Brown v. Univ. of N.C. Health Care Sys.
| Decision Date | 11 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-CV-0086 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | TAMMY BROWN, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, Defendant. |
In this employment discrimination case, Defendant University of North Carolina Health Care System ("UNC Health") moves to dismiss Plaintiff Tammy Brown's amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11.) Brown has responded in opposition. (Doc. 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted and the amended complaint will be dismissed.
The facts alleged in the current complaint, taken in the light most favorable to Brown, show the following:
Brown — a black woman — has been employed by UNC Health since January 2008. (Doc. 9 ¶ 6.) Her current position is Patients Account Manager for the Financial Counseling Team. (Id. ¶ 7.) Throughout her employment with UNC Health, Brown has consistently exceeded performance expectations and has regularly accepted responsibilities additional to those of her primary role, generally without commensurate compensation. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 15-16.) Brown alleges that, since 2014, UNC Health has subjected her to multiple forms of discriminatory conduct. (See id. ¶¶ 9-64.)
In September 2014, Brown learned that her salary was significantly lower than that of others in her same job class. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) At the time, Brown was the only black female in that class. (Id. ¶ 11.) Ten months later, after her supervisors advocated on her behalf, Brown received a pay increase to remedy the deficiency, but the increase was retroactive only to January 2015, unlike Caucasian co-workers in the same job class who received their increases in 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.)
Between 2016 and 2018, Brown applied for, but did not receive, multiple promotions. In March 2016, she applied for the positions of Executive Director, Patient Access and Executive Director, Pre-Services. (Id. ¶¶ 21-25.) While she was interviewed for both jobs, she did not receive either, and the Executive Director, Patient Access position was ultimately given to a less-qualified white applicant. (Id. ¶¶ 22-27, 36.) Then, in September 2016, she applied for the position of Director, Patient Access-Revenue Cycle Management. (Id. ¶ 32.) She did not receive an interview for that position, and her application disappeared from the online application portal. (Id. ¶ 33.) In March 2017, Brown again applied for the Executive Director, Patient Access position, butwas never interviewed. (Id. ¶ 36.) And in April 2018, she applied for the job of Director, Patient Access Medicaid but, again, was not interviewed. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.)
Between 2017 and 2018, Brown was promised multiple promotions which never came to fruition. First, in January 2017, Vice President MaryAnn Minsley told Brown that she would be promoted to Director of Financial Counseling. (Id. ¶ 34.) Before the promotion was finalized, however, Brown's team transitioned to a new reporting structure.1 (See id. ¶ 35.) Then, in June 2017, Vice President Steven Rinaldi told Brown that she would be promoted to a Director position by the end of the summer. (Id. ¶ 37.) However, Brown heard nothing and by October Rinaldi failed to respond to emails about it. (Id. ¶ 38.) In March 2018, Brown's Executive Director, Danielle Reese, who is black, informed her that she wanted her to serve as the Interim Director for Medicaid and Financial Assistance. (Id. ¶ 40.) Within a few days, though, Reese rescinded the opportunity because it was "too political." (Id. ¶ 42.) Later, Reese offered Brown a promotion to Director of Financial Counseling, and in August 2018 Reese provided her with the expected salary for the position. (Id. ¶¶ 46-48.) Brown indicated, based on the salaries of other UNC Health Director-level positions, that she believed the salary was too low. (Id.¶ 49.) She ultimately did not receive the position and later learned that she was considered to have rejected the offer. (See Doc. 16-3 at 4.)
On September 12, 2018, Reese hired her personal friend, Yolanda Banks, who is black, as a Manager for Financial Counseling. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 53, 55.) Brown filed a formal internal complaint regarding the hiring decision, claiming that Banks, who was significantly less experienced than Brown, received the position due to her friendship with Reese. (Id. ¶¶ 53-58.) When Reese learned of the formal complaint, she began treating Brown differently. (Id. ¶ 59.) Reese "became very short" with Brown, cut off daily communications with her, regularly changed locations for meetings with her at the last minute, and listed other UNC Health Directors with less experience than her as initial points of contact in her absence. (Id. ¶¶ 60-62.) Brown understood Reese to be retaliating against her for having filed her internal complaint. (Id. ¶ 59.)
In March 2019, Brown submitted an initial inquiry form to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Doc. 16-2.) Based on her submission, the EEOC drafted a charge of discrimination. (Doc. 16-1; Doc. 16 at 11.) The charge alleged that on November 30, 2018, Brown applied for the position of Director for Financial Counseling and on February 19, 2019, she learned that a less-qualified white applicant, Jennifer Headen,was selected. (Doc. 16-1.) On April 26, 2019, Brown digitally signed the charge, and on August 15, 2019, the EEOC issued her a Right to Sue letter which advised her of her right to bring suit on her claim within 90 days. (Id.; Doc. 9 ¶ 66.)
On November 12, 2019, Brown filed an application and order extending the time to file a complaint in North Carolina Superior Court in Orange County, North Carolina, and on December 3, 2019, filed suit in that court. (Doc. 1-1; Doc. 3.) UNC Health timely removed the action to this court (Doc. 1), and Brown filed an amended complaint (Doc. 9). Brown brings two claims against UNC Health for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2020) ("Title VII"): she claims, first, that UNC Health subjected her to discrimination on the basis of her race; and second, that it retaliated against her for engaging in protected activities.2 (Id. ¶¶ 67-79.) UNC Health now moves to dismiss both claims. (Doc. 11.) The motion is fully briefed and ready for decision. (See Docs. 12, 16, 18.)
UNC Health first seeks dismissal of Brown's claims on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(2). (Doc. 12 at 30—32.)
"The Fourth Circuit has not conclusively established whether a dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) or for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." Mary's House, Inc. v. North Carolina, 976 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696-97 (M.D.N.C. 2013) (citing Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524-25 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000)). This court, like others in the Fourth Circuit, has considered Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1) and will do so here. See Blackburn v. Trs. of Guilford Tech. Cmty. Coll., 822 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542 n.2 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (collecting cases); McCants v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 251 F. Supp. 3d 952, 954-55 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (same).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction raises the question of "whether [the plaintiff] has a right to be in the district court at all and whether the court has the power to hear and dispose of [the] claim." McCants, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 955 (alterations in original) (quoting Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452 (4th Cir. 2012)). While a plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant who raises the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to that immunity. Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014).
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. This prohibits a private citizen from suing a state in federal court for money damages. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844 (4th Cir. 2003). This prohibition extends to suits against any state agency that is considered an arm of the state. See Blackburn, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 542-43 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997)). State-funded colleges and universities structured to have close ties to the state are considered "arms of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Id. (citations and alterations omitted); see also Diede v. UNC Healthcare, No. 5:16-CV-00788-BR, 2018 WL 549430, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2018) (). However, there are exceptions. For example, Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity through the enactment of legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it did in enacting Title VII. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see also Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 275 (4th Cir. 2018) ().
Although UNC Health acknowledges that Congress has abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in relation to Title VII claims, it contends that Brown is required to affirmatively plead that sovereign immunity has been abrogated in order for the court to exercise jurisdiction.3 (Doc. 12 at 31-32.) This argument is not supported by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(1) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain...
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