Brown v. United States

• Decision Date: 26 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-1136C,16-1136C
• Parties: JEFFREY BROWN, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

JEFFREY BROWN, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 16-1136C

United States Court of Federal Claims

April 26, 2017

ORIGINAL

(Pro Se)

Keywords: Pro Se Complaint; Asset Forfeiture; Rules of the Court of Federal Claims 12(b)(1); Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Jeffrey Brown, pro se, Fairfax, VA.

William J. Grimaldi, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom were Brian A. Mizoguchi, Assistant Director, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

OPINION AND ORDER

KAPLAN, Judge.

The pro se plaintiff in this case, Jeffrey Brown, filed a complaint in this Court on September 14, 2016. Mr. Brown claims that he is entitled to funds that the United States Attorney's Office in Massachusetts has allegedly obtained through criminal and civil forfeiture in connection with a financial crime. The government has moved to dismiss Mr. Brown's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, the government's motion is GRANTED, and Mr. Brown's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND¹

I. The Relevant Criminal and Civil Proceedings

In the mid-2000s, Mr. Brown was the victim of a fraudulent investment scheme. See Compl. at 1-2, Docket No. 1; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (Def.'s Mot.) App. at DA3-10,Docket No. 5. In 2013, the perpetrators of the scheme either pleaded guilty or were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on wire fraud, mail fraud, racketeering, and other charges. Def.'s Mot. at 2-3.

Soon thereafter, on June 11, 2013, Mr. Brown obtained a default judgment against the perpetrators in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 3-4. The district court awarded Mr. Brown damages in the amount of $10,925,000 based on allegations of fraud, civil conspiracy, and civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. See id.

Also in June 2013, the government instituted forfeiture proceedings in the criminal case against the perpetrators in the District of Massachusetts.² Id. at 4. Mr. Brown had already filed a third-party claim in that case, and he objected to the government's forfeiture proceedings, asserting that any orders of forfeiture issued by the District of Massachusetts would be deemed invalid based on the "Civil Money Judgment[]" he had been awarded by the Eastern District of Virginia. Id.; see also Def.'s Mot. App. at DA 19-20.

In October 2013, the District of Massachusetts sentenced the perpetrators to prison and issued monetary judgments against them. See Def.'s Mot. at 5. The judgments included a restitution order in the amount of $5,222,757.16 to be paid to the victims of the scheme, including $978,325 to be paid to Mr. Brown. Id.; see also Judgment in a Criminal Case at 6-7, United States v. Gilner, No. 10-cr-10199 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2013), ECF No. 205. Any payment that was not a payment in full was to be "divided proportionately" among the named victims of the scheme. Judgment, United States v. Gilner, No. 10-cr-10199, at 9. The court also ordered forfeiture of the perpetrators' assets in the same amount. See id.

To date, however, the government asserts that it has obtained just $42,000 in forfeited assets. See Def.'s Mot. at 6-7. Further, the district court in Massachusetts has since denied a motion Mr. Brown filed asking that court to "adjudicate the validity of [his] interest in [the perpetrators'] property/assets," reasoning that Mr. Brown is merely "an unsecured general judgment creditor" with respect to the perpetrators. Id. at 5-6 (first alteration in original); see also Docket Entry, United States v. Gilner, No. 10-cr-10199 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2016), Docket No. 253. As a consequence, the court observed, "[t]o the degree [that he] seeks some form of 'restitution,' his recourse would appear to be by apetition directed to the Attorney General for restoration."³ Def.'s Mot. at 6 (first alteration in original); see also Docket Entry, United States v. Gilner, No. 10-cr-10199 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2016), Docket No. 253 (citing United States v. Watkins, 320 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2000)).

II. This Action

Mr. Brown filed his complaint in this Court on September 14, 2016. Docket No. 1. He claims that his action "involves Constitutional charges, grounds, [and] questions," and that he is "challeng[ing] the Constitutional violations of state and federal law, procedure and practice by state and federal officials and officers of Courts." Compl. ¶ 9. Further, he claims that he "brings [his] action through [the] civil RICO statute."⁴ Id.

Although the complaint's factual allegations are somewhat difficult to parse, Mr. Brown appears to believe that the government has seized additional assets from the perpetrators of the fraud but has not sold those assets or paid out funds in restitution to the victims. See Compl. at 2-4, 14. He thus alleges that "[t]o the date of this filing apparently no restitution has been released to any of the victims in [the District of Massachusetts] case." Id. at 2 ¶ 7.

Further, Mr. Brown asserts "[t]hat there needs to be Discovery along with dates when any funds were returned to any of the victims to correct balances." Id. at 2 ¶ 8. To that end, his complaint lists various assets that he believes were owned by the scheme's perpetrators and that he appears to allege the government has seized or obtained through forfeiture. Id. at 3-4. He requests, among other things, that the government "explain what happened to [the] seized, forfeited, [or] frozen assets."⁵ Id. at 3. His complaint also contains an allegation stating that "[t]he Freedom of Information Act should be Ordered to obtain what happened to all assets in the Government []Prosecutor['s] Control[]." Id. at 2 ¶ 7.

Mr. Brown requests an award of $30,000,000 in damages, including "monetary, personal, [and] punitive" damages, as well as "injunctive and specific performance relief." Id. at 14. He further requests that the Court order "[t]he Government, Department of Justice, Victims Restitution office, [etc. . . .], to contact the [v]ictims and to [c]ommunicate with them [about] when they will receive [their] restitution funds." Id. He also asks for "an Order from this Court to stop prosecutors from holding assets for their own gain." Id.

The government has moved to dismiss Mr. Brown's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1). Docket No. 5. Mr. Brown filed a document titled "Amended Complaint with Clarification of Language [and] Peti[ti]oner Brown['s] Objection to Respondent[']s Answers," Docket No. 7, which the Court treated as a response to the government's motion, see Order, Docket No. 6. The government has filed a reply in support of its motion. Docket No. 8.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court accepts as true all undisputed facts in the pleadings and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." RCFC 12(h)(3); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). The court may "inquire into jurisdictional facts" to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

It is well established that complaints that are filed by pro se plaintiffs, like this one, are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, even pro se plaintiffs must persuade the court that jurisdictional requirements have been met. Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499, aff'd, 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Pursuant to the Tucker Act, the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to "render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2012). The Tucker Act serves as a waiver of sovereign immunity and a jurisdictional grant, but it does not create a substantive cause of action. Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). To invoke the Court's Tucker Act jurisdiction, a plaintiff must therefore establish that "a separate source of substantive law . . . creates the right to money damages." Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part)). In other words, the plaintiff must identify a statute or provision of law that is "substantively money-mandating." McHenry v. United States, 367 F.3d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)).

Further, the Court of Federal Claims has only limited power to provide equitable relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). Specifically, as relevant here, the Court of Federal Claims lacks the power to grant equitable relief unless such relief is "an incident of and collateral to a money judgment." James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) ("To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States.").

II. Application of Standards to Mr....