by the Court after the defendants had answered the original complaint as first amended.
All of the defendants deny liability. The cause has been tried to the Court, and this memorandum incorporates the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Historical facts of the case are not seriously disputed.
Brown and another individual, Clincy, were brought to Little Rock by Deputy United States Marshals from Omaha, Nebraska, in January 1969. The party arrived in Little Rock about 7:00 P.M. on Saturday, January 4, 1969, and plaintiff and his fellow were duly incarcerated in the jail which at that time was concededly overcrowded and understaffed. They were assigned initially to a common cell or "bull pen" on the second floor of the Jail which was already occupied by a substantial number of other prisoners, most of them being local men being held in jail awaiting trial on various and sundry State charges. They remained in that cell, along with other inmates, from January 4 until March 19 when they were placed in a smaller cell.
During that period of time Brown and Clincy were twice unlawfully assaulted and beaten by State prisoners. Additionally, in February Brown and Clincy were involved in a confrontation between inmates of the second floor and jail employees who had occasion to use tear gas to compel the inmates to leave their sleeping quarters and go into the so-called "day room." Plaintiff came into contact with some of the gas, and he claims that it caused him to develop a rash on his hands and injured his eyes.
The claim of Brown against the Government and his claim against the individual defendants necessarily overlap. He claims that Sheriff Love and Jailer Allen were guilty of negligence in placing him in a crowded cell without providing any protection against assaults from other inmates, and he claims that the Government, as well as the individual defendants, are liable on account of the alleged negligence of the latter. As to the Government he claims further that Government personnel were guilty of negligence in permitting him to be confined in an institution when they knew or should have known that he would be confined under conditions dangerous to his life or safety and without adequate protective safeguards. Going still further, plaintiff charges that his being confined as he was was not only negligent but was also violative of rights guaranteed to him by the Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
All of the defendants make common cause in denying that plaintiff's confinement in the Jail was characterized, attended or tainted by any negligence, misfeasance, or malfeasance, and all take issue with him as to damages. The individual defendants contend that plaintiff's own negligence or misconduct proximately caused or contributed to his alleged injuries, and they plead that in any event his claim against them is barred by the applicable Arkansas statute of limitations. The Government alleges as a separate defense that the individual defendants were independent contractors, and that the Government is not responsible for their negligence or misconduct.2
Whether the plaintiff's claims be bottomed on the Constitution itself, including amendments thereto, or on the Torts Claims Act, or on 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, or on the common law, the burden is upon him to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged injuries and damages were proximately caused by negligence or culpable conduct on the part of those having him in charge, and it is also incumbent upon him to prove the nature and extent of his damages.
Taking up first the question of damages, although plaintiff contends that the assaults and the affair of the tear gas of which he complains seriously and perhaps permanently injured him, that claim is refuted by the undisputed evidence in the case. The Court finds that while the two assaults and his exposure to the tear gas undoubtedly caused him some physical pain and perhaps mental anguish, he was not seriously or permanently injured and is not now under any physical disability attributable to the events that occurred while he was in jail in Little Rock. He has had no medical or hospital expenses; he has lost no time from work or any earnings. There is no evidence that his injuries were the result of any malice or intentional or oppressive conduct on the part of either of the individual defendants or on the part of any agent of the Government.
In such circumstances it is clear that this case would in no event justify an award of any large sum of money; and, indeed, any small sum awarded to plaintiff might be considered somewhat nominal. However, it is necessary to consider the questions of liability presented by the record.
The case is complicated by a number of factors which should be mentioned. Plaintiff is seeking to impose liability not only upon the Government but upon the individual defendants as well. His claim against the Government must have a federal basis; his claim against the individual defendants is based on both federal and State law. The claim against the Government is based in part on alleged conduct of salaried Government agents and employees and in part on the alleged conduct on the part of the individual defendants and their subordinates at the Jail. And there is a controversy over whether the Government would be responsible for actionable misconduct on the part of jail personnel who actually are employees of Pulaski County, hired by the Sheriff and paid out of funds appropriated by the Quorum Court of Pulaski County.
In view of those complicating factors, it may be helpful to look at underlying statutes and well established legal principles.
Section 1331(a) of 28 U.S.C.A. provides that the District Courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. It is clear that this statute is a purely jurisdictional statute and does not create any substantive cause of action.
Section 1332(a) of 28 U.S.C.A. is also a jurisdictional statute. It gives the District Courts original jurisdiction of civil actions in which the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, is more than $10,000, and where diversity of citizenship exists between the parties.
In connection with both of those sections the Court finds that the amount in controversy in this case is in excess of $10,000 if judged by plaintiff's demand, and that there is diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff, on one hand, and the individual defendants, on the other hand. To the extent that the claim of plaintiff against the individual defendants is based on diversity of citizenship, the rights of the parties are governed by the substantive law of the State of Arkansas.
Section 1343(3) of 28 U.S.C.A. vests the District Courts with jurisdiction of civil cases brought to redress the deprivation under color of State law of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States.
Section 1346(b) of 28 U.S.C.A. gives the District Courts jurisdiction of suits brought against the Government under the Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act provides substantially that the United States shall be liable, subject to certain exceptions, for tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C.A., §§ 2674 and 2680.
Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C.A., states that every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 4042 of 18 U.S.C.A. provides that the Federal Bureau of...
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